FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., 

INC., a California corporation,
Plaintiff-counter-
defendant-Appellee, No. 07-55344
v.
 D.C. No.
CV-03-08506-DSF
FARZAD TABARI; LISA TABARI,
California residents, d/b/a FAST OPINION
IMPORTS,
Defendants-counter-claimants
Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 8, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed July 8, 2010

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Ferdinand F. Fernandez

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Chief Judge Kozinski,;

Concurrence by Judge Fernandez

9699
9702 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI

COUNSEL

Jens B. Koepke (argued), Robin Meadow, Greines, Martin,

Stein & Richland LLP, Los Angeles, California; Alan S. Coo-
per, Howrey, LLP, Washington, DC, for the plaintiff, counter-
defendant, appellee.
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9703
Lisa Tabari (argued), Farzad Tabari, pro se, Mission Viejo,
California, for the defendants, counter-claimants, appellants.

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

In this trademark infringement case, we consider the appli-

cation of the nominative fair use doctrine to internet domain
names.

Facts

Farzad and Lisa Tabari are auto brokers—the personal

shoppers of the automotive world. They contact authorized
dealers, solicit bids and arrange for customers to buy from the
dealer offering the best combination of location, availability
and price. Consumers like this service, as it increases compe-
tition among dealers, resulting in greater selection at lower
prices. For many of the same reasons, auto manufacturers and
dealers aren’t so keen on it, as it undermines dealers’ territo-
rial exclusivity and lowers profit margins. Until recently, the
Tabaris offered this service at buy-a-lexus.com and buyorlea-
selexus.com.

Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. (“Toyota”) is the exclusive dis-

tributor of Lexus vehicles in the United States, and jealous
guardian of the Lexus mark. A Toyota marketing executive
testified at trial that Toyota spends over $250 million every
year promoting the Lexus brand. In the executive’s estima-
tion, “Lexus is a very prestigious luxury brand and it is an
indication of an exclusive luxury experience.” No doubt true.

Toyota objected to the Tabaris’ use on their website of

copyrighted photography of Lexus vehicles and the circular
“L Symbol Design mark.” Toyota also took umbrage at the
9704 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
Tabaris’ use of the string “lexus” in their domain names,
which it believed was “likely to cause confusion as to the
source of [the Tabaris’] web site.” The Tabaris removed
Toyota’s photography and logo from their site and added a
disclaimer in large font at the top. But they refused to give up
their domain names. Toyota sued, and the district court found
infringement after a bench trial. It ordered the Tabaris to
cease using their domain names and enjoined them from using
the Lexus mark in any other domain name. Pro se as they
were at trial, the Tabaris appeal.

Nominative Fair Use

When customers purchase a Lexus through the Tabaris,

they receive a genuine Lexus car sold by an authorized Lexus
dealer, and a portion of the proceeds ends up in Toyota’s bank
account. Toyota doesn’t claim the business of brokering
Lexus cars is illegal or that it has contracted with its dealers
to prohibit selling through a broker. Instead, Toyota is using
this trademark lawsuit to make it more difficult for consumers
to use the Tabaris to buy a Lexus.

The district court applied the eight-factor test for likelihood

of confusion articulated in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599
F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979), and found that the Tabaris’
domain names—buy-a-lexus.com and buyorleaselexus.com—
infringed the Lexus trademark. But we’ve held that the Sleek-
craft analysis doesn’t apply where a defendant uses the mark
to refer to the trademarked good itself. See Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002); New Kids
on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992).1 The Tabaris are using the term Lexus to describe
1
This is no less true where, as here, “the defendant’s ultimate goal is to
describe his own product.” Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139,
1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted). In Welles, for instance, we
applied our nominative fair use analysis to a former playmate’s use of the
Playboy mark to describe herself and her website. 279 F.3d at 801. We
observed that, in those circumstances, “application of the Sleekcraft test,
which focuses on the similarity of the mark used by the plaintiff and the
defendant, would lead to the incorrect conclusion that virtually all nomina-
tive uses are confusing.” Id.
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9705
their business of brokering Lexus automobiles; when they say
Lexus, they mean Lexus. We’ve long held that such use of the
trademark is a fair use, namely nominative fair use. And fair
use is, by definition, not infringement. The Tabaris did in fact
present a nominative fair use defense to the district court.

