Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to

resolution 1874 (2009)

Summary
Over the period under review the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has
continued to reject and to violate Security Council resolutions. In November 2010
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea revealed that it had been pursuing a
programme of uranium enrichment and was constructing a new nuclear reactor. The
country has also continued to defy the bans on imports and exports of nuclear-related
items, of conventional arms and of luxury goods, and this report details several
seizures of banned shipments.
The Panel believes that, while sanctions have clearly not stopped the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programmes and trade in arms,
they have made it more difficult and expensive for the country to pursue these.
Nevertheless Member States continue to face numerous difficulties in implementing
sanctions. The Panel has discovered loopholes and other vulnerabilities in shipping
and transportation practices that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
others have exploited, and notes increasing sophistication on the part of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea both in the establishment of shell and front
companies and offshore financial agents, and in the proliferation of affiliates,
substitutes and aliases intended to mask already designated entities and individuals.
This report therefore includes a variety of recommendations to improve the
effectiveness of sanctions. These include suggested responses to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’s uranium enrichment programme, further efforts to
encourage Member States to report as required by the Council, extending the list of
items prohibited by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006),
clearer guidelines on the definition of luxury goods and an expansion and updating
of the list of eight entities and five individuals currently sanctioned by the
Committee.

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 In pursuing its mandate the Panel has consulted extensively with Member
States, inspected seized goods and interviewed numerous experts at international
conferences and in New York. It has increased its knowledge of techniques of
sanctions evasion used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (which include
extensive falsification of documents and diversion of cargo), illicit financial
transactions carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the channels
through which banned goods travel, and cooperation of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea with other States in pursuing proscribed activities. The Panel is
grateful for the cooperation it has received from many Member States.
Much remains to be done to improve sanctions implementation among Member
States and to constrain the networks that facilitate sanctions evasion. Looking
forward, the Panel plans to work with Member States to improve the rate of filing of
national implementation and compliance-related reports, to work towards
establishing best practice for vigilance on cargo to and from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, to suggest other entities and individuals for designation, and to
recommend ways of countering the efforts of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea to evade sanctions.

2 11-32818
Contents
Page

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
III. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
IV. Panel of Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
V. Reports of Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. National implementation reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Compliance-related reports (inspection, seizure and disposal) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
VI. Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A. Nuclear programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B. Ballistic missile programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C. Other existing weapons of mass destruction programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VII. Export and import-related measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A. Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-related exports and
imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
B. Arms exports and imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
C. Ban on luxury goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
VIII. Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A. Trade and transportation infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B. Patterns of sanctions evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
C. Interdiction actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
IX. Financial measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A. Illicit financial transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B. Foreign investment in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
X. Designation of goods, entities and individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A. Designation of entities and individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
B. Designation of goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
XI. Unintended impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A. Unintended impact on the humanitarian situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B. Unintended impact on diplomatic missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
XII. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

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 Annexes
A.1. Imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.2. Imagery of the fuel fabrication complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
A.3. Imagery of the 5-MWe reactor and light water reactor construction site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.4. Imagery of the new launch site close to Tongchangdong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.5. Items designated by Member States as luxury goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A.6. List of autonomous designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A.7. Main transportation routes in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

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 Abbreviations

HEU highly enriched uranium

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IATA International Air Transport Association

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IMO International Maritime Organization

INFCIRC information circular (IAEA publication)

LEU low enriched uranium

LLI Lloyd’s List Intelligence

MWe Megawatt-electrical

MWt Megawatt-thermal

SWU separative work unit

UF6 uranium hexafluoride

WCO World Customs Organization

11-32818 5
 I. Introduction
1. In paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), the Secretary-
General was requested to establish a Panel of Experts to gather, examine and
analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed by the
Council in its resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and, in particular, to
document incidents of non-compliance; to assist the Security Council Committee
established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in carrying out its functions; and to
make recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee or Member
States may consider to improve implementation of those measures. This is the
Panel’s second annual report.
2. The situation remains challenging. At the date of this report there are no
indications that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is ready to roll back its
proscribed programmes. The political and security climate on and around the
Korean peninsula has deteriorated in the wake of unprovoked acts of war by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. With the Six-Party Talks stalled the
sanctions remain the primary Council mechanism for both condemnation and
constraint of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s non-conventional
capabilities.
3. Although the revelation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its
uranium enrichment programme despite the sanctions might seem to raise issues
about their effectiveness, it appears that the country may have acquired and
developed much of this programme before their adoption. Recent developments are
therefore not evidence that they have been ineffective. On the contrary evidence
suggests that the sanctions have succeeded in economic terms by raising the costs of
illicit transfers while simultaneously lowering the returns to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. They are also believed to have increased the risk of
doing business for States and non-State actors, which may have a deterrent effect.
Nevertheless, implementation of the sanctions has to be improved to prevent further
development and possible proliferation of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s nuclear programmes.
4. During the reporting period, the Panel followed up on its investigations and on
the findings it has reported to date. This report and its confidential annex present the
latest findings of the Panel. It notes both challenges and successes in reports of
Member States, outlines the latest information on the proscribed nuclear, ballistic
missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, and discusses compliance with the Council’s sanctions
in preventing trade in banned items. It notes both successes and challenges in
interdiction 1 of attempts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to evade
sanctions and considers some of the techniques used in sanctions evasion, including
the financial movements associated with illicit transactions. The report then
discusses the designation of goods, entities and individuals under the resolutions
and the possibility of unintended impact of Security Council measures. It ends by
presenting a variety of recommendations to the Council, the Committee and
Member States to counter sanctions evasion more effectively.

