Google Groups no longer supports new Usenet posts or subscriptions. Historical content remains viewable.
Dismiss

Jewish ideas and philosophy insular?

6 views
Skip to first unread message

Claire Petersky

unread,
Oct 25, 2003, 10:35:08 PM10/25/03
to
Do you think that Jewish thinkers and teachers have been insular over the
last couple of millennia -- generally only drawing on the Jewish
tradition -- or do you think they have been influenced from time to time on
the other cultures surrounding them?

If you think they've been influenced, do have positive examples? (By
positive examples, I mean where Jewish tradition has picked up something
constructive or useful for Jews or for the larger culture.)

Thank you for considering this question.

Warm Regards,

Claire Petersky
Please replace earthlink for mouse-potato and .net for .com

Home of the meditative cyclist:
http://home.earthlink.net/~cpetersky/Welcome.htm

Books just wanna be FREE! See what I mean at:
http://bookcrossing.com/friend/Cpetersky

Tsatske

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 1:25:13 AM10/26/03
to
Hi Claire,

I think Jewish thought in every century and culture is a reflection of Jews'
place in that period. In times where Jews were respectable and relatively
integrated members of society, Jewish thinkers were likewise open to outside
influences. Examples, Philon of Alexandria (Hellenic influences), Maimonides
(Aristo and Arab influences), American Jewish thinkers. In times where Jews
were insulated from the rest of society and faced with widespread contempt,
Jewish thought was insular, never more so that in 17th-18th century Eastern
Europe.
-----------
az got vet mikh derfreyen, vel ikh oykh mitn tokhes drayen.

"Claire Petersky" wrote :

Harry Weiss

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 1:31:52 AM10/26/03
to
Claire Petersky <cpet...@mouse-potato.com> wrote:
> Do you think that Jewish thinkers and teachers have been insular over the
> last couple of millennia -- generally only drawing on the Jewish
> tradition -- or do you think they have been influenced from time to time on
> the other cultures surrounding them?

> If you think they've been influenced, do have positive examples? (By
> positive examples, I mean where Jewish tradition has picked up something
> constructive or useful for Jews or for the larger culture.)

Maimonedes was heavily influenced by Artistotelean philosphy and Arab
philsophy. The various gaonim were heavily influenced by Arab culture and
much of what both of the above wrote was in Arabic.

Rabbi Solevitichik was heavily influenced by some of the more modern
philosphers.

Jewish thinkers frequently took the outside though process and applied it
better explain the Torah.


> Thank you for considering this question.

> Warm Regards,

> Claire Petersky
> Please replace earthlink for mouse-potato and .net for .com

> Home of the meditative cyclist:
> http://home.earthlink.net/~cpetersky/Welcome.htm

> Books just wanna be FREE! See what I mean at:
> http://bookcrossing.com/friend/Cpetersky


--
Harry J. Weiss
hjw...@panix.com

Creedmoor Chronicles

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 9:28:43 AM10/26/03
to
"Harry Weiss" <hjw...@panix.com> wrote in message

The various gaonim were heavily influenced by Arab culture and
> much of what both of the above wrote was in Arabic.

Yehoram Gaon was more influenced by Spain (Ladino) than by Arabia.

IS


dustbird

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 1:08:47 PM10/26/03
to

"Claire Petersky" <cpet...@mouse-potato.com> wrote in message
news:bnfbss$6a1$1...@falcon.steinthal.us...

> Do you think that Jewish thinkers and teachers have been insular over the
> last couple of millennia -- generally only drawing on the Jewish
> tradition -- or do you think they have been influenced from time to time
on
> the other cultures surrounding them?
>
> If you think they've been influenced, do have positive examples? (By
> positive examples, I mean where Jewish tradition has picked up something
> constructive or useful for Jews or for the larger culture.)
>
> Thank you for considering this question.
>
> Warm Regards,
>
> Claire Petersky

Well, I'm not jewish, but I've been kind of puzzled by this: Ibin
Warraq, whom I think says he is an athiest, in his book Why I Am Not A
Muslim (1995) says that Zorastriaism, an Iranian religion, has influenced
Judaism. Some of the parallels he points out (pp.44-45) are:

1. Isa 40-48 and the Zoroastrian hymn Gatha 44.3-5. In both, G-d created
light and darkness.

2. Ahura Mazda, the supreme lord, exercises creative power through his Holy
Spirit - Spenta Mainyu - and governs the universe through angels and
archangels.

3. Ahura Mazda makes his revelation and gives his commandments to Zoraster
on a mountain.

4. The Zoroastrian purification laws, in particular those concerned with
removing impurity produced by contact with unclean or dead matter, are as
elaborate as in the Levitical code.

5. The six periods of creation parallel the six days of creation.

6. Mankind is descend from a single couple, Mashya (man) and Mashyana
(woman).

7. After mankind is depopulated by a winter, except in the enclosure of "the
blessed Yima," the erarth is repopulated by two of each kind.

8. The three sons of Yima's successor Thraetaona inherit the earth, and
correspond to Shem, Ham and Japheth.

These parallels cause me to wonder if Jews just made up their theology by
selectively borrowing and improvising
from outside sources. However, I also wonder if there any any possibility
that Jewish traditions could have been the source of the Zorastrian
parallels? Warraq doesn't address this, so far as I have read.

Steve Goldfarb

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 2:17:13 PM10/26/03
to
In <bnh0ra$a...@library1.airnews.net> "dustbird" <dust...@cross.wind> writes:

> Well, I'm not jewish, but I've been kind of puzzled by this: Ibin
>Warraq, whom I think says he is an athiest, in his book Why I Am Not A
>Muslim (1995) says that Zorastriaism, an Iranian religion, has influenced
>Judaism. Some of the parallels he points out (pp.44-45) are:

It's certainly a possibility that these concepts were invented once by
some clever guy, presumably Zoroaster or Moses, and that the other guy
knew of it and stole it. However, given the content in the interests of
intellectual honesty you have to at least allow for the possibility that
what they claim is true. If so, then it makes perfect sense that two
different religious would have similar creation stories, wouldn't it?

After all, if either Zoroastrianism or Judaism is correct and all humanity
descends from Adam, etc., etc., then wouldn't you expect that this
information might have been passed down to descendents of Adam (or Noah)
who were not the ancestors of the Jews? (or Zoroastrians?)

I don't think that Judaism claims that the whole story was revealed
uniquely to Jews at Mount Sinai -- to the contrary, I think it's clear
that some of the details must have been "out there" all along -- IIRC the
story goes that Adam lived almost to the time of Noah, and that all of the
people of Noah's generation would have known his story. Presumably Ham and
Japeth didn't magically forget it, and probably would have told their
children.

So it would actually be expected that other religions would have similar
details -- not that they stole it from Judaism, but if the stories are
true then they would have had a tradition of them as well.