[1] In cases where a nominative fair use defense is raised,

we ask whether (1) the product was “readily identifiable”
without use of the mark; (2) defendant used more of the mark
than necessary; or (3) defendant falsely suggested he was
sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder. Welles, 279
F.3d at 801 (quoting New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308-09). This test
“evaluates the likelihood of confusion in nominative use
cases.” Id. It’s designed to address the risk that nominative
use of the mark will inspire a mistaken belief on the part of
consumers that the speaker is sponsored or endorsed by the
trademark holder. The third factor speaks directly to the risk
of such confusion, and the others do so indirectly: Consumers
may reasonably infer sponsorship or endorsement if a com-
pany uses an unnecessary trademark or “more” of a mark than
necessary. But if the nominative use satisfies the three-factor
New Kids test, it doesn’t infringe. If the nominative use does
not satisfy all the New Kids factors, the district court may
order defendants to modify their use of the mark so that all
three factors are satisfied; it may not enjoin nominative use of
the mark altogether.2

[2] A. The district court enjoined the Tabaris from using

“any . . . domain name, service mark, trademark, trade name,
meta tag or other commercial indication of origin that
includes the mark LEXUS.” A trademark injunction, particu-
larly one involving nominative fair use, can raise serious First
Amendment concerns because it can interfere with truthful
communication between buyers and sellers in the market-
2
If defendants are unable or unwilling to modify their use of the mark
to comply with New Kids, then the district court’s order to modify may
effectively enjoin defendants from using the mark at all.
9706 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
place. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976).
Accordingly, “we must [e]nsure that [the injunction] is tai-
lored to eliminate only the specific harm alleged.” E. & J.
Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th
Cir. 1992). To uphold the broad injunction entered in this
case, we would have to be convinced that consumers are
likely to believe a site is sponsored or endorsed by a trade-
mark holder whenever the domain name contains the string of
letters that make up the trademark.

In performing this analysis, our focus must be on the “ ‘rea-

sonably prudent consumer’ in the marketplace.” Cf. Dream-
werks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129
(9th Cir. 1998) (describing the test for likelihood of confusion
in analogous Sleekcraft context). The relevant marketplace is
the online marketplace, and the relevant consumer is a reason-
ably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online; the
kind of consumer who is likely to visit the Tabaris’ website
when shopping for an expensive product like a luxury car.
See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304
F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2002). Unreasonable, imprudent and
inexperienced web-shoppers are not relevant.

[3] The injunction here is plainly overbroad—as even

Toyota’s counsel grudgingly conceded at oral argument—
because it prohibits domain names that on their face dispel
any confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement. The Tabaris
are prohibited from doing business at sites like independent-
lexus-broker.com and we-are-definitely-not-lexus.com,
although a reasonable consumer wouldn’t believe Toyota
sponsors the websites using those domains. Prohibition of
such truthful and non-misleading speech does not advance the
Lanham Act’s purpose of protecting consumers and prevent-
ing unfair competition; in fact, it undermines that rationale by
frustrating honest communication between the Tabaris and
their customers.
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9707
Even if we were to modify the injunction to exclude
domain names that expressly disclaim sponsorship or
endorsement (like the examples above), the injunction would
still be too broad. The Tabaris may not do business at lexus-
broker.com, even though that’s the most straightforward,
obvious and truthful way to describe their business. The nom-
inative fair use doctrine allows such truthful use of a mark,
even if the speaker fails to expressly disavow association with
the trademark holder, so long as it’s unlikely to cause confu-
sion as to sponsorship or endorsement. See Welles, 279 F.3d
at 803 n.26. In New Kids, for instance, we found that use of
the “New Kids on the Block” mark in a newspaper survey did
not infringe, even absent a disclaimer, because the survey said
“nothing that expressly or by fair implication connotes
endorsement or joint sponsorship.” 971 F.2d at 309. Speakers
are under no obligation to provide a disclaimer as a condition
for engaging in truthful, non-misleading speech.