__________________
1 In this report, the word “interdiction” refers to the inspection, seizure and disposal of cargo as
defined in paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 of resolution 1874 (2009).

6 11-32818
 II. Methodology
5. Since it began its work on 14 September 2009, the Panel of Experts has carried
out its research and investigations on the basis of the terms of its mandate provided
in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), directions received from the Committee
and operating rules and procedures adopted by its members. In this the Panel has
also been mindful of the best practices recommended by the Informal Working
Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997).
6. Prominent among these are maintaining high evidentiary methodological
standards while recognizing that the Panel does not have the investigative power of
a body of a judiciary character and lacks subpoena powers. In addition to first-hand
and on-site observations by the Experts themselves, the Panel relies on two sorts of
information: confidential information supplied by cooperating States and/or
international organizations, officials, journalists and private individuals; and
information in the public domain. In weighing the reliability of confidential
information, the Panel always kept in mind the identity and role of the sources
supplying it. In its work the Panel has tried to ensure that its assertions and findings
are corroborated by credible information sources.
7. While observing the principles of objectivity, transparency and accountability
in and for its work, the Panel has also agreed on the importance of ensuring
confidentiality. Information that has been provided to the Panel of Experts on a
confidential or restricted basis has been handled accordingly and in a manner
consistent with the responsibilities of the Panel of Experts.
8. In its investigations and report writing the Panel faces some particular
challenges, including:
• The vehement rejection of all aspects of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874
(2009) by the leadership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea means
that the Panel, unlike many other Security Council panels, has had no direct
access to the State sanctioned.
• An almost complete lack of transparency on the part of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea towards the international community.
• The difficulty of investigating potential violations that occurred before the
imposition of a reporting mechanism in case of interdiction of prohibited cargo
to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (June 2009), as well as
other previous suspicious activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea.

III. Background
9. In response to the first nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, on 9 October 2006, the Security Council, under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations, adopted resolution 1718 (2006) on 14 October
2006, by which it imposed a series of sanctions against the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to compel the country to abandon all nuclear weapons, existing
nuclear programmes, all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile programmes. Despite the international sanctions and the Six-Party Talks, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May

11-32818 7
 2009. Faced with such a blatant provocation and the country’s persistent
non-compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions as well as with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international
obligations, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1874 (2009) on
12 June 2009, strengthening the measures previously adopted.
10. On 13 June 2009, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced that
it strongly condemned and rejected Security Council resolution 1874 (2009). It also
declared that it would take a series of countermeasures “to defend the national
dignity and the country’s sovereignty”, including the weaponization of all newly
extracted plutonium and the commencement of a uranium enrichment process
pursuant to its recent decision to build its own light water reactor. 2 The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea further indicated that it did not intend to return to the
Six-Party Talks.
11. In parallel with these hostile allegations, on 26 March 2010 the Republic of
Korea corvette Cheonan was sunk, with the loss of 46 lives. The Security Council
deplored this attack in its presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/13) and determined
that such an incident endangers peace and security in the region and beyond. An
investigation by a multinational team of experts organized by the Republic of Korea
concluded that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had torpedoed the
Cheonan; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea denied this. Then on
23 November 2010, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shelled Yeonpyeong
Island, killing four nationals of the Republic of Korea, including civilians. 3 The
military actions and unprovoked acts of war of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea showed that its conventional forces remain a direct military threat to the
Republic of Korea.
12. Many analysts indicate that the internal challenges of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, such as the difficult economic situation, the complex succession
issues, 4 and a worsening food shortage, may lead the regime to be more dependent
on the military. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea amended its
constitution in April 2009 to elevate the “military-first” (Songun) ideology to a
national guiding principle. It remains to be seen how this elevation of the status of
__________________
2 See Korean Central News Agency, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures
against UNSC’s ‘Resolution 1874’”, 13 June 2009.
3 The report of the United Nations Command established pursuant to Security Council resolution
84 (1950) states that the Korean People’s Army attack against Yeonpyeong-Do was a deliberate
and premeditated action, as well as a hostile act and an act of armed force against the Republic
of Korea and its forces. It also states that it could not be justified by the Republic of Korea live
fire exercise of 23 November which was conducted in the waters contiguous to Yeonpyeong-Do
and the North-west Islands or waters customarily patrolled and administered by the Republic of
Korea and the United Nations Command. See the special investigation into the Korean People’s
Army attack on Yeonpyeong-Do and the Republic of Korea Marine Corps’ response on
23 November 2010 (S/2010/648, annex). The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea states that
its shelling was a response to Republic of Korea fire on its territorial waters. See Open
Announcement No. 2 issued on 23 February 2011 by the Inspection Group of the National
Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the truth behind the
Yonphyong Island shelling (S/2011/129, annex).
4 The Korean Central News Agency announced on 27 and 28 September 2010 that Kim Jong-un,
the youngest son of Kim Jong-il, the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, was
promoted to the rank of General of the Korean People’s Army and named to the Central
Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party.