--sg

>1. Isa 40-48 and the Zoroastrian hymn Gatha 44.3-5. In both, G-d created
>light and darkness.

>2. Ahura Mazda, the supreme lord, exercises creative power through his Holy
>Spirit - Spenta Mainyu - and governs the universe through angels and
>archangels.

>3. Ahura Mazda makes his revelation and gives his commandments to Zoraster
>on a mountain.

>4. The Zoroastrian purification laws, in particular those concerned with
>removing impurity produced by contact with unclean or dead matter, are as
>elaborate as in the Levitical code.

>5. The six periods of creation parallel the six days of creation.

>6. Mankind is descend from a single couple, Mashya (man) and Mashyana
>(woman).

>7. After mankind is depopulated by a winter, except in the enclosure of "the
>blessed Yima," the erarth is repopulated by two of each kind.

>8. The three sons of Yima's successor Thraetaona inherit the earth, and
>correspond to Shem, Ham and Japheth.

> These parallels cause me to wonder if Jews just made up their theology by
>selectively borrowing and improvising
>from outside sources. However, I also wonder if there any any possibility
>that Jewish traditions could have been the source of the Zorastrian
>parallels? Warraq doesn't address this, so far as I have read.

--
---------------------------------------
Steve Goldfarb Eppur si muove
s...@stevegoldfarb.com (and still, it moves)
http://stevegoldfarb.com/ - Galileo

Herman Rubin

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 3:43:47 PM10/26/03
to
In article <bnfbss$6a1$1...@falcon.steinthal.us>,

Claire Petersky <cpet...@mouse-potato.com> wrote:
>Do you think that Jewish thinkers and teachers have been insular over the
>last couple of millennia -- generally only drawing on the Jewish
>tradition -- or do you think they have been influenced from time to time on
>the other cultures surrounding them?

>If you think they've been influenced, do have positive examples? (By
>positive examples, I mean where Jewish tradition has picked up something
>constructive or useful for Jews or for the larger culture.)

Maimonides was certainly influenced by the Christian
version of Aristotle's philosophy. Also, their discussions
on the afterlife are based far more on non-Jewish opinions
than those based on Biblical Judaism.

>Thank you for considering this question.

On the other hand, they have not adequately considered
modern secular knowledge, especially that of science,
history, and linguistics, and the insight they give
into the Torah.
--
This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views
are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University.
Herman Rubin, Department of Statistics, Purdue University
hru...@stat.purdue.edu Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558

Jim F.

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 5:11:02 PM10/26/03
to

"Harry Weiss" <hjw...@panix.com> wrote in message
news:bnflmp$m6h$1...@reader1.panix.com...

> Claire Petersky <cpet...@mouse-potato.com> wrote:
> > Do you think that Jewish thinkers and teachers have been insular over
the
> > last couple of millennia -- generally only drawing on the Jewish
> > tradition -- or do you think they have been influenced from time to time
on
> > the other cultures surrounding them?
>
> > If you think they've been influenced, do have positive examples? (By
> > positive examples, I mean where Jewish tradition has picked up something
> > constructive or useful for Jews or for the larger culture.)
>
> Maimonedes was heavily influenced by Artistotelean philosphy and Arab
> philsophy. The various gaonim were heavily influenced by Arab culture and
> much of what both of the above wrote was in Arabic.
>
> Rabbi Solevitichik was heavily influenced by some of the more modern
> philosophers.

There was also in the 19th century the German Jewish philosopher,
Hermann Cohen, who was a founder of the neo-Kantian Marburg
School who in addition to his expositions of the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant was known as a systematizer of Judaism as an
ethical monotheism. Indeed, he contended that Judaism constituted
the best example of a religion of reason, that is the kind of rational
religion that philosophers like Kant had looked forward to.

Important Jewish philosophers of the 20th century include
Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber who was a kind of
existentialist, and Emmanuel Levinas who early in his
career became known for his expositions of the ideas
of Husserl and Heidegger, later on sought to work out
a complete ethical philosophy and was also known
as a commentator on the Talmud.

In the US, Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan, the founder of
Reconstructionist Judaism, sought to create a
naturalistic theology based on John Dewey's
naturalistic pragmatism.

Jim F.

Micha Berger

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 5:57:57 PM10/26/03
to
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003 20:43:47 +0000 (UTC), Herman Rubin <hru...@stat.purdue.edu> wrote:
: Maimonides was certainly influenced by the Christian

: version of Aristotle's philosophy. Also, their discussions
: on the afterlife are based far more on non-Jewish opinions
: than those based on Biblical Judaism.

You misspelled "Moslem". Maimonides certainly had Averroes' version of
Aristotle, as can be seen by the neo-Platonic elements mixed in. Averroes
accidentally included Plotinus's work in his translation of Aristotle.
Plotinus's philosophy is neo-Platonism.

-mi

R

unread,
Oct 26, 2003, 8:40:15 PM10/26/03
to

And you see a lot of neo-Plotinism in Maimonedes' writings?

Jim F.

unread,
Oct 27, 2003, 2:41:42 AM10/27/03
to

"Micha Berger" <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote in message
news:bnhivt$11h46d$3...@ID-113975.news.uni-berlin.de...

Micha is certainly right about this. The lines of influence worked
almost the opposite of what Herman asserts. It was the
writings of the Muslim Aristotelians like Averroes and
the Rambam's own commentaries on Aristotle along
with his *The Guide for the Perplexed* that were to
eventually make a great impact on the Christian intellectual
world. Aquinas for example often liked to cite "Rabbi Moses",
in his own writings and had a more than passing familiarity
with "*The Guide*.

Jim F.

>
> -mi


Y. Macales

unread,
Oct 27, 2003, 8:22:10 AM10/27/03
to
"> These parallels cause me to wonder if Jews just made up their
theology by
> selectively borrowing and improvising
> from outside sources. However, I also wonder if there any any possibility
> that Jewish traditions could have been the source of the Zorastrian
> parallels? Warraq doesn't address this, so far as I have read.

As a "O" Jew, my view is that these others religions took the original
Torah and took and distorted various parts for themselves. I find it
interesting that there is an opinion that the "gifts" Avraham Avinu
gave to his sons from Ketura and who were sent to the East (book of
Genesis) were various "mystical" ideas and abilities, which in some
distorted form exist in Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions. I
saw on TV some time ago a film made in (pre-war) Iraq showing various
Shi'ite Muslim "holy men" apparently eating light bulbs and glass and
running themselves through with swords. If this is true and not some
magic trick, these abilities are some remnant of the powers that
Avaraham had and gave his sons and which has been lost among the
Jewish people today, although other things he left us are still going
strong (Torah, Hesed, Love of Eretz Israel, etc).