Although our opinion in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-

schaft v. Church remarked on that defendant’s “prominent use
of the word ‘Independent’ whenever the terms ‘Volkswagen’
or ‘VW’ appeared in his advertising,” 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th
Cir. 1969), it isn’t to the contrary. The inclusion of such
words will usually negate any hint of sponsorship or endorse-
ment, which is why we mentioned them in concluding that
there was no infringement in Volkswagenwerk. Id. But that
doesn’t mean such words are required, and Volkswagenwerk
doesn’t say they are. Our subsequent cases make clear they’re
not. See Welles, 279 F.3d at 803 n.26; New Kids, 971 F.2d at
309.3
3
The Sixth Circuit enjoined a domain name in part because it did “not
include words like ‘independent’ or ‘unaffiliated,’ ” but in that case there
were additional factors indicating sponsorship or endorsement, including
the use of stylized versions of the plaintiff’s marks on the site. PACCAR
Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2003).
Where these or other factors suggest that nominative use is likely to cause
confusion, a disclaimer may well be necessary. But a disclaimer is not
required every time a URL contains a mark.
9708 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
[4] The district court reasoned that the fact that an internet
domain contains a trademark will “generally” suggest spon-
sorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. When a
domain name consists only of the trademark followed by
.com, or some other suffix like .org or .net, it will typically
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
Cf. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327
(9th Cir. 1998).4 This is because “[a] customer who is unsure
about a company’s domain name will often guess that the
domain name is also the company’s name.” Id. (quoting
Cardservice Int’l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va.
1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brookfield
Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1045 (9th Cir. 1999). If customers type in trademark.com and
find the site occupied by someone other than the trademark
holder, they may well believe it is the trademark holder,
despite contrary evidence on the website itself. Alternatively,
they may become discouraged and give up looking for the
trademark holder’s official site, believing perhaps that such a
website doesn’t exist. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327.
4
Of course, not every trademark.com domain name is likely to cause
consumer confusion. See Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 944-46. For
instance, we observed in Interstellar Starship that an apple orchard could
operate at the website apple.com without risking confusion with Apple
Computers, in light of the vast difference between their products. Id. at
944. “If, however, the apple grower . . . competed directly with Apple
Computer by selling computers, initial interest confusion probably would
result,” as the apple grower would be using the apple.com domain to
appropriate the goodwill Apple Computer had developed in its trademark.
Id.
When a website deals in goods or services related to a trademarked
brand, as in this case, it is much closer to the second example, where
apple.com competes with Apple Computers. If a company that repaired
iPods, iPads and iPhones were to set up at apple.com, for instance, con-
sumers would naturally assume that the company was sponsored or
endorsed by Apple (or, more likely, that it was Apple). Where a site is
used to sell goods or services related to the trademarked brand, a trade-
mark.com domain will therefore suggest sponsorship or endorsement and
will not generally be nominative fair use.
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9709
[5] But the case where the URL consists of nothing but a
trademark followed by a suffix like .com or .org is a special
one indeed. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1057.5 The impor-
tance ascribed to trademark.com in fact suggests that far less
confusion will result when a domain making nominative use
of a trademark includes characters in addition to those making
up the mark. Cf. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d
1135, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the official Lexus site
is almost certain to be found at lexus.com (as, in fact, it is),
it’s far less likely to be found at other sites containing the
word Lexus. On the other hand, a number of sites make nomi-
native use of trademarks in their domains but are not spon-
sored or endorsed by the trademark holder: You can preen
about your Mercedes at mercedesforum.com and mercedes-
talk.net, read the latest about your double-skim-no-whip latte
at starbucksgossip.com and find out what goodies the world’s
greatest electronics store has on sale this week at frys-
electronics-ads.com. Consumers who use the internet for
shopping are generally quite sophisticated about such matters
and won’t be fooled into thinking that the prestigious German
car manufacturer sells boots at mercedesboots.com, or homes
at mercedeshomes.com, or that comcastsucks.org is sponsored
or endorsed by the TV cable company just because the string
of letters making up its trademark appears in the domain.

When people go shopping online, they don’t start out by

typing random URLs containing trademarked words hoping to
5
Citing our refusal to distinguish between “Golden Door,” a spa, and a
competing “Golden Door for Hair,” the district court treated buyorlea-
selexus.com as legally indistinguishable from lexus.com. Golden Door,
Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1980); see also PACCAR Inc.,
319 F.3d at 252. According to Toyota, such “legally identical” phrases in
a domain name can never be fair use. But there is no such rule; we look
to context to determine how much weight to give the words accompanying
a mark. See, e.g., Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908 (9th
Cir. 2003). In Golden Door, we noted that the defendant answered the
phone “Golden Door,” not “Golden Door for Hair,” and featured the
words “Golden Door” prominently in its signs. 646 F.2d at 350.
9710 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
get a lucky hit. They may start out by typing trademark.com,
but then they’ll rely on a search engine or word of mouth.6 If
word of mouth, confusion is unlikely because the consumer
will usually be aware of who runs the site before typing in the
URL. And, if the site is located through a search engine, the
consumer will click on the link for a likely-relevant site with-
out paying much attention to the URL. Use of a trademark in
the site’s domain name isn’t materially different from use in
its text or metatags in this context; a search engine can find
a trademark in a site regardless of where exactly it appears.
In Welles, we upheld a claim that use of a mark in a site’s
metatags constituted nominative fair use; we reasoned that
“[s]earchers would have a much more difficult time locating
relevant websites” if the law outlawed such truthful, non-
misleading use of a mark. 279 F.3d at 804. The same logic
applies to nominative use of a mark in a domain name.