8 11-32818
 the military in the national leadership and pre-eminent role of the military will
affect the leadership in making important decisions.
13. Several recent reports indicate that the economy of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea continues to suffer from chronic difficulties including growing
trade deficits, the lack of foreign currency reserves and especially from food
shortages. According to these reports, the country faces a protracted economic crisis
and serious food shortage due to a combination of natural tragedies and man-made
problems. 5 These include poor soil management, outdated economic, transport and
information infrastructure, all of which were exacerbated by heavy rains in
August/September 2010, the coldest winter on record in 2010/11 and the outbreak of
foot and mouth disease in February/March 2011. This followed a currency reform
debacle in November/December 2009 that disrupted internal market trade and led to
further economic constraints, food disruptions and a number of reported political
protests.
14. Careful monitoring and research are required to determine the effects of these
developments in and around the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and its
relationship with neighbouring countries. In particular, the Panel of Experts is
concerned by the recent revelations of the country’s uranium enrichment programme
and its statements that it would bolster its “nuclear deterrent”. 6 These concerns were
echoed by the display of new ballistic missiles during the military parade
celebrating the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party. 7 These indicate
that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains actively engaged in illicit
activities relating to its nuclear and ballistic missile-related programmes proscribed
by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

IV. Panel of Experts

15. The Panel of Experts was initially appointed by the Secretary-General on
12 August 2009 in accordance with paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution
1874 (2009).

__________________
5 See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Food Programme, The
State of Food Insecurity in the World (Rome, 2010); and the report of the Rapid Food Security
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (World Food Programme,
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and United Nations Children’s Fund,
24 March 2011). The accuracy of these reports has been questioned. See for example the
remarks made by the Minister of Unification of the Republic of Korea during a meeting with
representatives of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in the Republic of Korea on
25 April 2011; available from http://eng.unikorea.go.kr.
6 On 27 July 2010, in response to joint United States-Republic of Korea naval drills, General Kim
Yong-chun, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, declared that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea would bolster its nuclear deterrent in a more advanced way. In his statement
at the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly on 29 September 2010, Pak Kil-yon,
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced that, as long as United States nuclear aircraft
carriers sail around the seas of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its nuclear deterrent
could never be abandoned, but should be strengthened.
7 During the military parade of 10 October 2010, a new ballistic missile, referred to as Musudan,
and a Nodong with a new warhead were publicly displayed for the first time. The Musudan,
which has yet to be tested, is considered to have an intermediate range (3,000 to 5,500 km).