Micha Berger

unread,
Oct 27, 2003, 2:12:55 PM10/27/03
to
On Mon, 27 Oct 2003 01:40:15 +0000 (UTC), R <rut...@verizon.net> wrote:
:> You misspelled "Moslem". Maimonides certainly had Averroes' version of

:> Aristotle, as can be seen by the neo-Platonic elements mixed in. Averroes
:> accidentally included Plotinus's work in his translation of Aristotle.
:> Plotinus's philosophy is neo-Platonism.

: And you see a lot of neo-Plotinism in Maimonedes' writings?

(Neo-Platonism. The author, Plotinus, revived, made new, "neo-", much
of Plato's thought.)

Yes, obviously. Otherwise my comment makes little sense. So I assume you're
really asking for examples.

There is a strong similarity between the Rambam's understanding of "da'as"
(knowledge) and how it is a pre-requisite for prophecy and Plotinus's
conceptualization thereof.

He rejects voluntarism (that H' chose to create) for something akin to
Plato's emanation -- that creation is inherent in G-dhood. Nature is
described as a layer between divinity and man, one that the deserving
man can pierce. (Thus hashgachah peratis, providence for the individual
is earned.) Neither is an actual emanation model that you find in qabalah,
but they are more Plotinus than Aristotle.

The Rihal, in the Kuzari, or ibn Greirol (Meqor Chaim), are real
neoplatonists. The Rambam just shows a couple of influences.

-mi

--
Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness,
mi...@aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

ahaleva

unread,
Oct 27, 2003, 5:19:54 PM10/27/03
to
Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote in message news:<bnjq6a$11harb$1...@ID-113975.news.uni-berlin.de>...

> On Mon, 27 Oct 2003 01:40:15 +0000 (UTC), R <rut...@verizon.net> wrote:
> :> You misspelled "Moslem". Maimonides certainly had Averroes' version of
> :> Aristotle, as can be seen by the neo-Platonic elements mixed in. Averroes
> :> accidentally included Plotinus's work in his translation of Aristotle.
> :> Plotinus's philosophy is neo-Platonism.
>
> : And you see a lot of neo-Plotinism in Maimonedes' writings?
>
> (Neo-Platonism. The author, Plotinus, revived, made new, "neo-", much
> of Plato's thought.)
>
> Yes, obviously. Otherwise my comment makes little sense. So I assume you're
> really asking for examples.
>
> There is a strong similarity between the Rambam's understanding of "da'as"
> (knowledge) and how it is a pre-requisite for prophecy and Plotinus's
> conceptualization thereof.
>
> He rejects voluntarism (that H' chose to create) for something akin to
> Plato's emanation -- that creation is inherent in G-dhood. Nature is
> described as a layer between divinity and man, one that the deserving
> man can pierce. (Thus hashgachah peratis, providence for the individual
> is earned.) Neither is an actual emanation model that you find in qabalah,
> but they are more Plotinus than Aristotle.

To say M rejects God's absolute freedom of choice for some kind of
necessity (call it "inherence in Godhood" if you like) which governs
God in some way, violates both the plain statements of scripture and
M's various discussions of, inter alia, negative attributes.

I think you need to substantiate such a proposition, and have a tough
row to hoe indeed.

Ronnie

Micha Berger

unread,
Oct 28, 2003, 5:36:02 PM10/28/03
to
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003 22:11:02 +0000 (UTC), Jim F. <m...@privacy.net> wrote:
: There was also in the 19th century the German Jewish philosopher,

: Hermann Cohen, who was a founder of the neo-Kantian Marburg
: School who in addition to his expositions of the philosophy of
: Immanuel Kant was known as a systematizer of Judaism as an
: ethical monotheism...

R' JB Solovetichik's PhD thesis was on Cohen, so Cohen ended up having
much influence on American mod-O.

-mi

Micha Berger

unread,
Nov 1, 2003, 6:26:56 PM11/1/03
to
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003 19:17:13 +0000 (UTC), Steve Goldfarb <s...@panix.com> wrote:
: After all, if either Zoroastrianism or Judaism is correct and all humanity
: descends from Adam, etc., etc., then wouldn't you expect that this
: information might have been passed down to descendents of Adam (or Noah)
: who were not the ancestors of the Jews? (or Zoroastrians?)

Actually, I would. And most do have legends of a single ancestor. India
is an exception, because their legend system supports the cast system by
having different ancestors.

Also, nearly all societies have the notions of a week and a flood.

: So it would actually be expected that other religions would have similar

: details -- not that they stole it from Judaism, but if the stories are
: true then they would have had a tradition of them as well.

Well said. We shouldn't have a monopoly on every truth.

Gut Voch!
-mi

--
Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
mi...@aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (413) 403-9905 It is two who look in the same direction.

Micha Berger

unread,
Nov 1, 2003, 6:30:24 PM11/1/03
to
On Mon, 27 Oct 2003 13:22:10 +0000 (UTC), Y. Macales <yaakov_...@hotmail.com> wrote:
: As a "O" Jew, my view is that these others religions took the original

: Torah and took and distorted various parts for themselves. I find it
: interesting that there is an opinion that the "gifts" Avraham Avinu
: gave to his sons from Ketura and who were sent to the East (book of
: Genesis) were various "mystical" ideas and abilities, which in some
: distorted form exist in Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions...

There is also the Babylonian period, where prophets were considered
the intelligensia, the prize of the king's court. During those years
Jewish thought shaped that of the empire. Greek philosophy could well
have Jewish ancestry.

But even if not, then two studies of the same Truth ought to have overlap
anyway.

Micha Berger

unread,
Nov 17, 2003, 12:37:23 PM11/17/03
to
On Mon, 27 Oct 2003 22:19:54 +0000 (UTC), ahaleva <aha...@kaplangilman.com> wrote:
: To say M rejects God's absolute freedom of choice for some kind of

: necessity (call it "inherence in Godhood" if you like) which governs
: God in some way, violates both the plain statements of scripture and
: M's various discussions of, inter alia, negative attributes.

: I think you need to substantiate such a proposition, and have a tough
: row to hoe indeed.

M does reject the straight neo-Platonist emanation (or the Qabbalah's
"atzilus") of al Farabi and ibn Sina. However, in the Morah I:53 (M's
discussion of why Hashem can't really have attributes), he contrasts G-d
with beings that have free will, and between G-d and beings that "act"
in the normal sense of the word. And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of
the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
His essence".

There is still a reason why G-d is referred to as First Cause. See M's
whole discussion in ibid 69. Actually, M refers to G-d more often as
Nitzav (standing, ie static) than as Borei (Creator, employing a verb for
creation), in R' Qafeh's translation.

In any case, the row would be tough to hoe if Marvin Fox and Herbert
Davidson not done so first. I don't take their heretical views seriously,
but this much they did succeed in convincing me.

-mi

--
Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
mi...@aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and
http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (413) 403-9905 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

ahaleva

unread,
Nov 19, 2003, 9:32:10 AM11/19/03
to
Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote in message news:<bpb0ei$1mn8sh$1...@ID-113975.news.uni-berlin.de>...