[6] Of course a domain name containing a mark cannot be

nominative fair use if it suggests sponsorship or endorsement
by the trademark holder. We’ve already explained why trade-
mark.com domains have that effect. See pp. 9707-08 supra.
Sites like trademark-USA.com, trademark-of-glendale.com or
e-trademark.com will also generally suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder; the addition of “e”
merely indicates the electronic version of a brand, and a loca-
tion modifier following a trademark indicates that consumers
can expect to find the brand’s local subsidiary, franchise or
affiliate. See Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., No. 08-
15206 (9th Cir. June 28, 2010). For even more obvious rea-
sons, domains like official-trademark-site.com or we-are-
trademark.com affirmatively suggest sponsorship or endorse-
ment by the trademark holder and are not nominative fair use.7
6
By “word of mouth” we, of course, refer not merely to spoken recom-
mendations from friends and acquaintances, but to the whole range of
information available to online shoppers, including chat rooms, discussion
forums, feedback and evaluation websites, and the like.
7
Domain names containing trademarks may also be prohibited because
they dilute the value of those marks—for instance, by creating negative
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9711
But the district court’s injunction is not limited to this narrow
class of cases and, indeed, the Tabaris’ domain names do not
fall within it.

[7] When a domain name making nominative use of a

mark does not actively suggest sponsorship or endorsement,
the worst that can happen is that some consumers may arrive
at the site uncertain as to what they will find. But in the age
of FIOS, cable modems, DSL and T1 lines, reasonable, pru-
dent and experienced internet consumers are accustomed to
such exploration by trial and error. Cf. Interstellar Starship,
304 F.3d at 946. They skip from site to site, ready to hit the
back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s con-
tents. They fully expect to find some sites that aren’t what
they imagine based on a glance at the domain name or search
engine summary. Outside the special case of trademark.com,
or domains that actively claim affiliation with the trademark
holder, consumers don’t form any firm expectations about the
sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen the landing page
—if then. This is sensible agnosticism, not consumer confu-
sion. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:
Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 Cardozo L.
Rev. 105, 122-24, 140, 158 (2005). So long as the site as a
whole does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder, such momentary uncertainty does not pre-
clude a finding of nominative fair use.

Toyota argues it is entitled to exclusive use of the string

“lexus” in domain names because it spends hundreds of mil-

associations with the brand. Cf. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape

Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004). For example, the
website People of Walmart, which publishes rude photos of Walmart
shoppers at peopleofwalmart.com, might dilute the Walmart trademark by
associating it with violations of customers’ privacy and the idea that a visi-
tor to Walmart stores risks being photographed and ridiculed on the inter-
net. See Jeffrey Zaslow, Surviving the Age of Humiliation, Wall St. J.,
May 5, 2010, at D1. But Toyota does not allege that the Tabaris’ site has
any such effect.
9712 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
lions of dollars every year making sure everyone recognizes
and understands the word “Lexus.” But “[a] large expenditure
of money does not in itself create legally protectable rights.”
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968); see
also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 2002);
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1714-15 (1999). Indeed,
it is precisely because of Toyota’s investment in the Lexus
mark that “[m]uch useful social and commercial discourse
would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of
an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to
[Lexus] by using its trademark.” New Kids, 971 F.2d at 307.8

It is the wholesale prohibition of nominative use in domain

names that would be unfair. It would be unfair to merchants
seeking to communicate the nature of the service or product
offered at their sites. And it would be unfair to consumers,
who would be deprived of an increasingly important means of
receiving such information. As noted, this would have serious
First Amendment implications. The only winners would be
companies like Toyota, which would acquire greater control
over the markets for goods and services related to their trade-
marked brands, to the detriment of competition and consum-
ers. The nominative fair use doctrine is designed to prevent
this type of abuse of the rights granted by the Lanham Act.