11-32818 9
 16. On 12 May 2010, the Panel presented to the Security Council its final report
pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009). The report provided information
on the findings, in particular on incidents of non-compliance, made by the Panel
during the reporting period and 23 recommendations on actions that the Security
Council, the Committee or Member States might consider to improve the
implementation of the measures set out in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
That report was issued on 5 November 2010 under the symbol S/2010/571.
17. By its resolution 1928 (2010), adopted on 7 June 2010, the Security Council
decided to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 June 2011. The
Panel’s mandate is a repeat of the initial mandate detailed in paragraph 26 of
resolution 1874 (2009), namely (a) to assist the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1718 (2006) in carrying out its mandate; (b) to gather, examine and
analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed by the
Council in its resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), in particular incidents of
non-compliance; and (c) to make recommendations on actions that the Council, the
Committee or Member States may consider to improve the implementation of those
measures. The Council also requested the Panel of Experts to provide a midterm
report on its work no later than 12 November 2010, and a final report no later than
30 days prior to the termination of its mandate, with its findings and
recommendations.
18. The members of the Panel were reappointed by the Secretary-General on
8 July 2010 (see S/2010/376) as follows: David J. Birch (United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Coordinator), Masahiko Asada (Japan), Victor D.
Comras (United States of America), Erik Marzolf (France), Young-wan Song
(Republic of Korea), Alexander Vilnin (Russian Federation) and Xiaodong Xue
(China). However, owing to other professional and personal commitments,
Mr. Comras, Mr. Asada, Mr. Birch and Mr. Song withdrew from the Panel on 1 and
11 October 2010, 20 December 2010 and 28 February 2011, respectively. Their
successors, George A. Lopez (United States of America), Takehiko Yamamoto
(Japan), Duk Ho Moon (Republic of Korea) and John Everard (United Kingdom)
were appointed by the Secretary-General on 14 October 2010, 22 February 2011 and
21 March 2011 respectively (see S/2010/527, S/2011/88 and S/2011/170).
19. On 10 November 2010, the Panel presented to the Security Council its
midterm report pursuant to resolution 1928 (2010). 8 That report highlighted the
results of more intense and recent investigations into sanctions implementation by
Member States and sanctions evasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
and presented several tasks that the Panel planned to undertake in following up its
previous recommendations.
20. As requested by the Committee on 6 December 2010, the Panel submitted to
the Committee on 28 January 2011 a report entitled “Assessing the recent nuclear
programme developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. 9 In that
report, the Panel focused on how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could
acquire specialized materials, components and technology related to uranium
enrichment based on gas centrifuges and construction of a light water reactor,
despite the fact that it was subject to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). It

__________________
8 The report remains an internal document of the Security Council.
9 The report remains an internal document of the Committee.

10 11-32818
 also contained a number of recommendations for action to be taken by the
Committee to improve implementation of sanctions, aimed at preventing further
development and possible proliferation of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea nuclear programmes. It followed the briefing held by the Committee with
Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford University (United States) on 15 December 2010
concerning his report on the construction of a uranium enrichment facility and a
light water reactor in Yongbyon in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874
(2009).
21. The Panel’s work during the reporting period included broad consultations and
dialogue with various interested countries and appropriate experts regarding the
implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874
(2009), in particular incidents of non-compliance. In addition to their meetings with
representatives of several missions to the United Nations in New York, members of
the Panel visited Israel (12 August 2010), Thailand (18-20 August 2010), Austria
(15 September 2010), the United Arab Emirates (10-12 October 2010), the United
States (13-14 December 2010), Japan (11-14 January 2011) and the Republic of
Korea (17-19 January 2011). The Panel also met with representatives of the World
Customs Organization (WCO) (21 September 2010), the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
(30 March 2011). The Panel also had contacts with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).
22. Two of the aforementioned visits, conducted at the invitation both of Member
States and of the Committee, were aimed at physically inspecting, and establishing
documentary evidence of, the prohibited cargo seized in relation with incidents of
non-compliance reported in 2009. Following those visits, the Panel assisted the
Committee in considering and taking appropriate actions on requests regarding the
disposal of the cargo. The Panel has not yet had the opportunity physically to
inspect and to establish documentary evidence of cargo seized in relation with
another incident of non-compliance reported to the Committee in February 2010.
23. Acting on the basis of the terms of its mandate provided by the Security
Council in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), as further detailed in the
implementation assistance notice about the roles of the Committee and the Panel of
Experts in investigating sanctions violations, 10 the Panel intensified its efforts to
gather all necessary information to determine the full circumstances of possible or
alleged incidents of non-compliance from States, relevant United Nations bodies,
and other interested parties. During the reporting period, the Panel addressed several
requests for information to Member States through their Permanent Missions to the
United Nations. Those requests were aimed at gathering additional and/or
complementary information in relation to reports received by the Committee
regarding inspection, seizure and disposal, as well as other possible incidents of
non-compliance which came to the attention of the Panel through other sources.
24. During the reporting period, the Panel has been active in assisting the
Committee. In accordance with the Committee’s successive programmes of work,
__________________
10 The notice, “Information to assist United Nations Member States in carrying out their
obligations under Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)”, was approved by
the Committee on 10 August 2010. It was transmitted to all Member States in a note verbale dated
3 September 2010 and is available from the Committee’s website www.un.org/sc/committees/1718.