> On Mon, 27 Oct 2003 22:19:54 +0000 (UTC), ahaleva <aha...@kaplangilman.com> wrote:
> : To say M rejects God's absolute freedom of choice for some kind of
> : necessity (call it "inherence in Godhood" if you like) which governs
> : God in some way, violates both the plain statements of scripture and
> : M's various discussions of, inter alia, negative attributes.
>
> : I think you need to substantiate such a proposition, and have a tough
> : row to hoe indeed.
>
> M does reject the straight neo-Platonist emanation (or the Qabbalah's
> "atzilus") of al Farabi and ibn Sina.

> However, in the Morah I:53 (M's
> discussion of why Hashem can't really have attributes), he contrasts G-d
> with beings that have free will, and between G-d and beings that "act"
> in the normal sense of the word.

And, so? You assert God has no free will? This violates M's numerous
statements about God. Precision and a well developed argument would
hep here. It is hard to comprehend your point. Cite the passage you
assert supports your idea, demonstrate it, etc.

> And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of
> the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
> panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
> the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
> His essence".

Wrong. The "known" is not the object, but the intellectual
representation of the object in a "knowers" mind. Again, precision
here would preculde such an error. Are you simply paraprasing someone
else's argument? (Fox or Davidson?)

An active intellect and the intellectual objects which it "knows" are
one. Not the intellect and the objects it knows about.

God can make man in HIS image. NOT vice versa. Jews once accepted
this implicitly. Lately they seem to incline to a more pagan pose,
and generate ideas usch as "panentheism" which is probably heretical,
and certainly seen as such within Maimonidean tradition. No modern
"scholar" can change that by writing papers and getting them
published.

> There is still a reason why G-d is referred to as First Cause. See M's
> whole discussion in ibid 69. Actually, M refers to G-d more often as
> Nitzav (standing, ie static) than as Borei (Creator, employing a verb for
> creation), in R' Qafeh's translation.

God is classically referred to as such, and M agrees with the
designation. (It is echoed in the works of Maimonideans, such as R.
David Qamhi.) Not "still" agrees, as I have indicated above. I,69
addresses M's point that there is no difference between the terms
"agent" or "first cause", notwithstanding the positions of certain
persons.

> In any case, the row would be tough to hoe if Marvin Fox and Herbert
> Davidson not done so first. I don't take their heretical views seriously,
> but this much they did succeed in convincing me.

I say the row has still not been hoed. Not even close. Not at all.
You (as well as Fox and Davidson) might consider rereading carefully
the chapters you referred to.

If people would only read the guide as M directed, these gross errors
would be harder to make.

Ronnie

Dr. Shlomo Argamon (Engelson)

unread,
Nov 19, 2003, 10:03:42 AM11/19/03
to

aha...@kaplangilman.com (ahaleva) writes:

Then what is the distinction between "Knowledge" and "Known"?

-Shlomo-

Micha Berger

unread,
Nov 19, 2003, 1:57:46 PM11/19/03
to
On Wed, 19 Nov 2003 14:32:10 +0000 (UTC), ahaleva <aha...@kaplangilman.com> wrote:
: And, so? You assert God has no free will? This violates M's numerous

: statements about God. Precision and a well developed argument would
: hep here. It is hard to comprehend your point. Cite the passage you
: assert supports your idea, demonstrate it, etc.

G-d has no free will because G-d has no time over which the Will would
preceed his action. But that's my own arugment, not M's. I did quote
M. You understand it differently. And I cited. I'm not sure what more
you want/

:> And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of


:> the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
:> panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
:> the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
:> His essence".

: Wrong. The "known" is not the object, but the intellectual

: representation of the object in a "knowers" mind...

Read it again. He contrasts to the human mind, in which a tree and man's
knowledge of the tree are different.

:> There is still a reason why G-d is referred to as First Cause. See M's


:> whole discussion in ibid 69. Actually, M refers to G-d more often as
:> Nitzav (standing, ie static) than as Borei (Creator, employing a verb for
:> creation), in R' Qafeh's translation.

: God is classically referred to as such, and M agrees with the
: designation. (It is echoed in the works of Maimonideans, such as R.
: David Qamhi.) Not "still" agrees, as I have indicated above. I,69
: addresses M's point that there is no difference between the terms
: "agent" or "first cause", notwithstanding the positions of certain
: persons.

Here's the opening paragraph of I:69, as per Friedlander's translation:
If we say that God is the Cause, the coexistence of the Cause with
that which was produced by that Cause would necessarily be implied:
this again would involve the belief that the Universe was eternal,
and that it was inseparable from God. When, however, we say that
God is the Agens, the co-existence of the Agens with its product
is not implied: for the agens can exist anterior to its product:
we cannot even imagine how an agens can be in action unless it
existed before its own production. This is an argument advanced
by persons who do not distinguish between the potential and the
actual. You, however, should know that in this case there is no
difference whether you employ the term" cause" or" agens" : for
if you take the term" cause" in the sense of a mere potentiality,
it precedes its effect: but if you mean the cause in action, then
the effect must necessarily co-exist with the cause in action. The
same is the case with the agens: take it as an agens in reality,
the work must necessarily co-exist with its agens. For the builder,
before he builds the house, is not in reality a builder, but has
the faculty for building a house-in the same way as the materials
for the house before it is being built are merely in potentia --
but when the house has been built, he is the builder in reality,
and his product must likewise be in actual existence. Nothing is
therefore gained by choosing the term" agens" and rejecting the term"
cause." My object here is to show that these two terms are equal,
and in the same manner as we call God an Agens, although the work
does not yet exist, only because there is no hindrance or obstacle
which might prevent Him from doing it whenever He pleases, we may also
call Him the Cause, although the effect may not yet be in existence.

For someone who believes in the potentia, one who is the Cause of
that potential is the Agens of its realization. Therefore, G-d who is
one, must be both.

This says nothing about the question at hand.

-mi

--
Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ
mi...@aishdas.org for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905

Micha Berger

unread,
Nov 19, 2003, 2:01:24 PM11/19/03
to
Nevermind my previous post, there is an open-and-shut proof further down
in M's Guide I:69:

... When we call God the ultimate form of the universe, we do
not use this term in the sense of form connected with substance,
namely, as the form of that substance, as though God were the
form of a material being. It is not in this sense that we use it,
but in the following : Everything existing and endowed with a form,
is whatever it is through its form, and when that form is destroyed
its whole existence terminates and is obliterated. The same is the
case as regards the relation between God and all distant causes of
existing beings: it is through the existence of God that all things
exist, and it is He who maintains their existence by that process
which is called emanation (in Hebrew shepha'), as will be explained
in one of the chapters of the present work. If God did not exist,
suppose this were possible, the universe would not exist, and there
would be an end to the existence of the distant causes, the final
effects, and the intermediate causes. Consequently God maintains the
same relation to the world as the form has to a thing endowed with a
form: through the form it is what it is, and on it the reality and
essence of the thing depends. In this sense we may say that God is
the ultimate form, that He is the form of all forms: that is to say,
the existence and continuance of all forms in the last instance depend
on Him, the forms are maintained by Him, in the same way as all things
endowed with forms retain their existence through their forms. On
that account God is called, in the sacred language, be ha-'olamim,"
the life of the Universe," as will be explained (chap. lxxii.). ...