[8] B. Toyota asserts that, even if the district court’s

injunction is overbroad, it can be upheld if limited to the
Tabaris’ actual domain names: buyorleaselexus.com and buy-
a-lexus.com. We therefore apply the three-part New Kids test
to the domain names, and we start by asking whether the
8
“Words . . . do not worm their way into our discourse by accident.”
Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 975
(1993). Trademark holders engage in “well-orchestrated campaigns
intended to burn them into our collective consciousness.” Id. Although
trademark holders gain something by pushing their trademark into the lex-
icon, they also inevitably lose a measure of control over their mark.
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9713
Tabaris’ use of the mark was “necessary” to describe their
business. Toyota claims it was not, because the Tabaris could
have used a domain name that did not contain the Lexus
mark. It’s true they could have used some other domain name
like autobroker.com or fastimports.com, or have used the text
of their website to explain their business. But it’s enough to
satisfy our test for necessity that the Tabaris needed to com-
municate that they specialize in Lexus vehicles, and using the
Lexus mark in their domain names accomplished this goal.
While using Lexus in their domain names wasn’t the only
way to communicate the nature of their business, the same
could be said of virtually any choice the Tabaris made about
how to convey their message: Rather than using the internet,
they could publish advertisements in print; or, instead of tak-
ing out print ads, they could rely on word of mouth. We’ve
never adopted such a draconian definition of necessity, and
we decline to do so here. In Volkswagenwerk, for instance, we
affirmed the right of a mechanic to put up a sign advertising
that he specialized in repairing Volkswagen cars, although he
could have used a sandwich board, distributed leaflets or
shouted through a megaphone. 411 F.2d at 352.9 One way or
the other, the Tabaris need to let consumers know that they
are brokers of Lexus cars, and that’s nearly impossible to do
without mentioning Lexus, cf. Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Dae-
woo Int’l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983),
be it via domain name, metatag, radio jingle, telephone solici-
tation or blimp.
9
The Seventh Circuit has similarly upheld the right of a seller of Beanie
Babies to operate at “bargainbeanies.com” on the grounds that “[y]ou
can’t sell a branded product without using its brand name.” Ty Inc., 306
F.3d at 512. In a prophetic choice of examples, Judge Posner remarked
that prohibiting such a domain name “would amount to saying that if a
used car dealer truthfully advertised that it sold Toyotas, or if a muffler
manufacturer truthfully advertised that it specialized in making mufflers
for installation in Toyotas, Toyota would have a claim of trademark
infringement.” Id.
9714 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
The fact that the Tabaris also broker other types of cars
does not render their use of the Lexus mark unnecessary.10
Lisa Tabari testified: “I in my conviction and great respect for
the company always try to convince the consumer to first pur-
chase a Lexus or Toyota product.” If customers decide to buy
some other type of car, the Tabaris may help with that, but
their specialty is Lexus. The Tabaris are entitled to decide
what automotive brands to emphasize in their business, and
the district court found that the Tabaris do in fact specialize
in Lexus vehicles. Potential customers would naturally be
interested in that fact, and it was entirely appropriate for the
Tabaris to use the Lexus mark to let them know it.

Nor are we convinced by Toyota’s argument that the

Tabaris unnecessarily used domain names containing the
Lexus trademark as their trade name. See Volkswagenwerk,
411 F.2d at 352. The Tabaris’ business name is not buyorlea-
selexus.com or buy-a-lexus.com; it’s Fast Imports. Toyota
points out that the Tabaris’ domain names featured promi-
nently in their advertising, but that by no means proves the
domain names were synonymous with the Tabaris’ business.
The Tabaris may have featured their domain names in their
advertisements in order to tell consumers where to find their
website, as well as to communicate the fact that they can help
buy or lease a Lexus. Toyota would have to show signifi-
cantly more than “prominent” advertisement to establish the
contrary. We therefore conclude that the Tabaris easily satisfy
the first New Kids factor.