11-32818 11
 the Panel provided to the Committee several discussions papers and/or draft
implementation assistance notices regarding the application of some of the measures
set out in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). The Panel also assisted the
Committee in responses to enquiries made by Member States. In July 2010, the
Panel provided to the Committee its views regarding the designation of goods and
entities subject to the measures imposed by the Security Council. Further, the Panel
provided to the Committee on 27 January 2011 its views on how the request to open
a non-resident foreign currency account made by an Embassy of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea could be met in a manner consistent with resolutions
1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
25. The Panel has also been active in assisting the Committee’s outreach activities.
On 20 December 2010, the Panel participated in the open briefing to the wider
United Nations membership carried out by the Chair of the Committee to inform
Member States about the activities of the Committee and the Panel of Experts,
including the adoption of the Committee’s comprehensive programme of work,
cooperation with Member States, preparation of documents to assist
implementation, and efforts made to improve national reporting requirements.
26. In addition, members of the Panel participated in the 11th International Export
Control Conference (Kyiv, 8 and 9 June 2010), the Harvard Project for Asia and
International Relations Conference 2010 (Singapore, 22 August 2010), the 22nd
United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues (Saitama, Japan, 25-27 August
2010), the 12th Beijing Seminar on International Security (Beijing, 5-9 September
2010), the European Union/United Nations Sanctions Seminar (Brussels, 29 and
30 November 2010), the 18th Asian Export Control Seminar (Tokyo, 15-17 February
2011) and the Global Trans-shipment Seminar (Dubai, 7-9 March 2011). On these
occasions, the Panel had the opportunity to make presentations, to collect relevant
information on the implementation of the Security Council measures, and to
exchange views and discuss issues of common interest with other participants,
including submission of national implementation reports.
27. As recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on
General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997) and in order to increase efficiency and
decrease duplication of effort the Panel contacted and met other sanctions expert
groups to exchange views and information related to the implementation of relevant
Security Council resolutions. In all such cases each Panel has abided by the strictest
standards of confidentiality regarding information provided to it on a confidential or
restricted basis.
28. The interactions of the Panel are democratic, inclusive and participatory.
Internal decisions have been taken jointly by the Experts and the Panel has always
attempted to reach consensus. In the rare cases when consensus cannot be achieved
on substantive issues, the perspective of the majority is reflected and different
view(s) in the Panel are also reflected.

V. Reports of Member States

29. Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) stipulate two types of reporting
mechanisms by Member States. The first one involves reporting to the Security
Council on the steps taken by Member States to implement the measures imposed by
resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). The second involves reporting to the

12 11-32818
 Committee on inspection, seizure and disposal of cargo, the provision of which is
prohibited to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
30. Information provided in both types of reports plays an important role in
ensuring the effective implementation of the Security Council measures. In
paragraph 3 of resolution 1928 (2010) the Council, reiterating the obligation laid
down by paragraph 27 of resolution 1874 (2009), urged all States, relevant United
Nations bodies and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Committee
established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts, in
particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of
the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

A. National implementation reports

31. Member States are called upon to report to the Security Council and thereafter
upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken to implement
effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as
paragraphs 9, 10, 18, 19 and 20 of resolution 1874 (2009). Submission of national
implementation reports by all Member States is extremely important both for an
overall evaluation of the steps taken to implement sanctions and to ensure their
effective implementation.
32. After the submission of the Panel’s final report pursuant to resolution 1874
(2009) on 12 May 2010, 15 Member States provided national implementation
reports and additional relevant information. As at the end of April 2011, 78 Member
States and the European Union had submitted their national implementation reports
pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and 61 Member States had done so pursuant to
resolution 1874 (2009). A special concern of the Panel continues to be that 107
Member States have yet to report on their national implementation.
33. In terms of geographical distribution, an analysis of the 107 non-reporting or
late-reporting Member States indicate that 48 are members of the Group of African
States, 28 of the Group of Asian States, 24 of the Group of Latin American and
Caribbean States, 5 of the Group of Eastern European States and 2 of the Group of
Western European and other States.
34. In June 2010, the Panel submitted to the Committee a quarterly update on the
implementation by Member States covering the period from 1 March to 3 May 2010.
In accordance with the programme of work of the Committee for the period from
1 November 2010 to 31 October 2011, the Panel remained ready to assist the
Committee in conducting and completing, as appropriate, a comprehensive review
of the reports received from Member States on their national implementation.
35. The national implementation reports received during the reporting period
continued to vary considerably in content, detail and format. Several describe in
detail the actions taken to implement the measures set out in the resolutions, but
others state only that steps have been taken or will be taken in implementation of the
resolutions. As stated earlier, it will remain difficult for the Committee and the
Panel of Experts to evaluate the implementation of the measures set out in
resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) on the sole basis of such a limited level of
information.