M writes that the maintenance of existance is by the emanation of shefa.

ahaleva

unread,
Nov 19, 2003, 10:59:05 PM11/19/03
to
arg...@sunlight.cs.biu.ac.il (Dr. Shlomo Argamon (Engelson)) wrote in message news:<tig4qx0...@sunlight.cs.biu.ac.il>...

> aha...@kaplangilman.com (ahaleva) writes:
>
> > > And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of
> > > the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
> > > panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
> > > the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
> > > His essence".
> >
> > Wrong. The "known" is not the object, but the intellectual
> > representation of the object in a "knowers" mind. Again, precision
> > here would preculde such an error. Are you simply paraprasing someone
> > else's argument? (Fox or Davidson?)
>
> Then what is the distinction between "Knowledge" and "Known"?
>
> -Shlomo-

He discusses this using the human mind as a mashal. In humans, when
something is actually known then knowledge (the faculty) and the known
(mental image) are one.

If you point to something that you find unclear or incorrect in that
discussion, I am happy to adress that. I could simply repeat
Rabbenu's discussion in toto, but I feel discussions here about what
he said should track the text to the extent possible and discuss
definite statements made therein rather than general ideas or
paraphases. It seems inefficient to restate what was already stated
by the master.

Ronnie

Jonathan J. Baker

unread,
Nov 20, 2003, 2:38:33 PM11/20/03
to

>arg...@sunlight.cs.biu.ac.il (Dr. Shlomo Argamon (Engelson)) wrote in message news:<tig4qx0...@sunlight.cs.biu.ac.il>...
>> aha...@kaplangilman.com (ahaleva) writes:
>>
>> > > And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of
>> > > the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
>> > > panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
>> > > the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
>> > > His essence".
>> >
>> > Wrong. The "known" is not the object, but the intellectual
>> > representation of the object in a "knowers" mind. Again, precision
>> > here would preculde such an error. Are you simply paraprasing someone
>> > else's argument? (Fox or Davidson?)
>>
>> Then what is the distinction between "Knowledge" and "Known"?
>>
>> -Shlomo-

>He discusses this using the human mind as a mashal. In humans, when
>something is actually known then knowledge (the faculty) and the known
>(mental image) are one.

I, the knower, have knowledge of the known. Or, to quote Kant
(Crit. Pur. Reas.)

: OUR knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the
: mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations
: (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of
: knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in
: the production] of concepts). Through the first an object is given
: to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to
: that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of
: the mind). Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the
: elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an
: intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition
: without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or
: empirical. When they contain sensation (which presupposes the
: actual presence of the object), they are empirical. When there is
: no mingling of sensation with the representation,they are pure.
: Sensation may be entitled the material of sensible knowledge.
: Pure intuition, therefore, contains only the form under which [B75]
: something is intuited; the pure concept only the form of the [A51]
: thought of an object in general. Pure intuitions or pure
: concepts alone are possible a priori, empirical intuitions and
: empirical concepts only a posteriori.

We have intuition, which is based on sense-experience, and
there are objects. Our internal representation of the object
(the knowledge, in M's terminology) is not identical with the
object itself (the known).

--
Jonathan Baker | Marches-wan, marches-two,
jjb...@panix.com | March the months all through and through
Web page <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker>

ahaleva

unread,
Nov 20, 2003, 3:10:25 PM11/20/03
to
Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote in message news:<bpgdtd$1nb52a$1...@ID-113975.news.uni-berlin.de>...

> On Wed, 19 Nov 2003 14:32:10 +0000 (UTC), ahaleva <aha...@kaplangilman.com> wrote:
> : And, so? You assert God has no free will? This violates M's numerous
> : statements about God. Precision and a well developed argument would
> : hep here. It is hard to comprehend your point. Cite the passage you
> : assert supports your idea, demonstrate it, etc.
>
> G-d has no free will because G-d has no time over which the Will would
> preceed his action. But that's my own arugment, not M's. I did quote
> M. You understand it differently. And I cited. I'm not sure what more
> you want/

Citation means more than a name of a chapter and a paraphasis of one
point you got out of it. Read a legal brief sometime.

Of course God has no time. The free will issue in relation to God
involves necessity. Is there any necessity on God to do anything? Is
He subject to any "rules" or "inclinations" or is he -- in our terms
-- absolutely free.
The Maimonidean position is as I stated, articulated using the terms
"volition" and "will", sha'a and radiya. Not as your ersatz scholars
style it, that God's "essence" (unknowable according to M) demands He
do X or Y.


> :> And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of
> :> the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
> :> panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
> :> the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
> :> His essence".
>
> : Wrong. The "known" is not the object, but the intellectual
> : representation of the object in a "knowers" mind...
>
> Read it again. He contrasts to the human mind, in which a tree and man's
> knowledge of the tree are different.

Well, I'll bet the kids I have read it orders of magnitude more times
than you can imagine. So, I think it is not I who must reread.

The relation intellect/known in man's mind is an analogy desgined to
help make the point vis-a-vis God. Man's mind -- when active -- and
the *object of its cognition* ARE one! That is the whole point!!

"and that the intellect and the abstract form of the tree are not two
different things, for the intellect in action is nothing but the thing
comprehended, and that agent by which the form of the tree [NOT THE
TREE ITSELF -- BUT IT'S "ABSTRACT FORM" OR MENTAL IMAGE] has been
turned into an intellectual and abstract object, namely, that which
comprehends, is undoubtedly the intellect in action. All intellect is
identical with its action; ..."

This is hardly "panentheism, which is a heretical doctrine according
to Maimonides, and God and his creatures are NOT (lo 'alenu) "one"!

To label M as a panentheist is just one more in a long series of
misinterpretaion of the master by those oblivious to his tradition.

Ronnie

Micha Berger

unread,
Nov 21, 2003, 1:02:27 PM11/21/03
to
On Thu, 20 Nov 2003 20:10:25 +0000 (UTC), ahaleva <aha...@kaplangilman.com> wrote:
: Citation means more than a name of a chapter and a paraphasis of one

: point you got out of it. Read a legal brief sometime.

The chapters aren't all that long. And this is usenet, not a legal brief.
If we invested comparable amounts of time, discussion here would be
impossible. I gave you enough that if you wanted to, you could rebut.