[9] As for the second and third steps of our nominative fair
use analysis, Toyota suggests that use of the stylized Lexus
10
Toyota doesn’t suggest that the Tabaris used the Lexus mark to refer
to those other cars, or that the Tabaris used the Lexus mark in order to
redirect customers to those cars. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan
Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004). Everyone seems to
concede the Tabaris are bona fide Lexus brokers. We therefore do not con-
sider whether the Tabaris used the Lexus mark in conjunction with broker-
ing vehicles other than Lexus, or whether such use would be infringing.
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9715
mark and “Lexus L” logo was more use of the mark than nec-
essary and suggested sponsorship or endorsement by Toyota.
This is true: The Tabaris could adequately communicate their
message without using the visual trappings of the Lexus
brand. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 n.7. Moreover, those visual
cues might lead some consumers to believe they were dealing
with an authorized Toyota affiliate. Imagery, logos and other
visual markers may be particularly significant in cyberspace,
where anyone can convincingly recreate the look and feel of
a luxury brand at minimal expense. It’s hard to duplicate a
Lexus showroom, but it’s easy enough to ape the Lexus site.

[10] But the Tabaris submitted images of an entirely

changed site at the time of trial: The stylized mark and “L”
logo were gone, and a disclaimer appeared in their place. The
disclaimer stated, prominently and in large font, “We are not
an authorized Lexus dealer or affiliated in any way with
Lexus. We are an Independent Auto Broker.” While not
required, such a disclaimer is relevant to the nominative fair
use analysis. See Welles, 279 F.3d at 803. Toyota claims the
Tabaris’ disclaimer came too late to protect against confusion
caused by their domain names, as such confusion would occur
before consumers saw the site or the disclaimer. See Brook-
field, 174 F.3d at 1057. But nothing about the Tabaris’
domains would give rise to such confusion; the Tabaris did
not run their business at lexus.com, and their domain names
did not contain words like “authorized” or “official.” See pp.
9709-11 supra. Reasonable consumers would arrive at the
Tabaris’ site agnostic as to what they would find. Once there,
they would immediately see the disclaimer and would
promptly be disabused of any notion that the Tabaris’ website
is sponsored by Toyota. Because there was no risk of confu-
sion as to sponsorship or endorsement, the Tabaris’ use of the
Lexus mark was fair.

[11] This makeover of the Tabaris’ site is relevant because

Toyota seeks only forward-looking relief. In Volkswagen-
werk, we declined to order an injunction where the defendant
9716 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
had likewise stopped all infringing activities by the time of
trial, 411 F.2d at 352, although we’ve said that an injunction
may be proper if there’s a risk that infringing conduct will
recur, Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d 1132,
1135-36 (9th Cir. 1986). Even assuming some form of an
injunction is required to prevent relapse in this case, the
proper remedy for infringing use of a mark on a site generally
falls short of entirely prohibiting use of the site’s domain
name, as the district court did here. See Interstellar Starship,
304 F.3d at 948. “[O]nly upon proving the rigorous elements
of cyber-squatting . . . have plaintiffs successfully forced the
transfer of an infringing domain name.” Id. Forced relinquish-
ment of a domain is no less extraordinary.

[12] The district court is in a better position to assess in the

first instance the timing and extent of any infringing conduct,
as well as the scope of the remedy, if any remedy should
prove to be required. We therefore vacate the injunction and
remand for reconsideration. The important principle to bear in
mind on remand is that a trademark injunction should be tai-
lored to prevent ongoing violations, not punish past conduct.
Speakers do not lose the right to engage in permissible speech
simply because they may have infringed a trademark in the
past.

C. When considering the scope and timing of any infringe-

ment on remand, the district court must eschew application of
Sleekcraft and analyze the case solely under the rubric of
nominative fair use. Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151. The district
court treated nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to
be established by the Tabaris only after Toyota showed a like-
lihood of confusion under Sleekcraft. This was error; nomina-
tive fair use “replaces” Sleekcraft as the proper test for likely
consumer confusion whenever defendant asserts to have
referred to the trademarked good itself. Id. (emphasis omit-
ted); see also Welles, 279 F.3d at 801.
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9717
On remand, Toyota must bear the burden of establishing
that the Tabaris’ use of the Lexus mark was not nominative
fair use. A finding of nominative fair use is a finding that the
plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of confusion as to
sponsorship or endorsement. See Welles, 279 F.3d at 801;
New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 (“Because [nominative fair use]
does not implicate the source-identification function that is
the purpose of trademark, it does not constitute unfair competi-
tion.”).11 And, as the Supreme Court has unambiguously
instructed, the Lanham Act always places the “burden of
proving likelihood of confusion . . . on the party charging
infringement.” KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004); see also id. at
120-21. In this case, that party is Toyota. “[A]ll the [Tabaris]
need[ ] to do is to leave the factfinder unpersuaded.” Id. at
120.