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 36. As instructed, the Panel of Experts submitted to the Committee, including
through its final report pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), a number of
recommendations to stimulate more concrete and more in-depth reporting. Those
recommendations included, inter alia, circulation of reminders on a regular basis,
indicating the availability of the Committee and the Panel of Experts to provide any
assistance to the Member States; various outreach activities; provision of an
optional guideline template as a checklist and explanation of Member States’
reporting responsibilities; and an informal guidance paper on how to prepare
national reports. The Panel also recommended that the Committee assign the Panel a
special task of entering into dialogue with or providing assistance to non-reporting
or late-reporting Member States with respect to completion or submission of
national implementation reports.
37. On 3 December 2010, the Panel submitted to the Committee a draft
implementation notice aimed at assisting Member States in preparing and submitting
reports on measures they have taken to implement certain provisions in resolutions
1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). This notice, which provides an optional checklist
template including all of the measures about which the Security Council has
requested information, was approved by the Committee on 21 January 2011 and
circulated to Member States in a note verbale dated 7 February 2011. 11 In the same
note verbale, the Committee seized the opportunity to remind Member States of
their reporting obligations pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 1874 (2009) and to
encourage reporting on their national implementation. The Panel remains ready to
assist the Committee in implementing other recommendations to stimulate more
concrete and more in-depth reporting.
38. During the reporting period, the Panel of Experts intensified its outreach
activities. Since 12 May 2010, Experts of the Panel have participated in seven
conferences and seminars where they presented the Security Council measures and
invited non-reporting or late-reporting Member States to submit their national
implementation reports as soon as possible. Through those conferences and
seminars, as well as through its bilateral consultations, the Panel reached out to
more than 90 Member States, including 25 non-reporting or late-reporting Member
States.
39. The lack of consistent implementation of the measures related to luxury goods
(paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006)) remains an area of specific and
important concern. A review of submitted national implementation reports indicates
that many continue to omit any mention of luxury goods and that many countries
have yet to adopt controls over such exports to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. It also shows that national definitions of luxury goods vary 12 and associated
national export controls are being implemented in an uneven manner, which risks
undercutting the effectiveness of this measure. These concerns led the Panel to
develop a series of recommendations which were submitted to the Committee, as
detailed below. 13

__________________
11 This document is available from the Committee’s website, www.un.org/sc/committees/1718.
12 See the illustrative list of items designated by the Member States as luxury goods as at 30 April
2011 in annex A.5.
13 See section VII.C (Ban on luxury goods).

14 11-32818
 B. Compliance-related reports (inspection, seizure and disposal)

40. Under paragraph 15 of resolution 1874 (2009), any Member State that
undertakes an inspection or seizes and disposes of cargo is required to promptly
submit reports containing relevant details to the Committee on the inspection,
seizure and disposal. Paragraph 16 of that resolution also specifies that Member
States that do not receive the cooperation of the flag State with the inspection of a
vessel on the high seas or in directing the vessel to a port for inspection are required
to report such refusals to the Committee. The fact that the Security Council chose
specifically to “require” such reports underlines this obligation. As inspection,
seizure and disposal are to be conducted in cases of suspected non-compliance, the
Panel has chosen to describe these reports herein as “compliance-related reports”.
41. Since 12 May 2010, the Committee has received five official “compliance-
related reports” providing additional relevant information, in response to requests
made by the Committee and the Panel of Experts, on incidents of non-compliance
previously reported pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 1874 (2009).
42. During the reporting period, the Committee received an additional report on an
attempted violation which does not fall into the categories defined by paragraphs 15
and 16 of resolution 1874 (2009). The Committee was informed by a Member State
that on 9 March 2010 a private company received an unsolicited suspicious business
proposal for the development of a joint venture from the Chamber of Commerce of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The purpose of the joint venture was to
develop a significant capability within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
to produce graphite-related products, including ultrapure graphite concentrate,
which could have contributed to its nuclear programmes.
43. That report, which contains valuable information, illustrates the importance of
expanding the reporting mechanisms specified by resolution 1874 (2009), as proposed
by the Panel in its previous final report, to include the provision of information on
accomplished (when proscribed items are known to have been supplied to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), attempted (when the export of proscribed
items to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is stopped before the items
actually enter into international commerce) and denied cases (when acquisition or
export permission is sought but immediately denied by private companies or the
relevant authorities). In that regard, it should be recalled that the Panel of Experts is
mandated by paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse
information on all incidents of non-compliance. This case also illustrates the
important role that private companies can play in the successful implementation of
sanctions and underlines the importance of internal compliance programmes.
44. Upon receiving compliance-related reports, the Committee, in each case, sent
notes verbales to all Member States which could provide additional relevant
information on this case. The response rates to those enquiries have varied
considerably. In some instances, reports have yet to be received. All Member States
should be reminded that in resolutions 1874 (2009) and 1928 (2010) the Council
urged all States to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in
particular by supplying any information at their disposal.
45. During the reporting period, the Committee received additional communications
from Member States requesting further guidance on the disposal of the prohibited
seized cargo. Following the completion of the investigation, including the physical

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 inspection and the establishment of documentary evidence by the Panel, the
Committee did not raise any objection to the disposal of the seized prohibited items.