:> :> And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of


:> :> the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
:> :> panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
:> :> the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
:> :> His essence".
:>
:> : Wrong. The "known" is not the object, but the intellectual
:> : representation of the object in a "knowers" mind...
:>
:> Read it again. He contrasts to the human mind, in which a tree and man's
:> knowledge of the tree are different.

: Well, I'll bet the kids I have read it orders of magnitude more times
: than you can imagine. So, I think it is not I who must reread.

I'm glad to know you have edietic memory. BTW, did you see the Abravanel
ad loc?

: The relation intellect/known in man's mind is an analogy desgined to


: help make the point vis-a-vis God. Man's mind -- when active -- and
: the *object of its cognition* ARE one! That is the whole point!!

: "and that the intellect and the abstract form of the tree are not two
: different things, for the intellect in action is nothing but the thing
: comprehended, and that agent by which the form of the tree [NOT THE
: TREE ITSELF -- BUT IT'S "ABSTRACT FORM" OR MENTAL IMAGE] has been
: turned into an intellectual and abstract object, namely, that which
: comprehends, is undoubtedly the intellect in action. All intellect is
: identical with its action; ..."

: This is hardly "panentheism, which is a heretical doctrine according
: to Maimonides, and God and his creatures are NOT (lo 'alenu) "one"!

: To label M as a panentheist is just one more in a long series of
: misinterpretaion of the master by those oblivious to his tradition.

I didn't I labeled him neoPlatonic. Emanationist, not panentheist. I
called this one statement panentheistic. Any student of Aristotle who
relied on ibn Rushd (Avicerroe) had to be neoplatonist. The Enneads
(by Plotinus, the author of neoplatonism) were included in ibn Rushd's
translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Unless M studied Aristotle in
the original, he thought (as did the Metakallamun and R' Saadia) that A
himself was neoplatonist!

M speaks of the form of the tree, not its mental image. That's the
difference between the known and the knowledge that Shlomo asked you
about. Form, tzurah, is a critical part of the object itself, not an
idea about it.

To quote further:
Now, it has been proved, that God is an intellect which always
is in action, and that-as has been stated, and as will be proved
hereafter-there is in Him at no time a mere potentiality, that He
does not comprehend at one time, and is without comprehension at
another time, but He comprehends constantly; consequently, He and


the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,

His essence: and the act of comprehending because of which it is said
that He comprehends, is the intellect itself, which is likewise His
essence, God is therefore always the intellectus, the intelligens,
and the intelligibile.

And what do you do with the the next chapter (69), which begins:
The philosophers, as you know, call God the First Cause (in Hebrew
Tlah and sibbah) : but those who are known by the name of Mutakallemim
are very much opposed to the use of that name, and call Him Agens.

and ends:
I have thus explained to you in what sense God is said to be the Jgens,
the Form, and the End. This is the reason why the philosophers
not only call Him" the Maker" but also the" Cause." Some of the
scholars belonging to the Mutakallemim (Mohammedan theologians),
went so far in their folly and in their vainglory as to say that
the non-existence of the Creator, if that were possible, would
not necessarily imply the non-existence of the things created by
Him, i.e., the Universe : for a production need not necessarily
cease to exist when the producer, after having produced it,
has ceased to exist. They would be right, if God were only the
maker of the Universe, and if its permanent existence were not
dependent on Him. The storehouse does not cease to exist at the
death of the builder; for he does not give permanent existence to
the building. God, however, is Himself the form of the Universe,
as we have already shown, and it is He who causes its continuance
and permanency. It is therefore wrong to say that a thing can remain
durable and permanent, after the being that makes it durable and
permanent has ceased to exist, since that thing can possess no more
durability and permanency than it has received from that being. Now
you understand the greatness of the error into which they have
fallen through their assumption that God is only the 4gens, and
not the End or the Form.

G-d is not merely the Maker.

:-)BBii
-mi

--
Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
mi...@aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (413) 403-9905 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

ahaleva

unread,
Nov 23, 2003, 5:25:53 AM11/23/03
to
Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote in message news:<bpljcp$1nampc$1...@ID-113975.news.uni-berlin.de>...

> On Thu, 20 Nov 2003 20:10:25 +0000 (UTC), ahaleva <aha...@kaplangilman.com> wrote:
> : Citation means more than a name of a chapter and a paraphasis of one
> : point you got out of it. Read a legal brief sometime.
>
> The chapters aren't all that long. And this is usenet, not a legal brief.
> If we invested comparable amounts of time, discussion here would be
> impossible. I gave you enough that if you wanted to, you could rebut.

I wish you would just properly argue a point instead of repeatedly
obfuscating.
Legal briefs do more than quote. They *demonstrate* how the text
supports the position advocated. Readers are not assumed to conclude
the same thing as the author, so simply quoting large sections of text
do not add much information.

Most frustratingly you *never* proceed in this fashion. You write as
if everyone naturally agrees that *your* reading is *the* reading.
For those of us not in the choir, reverend, we have no idea what you
are talking about.

> :> :> And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of
> :> :> the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
> :> :> panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
> :> :> the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
> :> :> His essence".
>
> :> : Wrong. The "known" is not the object, but the intellectual
> :> : representation of the object in a "knowers" mind...
> :>
> :> Read it again. He contrasts to the human mind, in which a tree and man's
> :> knowledge of the tree are different.
>
> : Well, I'll bet the kids I have read it orders of magnitude more times
> : than you can imagine. So, I think it is not I who must reread.
>
> I'm glad to know you have edietic memory. BTW, did you see the Abravanel
> ad loc?

Less sarcasm, more substance? Please? No. I am not discussing
Abarbanel ("Abravanel" is a misnomer). I am discussing the text.



> : The relation intellect/known in man's mind is an analogy desgined to
> : help make the point vis-a-vis God. Man's mind -- when active -- and
> : the *object of its cognition* ARE one! That is the whole point!!
>
> : "and that the intellect and the abstract form of the tree are not two
> : different things, for the intellect in action is nothing but the thing
> : comprehended, and that agent by which the form of the tree [NOT THE
> : TREE ITSELF -- BUT IT'S "ABSTRACT FORM" OR MENTAL IMAGE] has been
> : turned into an intellectual and abstract object, namely, that which
> : comprehends, is undoubtedly the intellect in action. All intellect is
> : identical with its action; ..."
>
> : This is hardly "panentheism, which is a heretical doctrine according
> : to Maimonides, and God and his creatures are NOT (lo 'alenu) "one"!
>
> : To label M as a panentheist is just one more in a long series of
> : misinterpretaion of the master by those oblivious to his tradition.
>
> I didn't I labeled him neoPlatonic. Emanationist, not panentheist. I
> called this one statement panentheistic.

Only a panenteheist would say such a thing as you have rendered it. M
considers it heretical.

> Any student of Aristotle who
> relied on ibn Rushd (Avicerroe) had to be neoplatonist.