We have previously said the opposite: “[T]he nominative

fair use defense shifts to the defendant the burden of proving
no likelihood of confusion.” Brother Records, Inc., 318 F.3d
at 909 n.5. But that rule is plainly inconsistent with Lasting
Impression and has been “effectively overruled.” Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see
also 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 23:11 at 82 n.5 (4th ed. 2010). A defendant seeking to assert
nominative fair use as a defense need only show that it used
the mark to refer to the trademarked good, as the Tabaris
undoubtedly have here. The burden then reverts to the plain-
tiff to show a likelihood of confusion.
11
This is necessarily so because, unlike classic fair use, nominative fair
use is not specifically provided for by statute. A court may find classic fair
use despite “proof of infringement” because the Lanham Act authorizes
that result. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). Nominative fair use, on the other
hand, represents a finding of no liability under that statute’s basic prohibi-
tion of infringing use. See id. § 1114.
9718 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
Laches

The Tabaris claim Toyota’s case is barred by laches. This

would obviate any need to remand, as it would provide a com-
plete defense to Toyota’s trademark claims. The district court
rejected this defense, and we review for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1999).

[13] The district court found that Toyota waited six months
before contacting the Tabaris after it became aware of their
domain names. The Tabaris point to no evidence that would
justify overturning that finding on appeal. Nor was it an abuse
of discretion to conclude that short delay was reasonable. An
additional delay of two years ensued before Toyota brought
this suit, but during that period the parties were actively seek-
ing to resolve this matter out of court. It was not unreasonable
for Toyota to attempt to avoid the expense and inconvenience
of a lawsuit. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at
1285, 1294.

[14] Nor did the relatively brief delay prejudice the

Tabaris. See id. at 1294. The Tabaris note that one witness
answered “I don’t remember” in her deposition, but they pres-
ent no evidence that the witness’s loss of memory occurred
during the period of delay. We must therefore affirm the dis-
trict court’s rejection of the Tabaris’ laches defense.

Seventh Amendment

[15] Finally, we consider the Tabaris’ claim that the dis-

trict court deprived them of their right to a trial by jury when
it failed to empanel a jury to decide Toyota’s trademark
claims. Because Toyota only sought an injunction, the district
court did not err by resolving its claims in a bench trial. See,
e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d
296, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1979). Nor were the Tabaris entitled to
a jury trial on their equitable defenses to those claims, Danjaq
LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 962 (9th Cir. 2001), or their
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9719
counterclaims seeking declarations of trademark invalidity
and non-infringement, Shubin v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S.D. Cal.,
313 F.2d 250, 251-52 (9th Cir. 1963).

The Tabaris also claim the district court erred by bifurcat-

ing the trademark claims from the Tabaris’ counterclaims for
intentional and negligent interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage, as to which the Tabaris undoubtedly did
have a right to trial by jury. After resolving the trademark
claims in a bench trial, the district court granted summary
judgment against the Tabaris on the interference counter-
claims. This was proper only if there were no common factual
issues among the bifurcated claims; otherwise, the interfer-
ence counterclaims should have been addressed first in order
to avoid the risk that findings made in the bench trial would
become the law of the case and prevent a jury from determin-
ing the common issues. See Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Avcar Leasing
Sys., Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir. 1989).

[16] There’s no need for an exhaustive inquiry to deter-

mine whether there was factual overlap between the claims;
we can take Toyota’s word for it. After the bench trial, Toyota
sought summary judgment on the Tabaris’ counterclaims on
the ground that:

Much of the testimony and evidence offered at trial

to support or refute Defendants’ affirmative defenses
and . . . counterclaims . . . involve the same issues
of proof necessary to Defendants’ pending tortious
interference counterclaims. For example, the factual
allegations underlying Defendants’ affirmative
defense of inequitable conduct, unclean hands and
trademark misuse are also central to Defendants’ tor-
tious interference counterclaims.

Toyota claimed there was no longer any need for a jury trial
because the district court’s bench trial findings constituted the
9720 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
“law of the case.”12 Of course, this is precisely the result—
forfeiture of the right to trial by jury—that the rule articulated
in Dollar Systems strives to prevent. Id. Because Toyota never
should have been in a position to make such an argument, the
procedure adopted by the district court was error.