VI. Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic

missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea
46. In resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), the Security Council decided that
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall abandon all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programmes, all other existing weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. In
particular, the Council directed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to act
strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403) and provide IAEA transparency measures
extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals,
documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary
by IAEA. To date, there is no indication that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea is ready to abandon those programmes in a manner consistent with the
Security Council decisions and the international non-proliferation norms. On the
contrary, recent developments and observations indicate that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea remains actively engaged in such programmes.

A. Nuclear programmes

47. Over the past years, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has advanced
its nuclear programmes and improved its nuclear weapons capabilities. Without
returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea has not permitted IAEA to implement safeguards in the country since
December 2002. Defying international sanctions, the country is bolstering its
“nuclear deterrent”. With the Six-Party Talks stalled the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea was able to reverse disablement measures and the verification
protocol was not adopted. During the reporting period, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea periodically announced escalations: weaponization of separated
plutonium, revelation of its uranium enrichment programme, construction of a light
water reactor, and statements about nuclear fusion technology.
48. Until 2009, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea categorically denied
the existence of any uranium enrichment programme, including its illicit
procurement activities abroad over the years as well as the production of uranium
hexafluoride (UF6), the feed gas for centrifuges. 14 In April 2009 the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea declared officially that it planned to construct a light
__________________
14 In October 2002, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea acknowledged to an American
delegation the existence of clandestine uranium enrichment programme, but immediately after
denied it had made any such admission. This confrontation led to the termination of the 1994
Agreed Framework. Soon after, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced its
withdrawal from the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, extracted bomb-grade
plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods stored since 1994, and conducted its first underground
nuclear test (October 2006).

16 11-32818
 water reactor and produce its nuclear fuel. In June 2009, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea further announced that it would commence uranium enrichment.
In a letter to the Security Council dated 3 September 2009 (S/2009/443), it indicated
that the experimental uranium enrichment had been successfully conducted “to enter
into the completion phase”. In November 2010, the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea revealed to two groups of United States visitors its light water reactor
construction site. Then, in a dramatic move, it showed Siegfried Hecker of Stanford
University a 2,000 gas centrifuge plant, the Uranium Enrichment Workshop. This
was further confirmed by the Korean Central News Agency in an article of
30 November 2010 stating that “a modern factory for uranium enrichment equipped
with thousands of centrifuges is operating” to supply fuel to the light water reactor
under construction. These unilateral acts show that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea has continued both to refuse to accept and clearly to violate
Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and run contrary to the
agreements established by the Six-Party Talks. 15
49. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has stated, and Siegfried Hecker’s
reports have shown, 16 that it is developing uranium enrichment based on gas
centrifuge technologies, which are extremely difficult to detect but easy to
proliferate. 17 The size and sophistication of the 2,000 centrifuges in six cascades
greatly exceeded the international community’s expectations and pose serious
challenges to efforts to halt proliferation. The revelation and stated intentions of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea complicate the diplomatic process including
the Six-Party Talks. Redefining the denuclearization goal, sequencing future
milestones, and devising monitoring and verification tasks will be enormous
challenges.

1. Uranium enrichment programme revealed

50. Siegried Hecker reports that he was shown a modern small industrial-scale
uranium enrichment facility with 2,000 centrifuges arranged in six cascades and was
told that the centrifuge facility was now operational, producing low enriched
uranium (LEU) destined for fuel for the experimental light water reactor under
construction. 18 The chief process engineer said the centrifuges were not of the P-1
type and that their rotors were made of alloys containing iron, and implied that the
rotors had single bellows. The engineer claimed that all components were
manufactured domestically, but modelled after the centrifuges at Almelo and
__________________
15 Besides Security Council resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009),
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has violated, reversed, or nullified all its previous
commitments and obligations, including under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (1970), the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1992),
the IAEA-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Safeguards Agreement (1992), the United
States-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Agreed Framework (1994), and the agreements
established by the Six-Party Talks.
16 See, for example, Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear
Complex”, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November
2010, and “Redefining denuclearization in North Korea”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
20 December 2010 .
17 Low enriched uranium cascades can be readily reconfigured to produce weapons-grade highly
enriched uranium. This is the reason why every fuel production centrifuge plant is put under
IAEA safeguards and monitoring.
18 See annexes A.1 and A.2 for specific location of the Uranium Enrichment Workshop.