M is NOT a student of Aristotle. He rejects Aristotle repeatedly. He
accepts his scientific sublunar conclusions to the extent they are
"demonstrated." If you cannot see that you are not really *reading*
this text!

> The Enneads
> (by Plotinus, the author of neoplatonism) were included in ibn Rushd's
> translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Unless M studied Aristotle in
> the original, he thought (as did the Metakallamun and R' Saadia) that A
> himself was neoplatonist!

Digressions. READ what M says. It is better than assuming A,
connecting it with B, etc. This is the pilpul methodology, not
genuine Jewish mysticism, and does not work as an interpretive tool
when dealing with Rabbenu.


> M speaks of the form of the tree, not its mental image. That's the
> difference between the known and the knowledge that Shlomo asked you
> about. Form, tzurah, is a critical part of the object itself, not an
> idea about it.

The form abstracted from the substance. What is that? Part of the
tree? Is it tangible? Is it a Platonic "Idea"? M EXPLICITLY says it
is
an intellectual thing. You just will not read when the results of
such reading contradict would the modern "experts" on Maimonides.
Eyes they have, but do not see.

Mr. Baker would appear to share my reading of the "known" here.

I never said he was "merely" anything. The tefilla states he is
continually renewing creation. Why do you misconstrue everything I
say? Do you not see a difference between God not being "one" with his
creations on the one hand and being "merely" and "only" the creator on
the other.

Besides these six words you bothered to write, I simply do not know
what your point is in quoting all of this. Again, citation is not
just quoting either. It is demonstration. Have you ever seriously
discussed the Guide with someone who does *not* share your
assumptions?

Ronnie

>
> :-)BBii
> -mi

Micha Berger

unread,
Nov 23, 2003, 4:38:59 PM11/23/03
to
: Only a panenteheist would say such a thing as you have rendered it. M
: considers it heretical.

But you don't explain how you reach this conclusion.

:> Any student of Aristotle who


:> relied on ibn Rushd (Avicerroe) had to be neoplatonist.

: M is NOT a student of Aristotle. He rejects Aristotle repeatedly. He
: accepts his scientific sublunar conclusions to the extent they are
: "demonstrated." If you cannot see that you are not really *reading*
: this text!

By phrasing his worldview in A's terms, he's a student of A. He speaks
of the "Active Intellect", the "First Cause", form, substance, independant
intellects, his definition of "mal'ach" (angel) requires believing in
Aristotle's theory of intelect, impulse and action. Etc...

Yes, many of his conclusions differ. But that's what makes him a follower
rather than a copy.

:> The Enneads


:> (by Plotinus, the author of neoplatonism) were included in ibn Rushd's
:> translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Unless M studied Aristotle in
:> the original, he thought (as did the Metakallamun and R' Saadia) that A
:> himself was neoplatonist!

: Digressions. READ what M says. It is better than assuming A,
: connecting it with B, etc. This is the pilpul methodology, not
: genuine Jewish mysticism, and does not work as an interpretive tool
: when dealing with Rabbenu.

I did. I even quoted large sections. I'm awaiting your version of the
same. Rather than complaining that I don't argue as rigorously as a lawyer,
I could use a contrary interpretation.

:> M speaks of the form of the tree, not its mental image. That's the


:> difference between the known and the knowledge that Shlomo asked you
:> about. Form, tzurah, is a critical part of the object itself, not an
:> idea about it.

: The form abstracted from the substance. What is that? Part of the

: tree? Is it tangible? Is it a Platonic "Idea"?...

No, it's Aristotilian Form. Morph. As opposed to hyle.

: is


: an intellectual thing. You just will not read when the results of
: such reading contradict would the modern "experts" on Maimonides.
: Eyes they have, but do not see.

I cited the Abravanel because you took issue with my sources. Would
you wonder, then, why your reading contradicts Abravanel's?

:> To quote further:

Still, you do not offer an alternative to the translation I gave.

BTW, those 6 words are not a summary of what I believe your opinion
is. It was a summary of the gap between what you're telling me, and
what the quote seems to say.

M calls G-d both Cause and Agens. You seem to only support the cause
side. Thus my "merely". Yes, M calls G-d the Maker, but it's not the
only thing Maimonides calls G-d's role in Creation.

: Besides these six words you bothered to write, I simply do not know


: what your point is in quoting all of this. Again, citation is not
: just quoting either. It is demonstration. Have you ever seriously
: discussed the Guide with someone who does *not* share your
: assumptions?

I'mn trying to. But he doesn't address the content in question.

Jonathan J. Baker

unread,
Nov 24, 2003, 1:38:28 PM11/24/03
to

>Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote in message news:<bpljcp$1nampc$1...@ID-113975.news.uni-berlin.de>...
>> On Thu, 20 Nov 2003 20:10:25 +0000 (UTC), ahaleva <aha...@kaplangilman.com> wrote:

>> :> :> And ibid 68 he speaks of the unity of
>> :> :> the Knower, the Knowledge, and the Known. M goes so far as to make the
>> :> :> panentheistic (note that I did not say pantheistic) statement "He and
>> :> :> the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
>> :> :> His essence".

>> :> : Wrong. The "known" is not the object, but the intellectual
>> :> : representation of the object in a "knowers" mind...

>> :> Read it again. He contrasts to the human mind, in which a tree and man's
>> :> knowledge of the tree are different.

>> : The relation intellect/known in man's mind is an analogy desgined to


>> : help make the point vis-a-vis God. Man's mind -- when active -- and
>> : the *object of its cognition* ARE one! That is the whole point!!

Eh? Sounds like a) panentheism, and b) projecting that ability onto man,
neither of which sound right.

>> : "and that the intellect and the abstract form of the tree are not two
>> : different things, for the intellect in action is nothing but the thing
>> : comprehended, and that agent by which the form of the tree [NOT THE
>> : TREE ITSELF -- BUT IT'S "ABSTRACT FORM" OR MENTAL IMAGE] has been
>> : turned into an intellectual and abstract object, namely, that which
>> : comprehends, is undoubtedly the intellect in action. All intellect is
>> : identical with its action; ..."

In other words, positing an identity between the human Knower an dhis
Knowledge, but not with the Known. This is to be contrasted with
the three-way identity relation of the Knower, Knowledge AND Known of
God - in other words, panentheism.

>> : This is hardly "panentheism, which is a heretical doctrine according
>> : to Maimonides, and God and his creatures are NOT (lo 'alenu) "one"!

If he says they are, in 68, then find us some kind of statement that
supports your position.

>> : To label M as a panentheist is just one more in a long series of
>> : misinterpretaion of the master by those oblivious to his tradition.

>> I didn't I labeled him neoPlatonic. Emanationist, not panentheist. I
>> called this one statement panentheistic.

>Only a panenteheist would say such a thing as you have rendered it. M
>considers it heretical.