[17] Nevertheless, it was harmless, and there’s no need to

revisit the issue on remand. See Kulas v. Flores, 255 F.3d
780, 784 (9th Cir. 2001). When the district court granted sum-
mary judgment on the Tabaris’ counterclaims, it didn’t rely on
any factual findings made at the bench trial. It determined that
any reasonable jury would have to hold for Toyota on the
counterclaims: With regard to the Tabaris’ claim of negligent
interference, it held that the Tabaris had failed to provide any
evidence that Toyota owed them a duty of care. See Stolz v.
Wong Commc’ns Ltd. P’ship, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 238 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994). And, with regard to the intentional interfer-
ence claim, it found that Toyota’s act of bringing suit was
absolutely privileged, Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365,
370-72 (Cal. 1990), and that the Tabaris had failed to provide
any other evidence of intentional interference. The Tabaris
don’t challenge the substance of those holdings on appeal.13
12
Toyota artfully maneuvered to obscure this factual overlap before trial
and again on appeal. Toyota argued in favor of bifurcation on the grounds
that even “a cursory review” would show “that there are no common
issues of fact between any of these original claims and the counterclaims.”
This was technically correct: The overlap was between the Tabaris’
defenses and counterclaims, not Toyota’s “original claims” and the
Tabaris’ counterclaims. Toyota evidently hoped that the district court
would not notice the careful parsing of its language, and that the Tabaris
(who are defending this case pro se) would not call it to the court’s atten-
tion.
Toyota is playing the same game on appeal: It states that bifurcation
was proper because “[t]here was no factual overlap between Toyota’s
trademark claims and Fast Imports’ interference claims.” But Toyota is
only telling half the story by talking about only half of the relevant claims;
Toyota admitted as much in its motion for summary judgment. Such selec-
tive memory exceeds the bounds of zealous advocacy.
13
The Tabaris do challenge the district court’s holding that they failed
to present evidence that they were damaged by Toyota’s alleged tortious
 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI 9721
Because the district court could have granted summary judg-
ment on this basis before the bench trial, it was harmless error
for it to do so after the trial was concluded. See Kulas, 255
F.3d at 784. On remand, the district court therefore need not
disturb its grant of summary judgment on the Tabaris’ inter-
ference counterclaims.

***

We vacate and remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion. At the very least, the injunction must be modified to
allow some use of the Lexus mark in domain names by the
Tabaris. Trademarks are part of our common language, and
we all have some right to use them to communicate in truth-
ful, non-misleading ways.

Many of the district court’s errors seem to be the result of

unevenly-matched lawyering, as Toyota appears to have taken
advantage of the fact that the Tabaris appeared pro se. See,
e.g., p. 9720 n.12 supra. To avoid similar problems on
remand, the district court might consider contacting members
of the bar to determine if any would be willing to represent
the Tabaris at a reduced rate or on a volunteer basis.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

Costs on appeal are awarded to the Tabaris.

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the district court

erred in its handling of the nominative fair use defense. I write

conduct. But the district court also found that no reasonable jury could
find Toyota liable. The Tabaris’ argument that they were damaged is irrel-
evant in light of this unchallenged holding regarding liability.
9722 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES v. TABARI
separately, however, because I cannot concur in all that is said
by the majority.
First, and principally, I feel compelled to disassociate
myself from statements by the majority which are not sup-
ported by the evidence or by the district court’s findings. I
simply cannot concur in essentially factual statements whose
provenance is our musings rather than the record and determi-
nations by trier of fact. For example, on this record I do not
see the basis for the majority’s assertion that the “relevant
consumer is . . . accustomed to shopping online”;1 or that
“[c]onsumers who use the internet for shopping are generally
quite sophisticated”2 so that they are not likely to be misled;
or that “the worst that can happen is that some consumers
may arrive at [a] site uncertain as to what they will find”;3 or
that, in fact, consumers are agnostic and, again, not likely to
be misled;4 or that “[r]easonable consumers would arrive at
the Tabaris’ site agnostic as to what they would find.”5
Second, I am unable to join the gratuitous slap at counsel
for Toyota in the majority opinion,6 which I see as entirely
unnecessary to our decision or even to the upholding of the
marmoreal surface of the law.
Finally, I do not join the final textual paragraph, which
nudges the district court to find pro bono counsel for the
Tabaris, who have neither chosen to retain their own counsel
nor demonstrated that they cannot do so. To the extent that the
majority sees their activities as especially socially worthy and
above reproach, I do not agree.
Thus, I respectfully concur in the result.
1
Majority opinion, page 9706.
2
Id. at 9709.
3
Id. at 9711.
4
Id. at 9711.
5
Id. at 9715.
6
Id. at 9720 n.12.