Only the real Messiah would deny his Messiah-ship... and so the Life of
Brian continues. But this is philosophy, not comedy...

>> M speaks of the form of the tree, not its mental image. That's the
>> difference between the known and the knowledge that Shlomo asked you
>> about. Form, tzurah, is a critical part of the object itself, not an
>> idea about it.

>The form abstracted from the substance. What is that? Part of the
>tree? Is it tangible? Is it a Platonic "Idea"? M EXPLICITLY says it
>is
>an intellectual thing. You just will not read when the results of
>such reading contradict would the modern "experts" on Maimonides.
>Eyes they have, but do not see.

The same could be said of other parties here.

>Mr. Baker would appear to share my reading of the "known" here.

Perhaps. It's not clear from what you have written here exactly
what you mean by the Known. Is it

a) the physical object separate from the human intellect?
b) the physical object separate from the Divine intellect?
c) an abstract platonic form of an ideal of the object?

If you accept M's apparent three-way identity relationship between
Knower == Knowledge == Known, how do you define Known so as to
avoid the apparent panentheism which that identity describes? Or
even pantheism - if the idea does not posit that the Knower is
infinitely greater than the Known?

>> To quote further:
>> Now, it has been proved, that God is an intellect which always
>> is in action, and that-as has been stated, and as will be proved
>> hereafter-there is in Him at no time a mere potentiality, that He
>> does not comprehend at one time, and is without comprehension at
>> another time, but He comprehends constantly; consequently, He and
>> the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say,
>> His essence: and the act of comprehending because of which it is said
>> that He comprehends, is the intellect itself, which is likewise His
>> essence, God is therefore always the intellectus, the intelligens,
>> and the intelligibile.

What then is the distinction between the Known (intelligibile) and
a physical object? It sounds like "intelligens" is knowledge of a
particular object, while "intelligibile" is that which can be known
of the object, while the object itself may be something else again.
"Intelligibile" could perhaps be a platonic form (tzurah). It sounds
more likely than my original idea that it is das ding an sich. So it
need not be panentheist.

>> And what do you do with the the next chapter (69), which begins:

>> and ends:


>> has ceased to exist. They would be right, if God were only the
>> maker of the Universe, and if its permanent existence were not
>> dependent on Him. The storehouse does not cease to exist at the
>> death of the builder; for he does not give permanent existence to
>> the building. God, however, is Himself the form of the Universe,
>> as we have already shown, and it is He who causes its continuance
>> and permanency. It is therefore wrong to say that a thing can remain

Sounds like a shefa of existence-power, but not necessarily an equivalence
between the matter of the Universe and "the Form and Source-of-life"

>> G-d is not merely the Maker.

>I never said he was "merely" anything. The tefilla states he is
>continually renewing creation. Why do you misconstrue everything I
>say? Do you not see a difference between God not being "one" with his
>creations on the one hand and being "merely" and "only" the creator on
>the other.

It sounds like there are three (?) models being discussed.

a) Kalam: the clockmaker.
b) M: the Creator and he who provides shefa for continued existence, but
not identical with the created universe. The electric company -
they made the lamp, and need to supply electricity for the lamp
to work, if the electricity is cut off, the lamp ceases to work.
c) Panentheist (Hasidic?): The universe is God's essence, but is nullified
beside Him, and has no real existence aside from God's existence.
I am God, thou art God, all that groks is God.

ahaleva

unread,
Nov 24, 2003, 2:43:02 PM11/24/03
to
Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote in message news:<bpr8rk$1ruf5m$2...@ID-113975.news.uni-berlin.de>...

> : Only a panenteheist would say such a thing as you have rendered it. M
> : considers it heretical.
>
> But you don't explain how you reach this conclusion.

Which conclusion? There are two. I notice you do not explain anything
at all. You simply quote large amounts of text and assume any reader
will draw *your* conclusions. Hardly an auspicious manner of
proceeding.



> :> Any student of Aristotle who
> :> relied on ibn Rushd (Avicerroe) had to be neoplatonist.
>
> : M is NOT a student of Aristotle. He rejects Aristotle repeatedly. He
> : accepts his scientific sublunar conclusions to the extent they are
> : "demonstrated." If you cannot see that you are not really *reading*
> : this text!
>
> By phrasing his worldview in A's terms, he's a student of A. He speaks
> of the "Active Intellect", the "First Cause", form, substance, independant
> intellects, his definition of "mal'ach" (angel) requires believing in
> Aristotle's theory of intelect, impulse and action. Etc...

I think this is a gross error. Rather than repeat what has already
been demonstrated, I refer you to "Homo Mysticus: A Guide to Reading
Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed" by Hakham Professor Jose Faur.
Section 3, "Cosmology", based on a careful reading of the Arabic, and
a careful following of Maimonides' precise directions as to how one
should read the Guide, has a rather different view.

> Yes, many of his conclusions differ. But that's what makes him a follower
> rather than a copy.

Other possibilities exist besides (1) follower; and (2) copier.

> I did. I even quoted large sections. I'm awaiting your version of the
> same. Rather than complaining that I don't argue as rigorously as a lawyer,
> I could use a contrary interpretation.

Your style seems to me replete with a kind of passive agression. I
find it difficult to take. I never said anything about rigorously as
a lawyer. I said simply quoting text without demonstrating how th
wtext shoudl be read as you assert in your separate conclusion is
unfair and inerudte.

You have not provided any such demonstartion. The text is not
objective, and your reading is not necessarily correct or M's intent.
Thus you need ot support your reading by an analysis. You have not.
When I receive that, I will respond. I will not respond to a 25 line
quote with no idea as to what you mean to use the quote for.

Once again, consider that I do not see the text as you do; it is thus
NOT self evident as support for your posiiton.


> :> M speaks of the form of the tree, not its mental image. That's the
> :> difference between the known and the knowledge that Shlomo asked you
> :> about. Form, tzurah, is a critical part of the object itself, not an
> :> idea about it.
>
> : The form abstracted from the substance. What is that? Part of the
> : tree? Is it tangible? Is it a Platonic "Idea"?...
>
> No, it's Aristotilian Form. Morph. As opposed to hyle.

Even if arguendo that is correct, it is not part of the object. It
exists in the *mind* of the knower.


> : Besides these six words you bothered to write, I simply do not know
> : what your point is in quoting all of this. Again, citation is not
> : just quoting either. It is demonstration. Have you ever seriously
> : discussed the Guide with someone who does *not* share your
> : assumptions?
>
> I'mn trying to. But he doesn't address the content in question.

I disagree. L:arge quotes are not "content." You are either incapable
of understanding what I have written here, or unwilling. Either way, I
fear dialog with you and your various preconceptions is not
menaingfully possible.

You are not a ra'is. Your words are not tarjih. Dialog is a
horizontal endeavor.

Ronnie

0 new messages