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 Rokkasho-mura. 19 The chief engineer stated that the enrichment capacity was
8,000 kg separative work units per year (SWU/year), which is consistent with the
performance of P-2 centrifuges. 20 The average enrichment level is 3.5 per cent and
the tails are 0.27 per cent. Dr. Hecker assessed that, with an 8,000 kg SWU/year
capacity, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could produce up to two tons
of LEU, or up to 25-33 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), per year, sufficient
for one to two nuclear weapons.

Figure 1
Generic drawing of an early URENCO-type centrifuge

Source: David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Taking stock: North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment
Program”, Institute for Science and International Security, 8 October 2010.
Note: On the basis of Dr. Hecker’s description, the Institute for Science and International
Security assesses that the centrifuges are likely to be similar to the design shown above.
However, the tube is probably one piece with a bellows created at the centre of the tube.

51. Siegfried Hecker has mentioned he was not able independently to verify
whether the facility was operational, but the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s claim of a partially or fully operational facility was not inconsistent with
what he saw. Owing to the lack of access to the facility, the Panel cannot determine
at this stage whether the uranium enrichment workshop is operational. It is not yet
__________________
19 URENCO enrichment facilities are located in Almelo, Netherlands, and Japanese Nuclear Fuels
Limited operates a uranium enrichment facility in Rokkasho-mura.
20 Through its long-time cooperation with the Pakistani Khan network, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea is estimated to have duplicated or developed a new design based on P-2
centrifuges.

18 11-32818
 known whether the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did obtain all it needs to
assemble each centrifuge, or further to operate the cascades consisting of 2,000
centrifuges at an ultra-fast speed, or to achieve the final stage of operating them
with uranium hexafluoride. The Panel met a couple of independent experts who
discussed, with varying degrees of confidence, whether the uranium enrichment
workshop could have been operational in November 2010 as claimed by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engineers or would be in the future.
Similarly, the Panel learned that there are some technical aspects described by
Dr. Hecker which need to be further clarified. 21
52. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has repeatedly claimed to have
run the light water reactor and uranium enrichment programmes without external
inputs. But it acquired such external inputs both before 22 and after 23 imposition of
the Security Council sanctions. There are indications that experimental work may
have been undertaken in the production of UF6 at the end of the 1990s 24 and that
full-scale production of UF6 could have been achieved in the early 2000s. The
volume of known attempts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to acquire
aluminium tubes in the early 2000s 25 suggests that it may have advanced
significantly in the experimental phase of its centrifuge programme and was
considering moving to a larger scale.
53. Because the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea built the uranium
enrichment workshop inside the existing uranium metal fuel rod fabrication
building, 26 the assembly of six cascades of 2,000 centrifuges started only after the
IAEA inspectors had left the Yongbyon site in April 2009. However, the country’s
claim to have developed its uranium enrichment programme in such a short time,
including the manufacture of centrifuge components and feed material, is unrealistic.
The Panel strongly believes that the 2,000 centrifuge cascades seen by Dr. Hecker
were based on centrifuges produced and demonstrated at an undisclosed facility and
either rapidly moved to or replicated at the uranium enrichment workshop. Moreover
Dr. Hecker and many other experts strongly believe both that the Democratic
__________________
21 Although most experts believe that the enrichment plant may operate fully as the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea engineers stated, a few expressed sceptical opinions. One expert
raised a “few puzzling issues” regarding the visual observations made by Dr. Hecker, including
the diametre of the centrifuge and the number of centrifuges that form cascades not being as
consistent as one would expect for a P-2 centrifuge facility.
22 In 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attempted to illegally import specialized
items, an inverter and several power supply devices, that could have had application in a gas
centrifuge programme. Vacuum pumps observed by IAEA in Yongbyon in 2007 were illegally
imported in 2003. There are also indications about acquisitions of aluminium tubes in the early
2000s (see footnote 25).
23 It is reported that, in 2010, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea illegally imported two
computer-controlled machine tools. See “Official confirms raiding firm over N Korea sales”,
Taipei Times, 8 September 2010.
24 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reportedly acquired uranium hexafluoride (UF6)
storage equipment from Switzerland at the end of the 1990s.
25 Early in 2003, a German tried to export illegally to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea a
quantity of British-manufactured tubing sufficient for 4,000 P-2 centrifuges. In the same period,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea successfully obtained enough tubes for 2,700 P-2
centrifuges from a Russian company. Tubes handed by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea to the United States in 2007 were part of that delivery.
26 This building was called “building 4” and the IAEA inspectors and the United States technical
team monitored “disablement steps” done inside the building until April 2009.

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 People’s Republic of Korea has pursued uranium enrichment clandestinely for a long
time and that the centrifuge plant shown to Dr. Hecker cannot be the only one
existing in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — it is highly likely that one
or more parallel covert facilities capable of LEU or HEU production exist elsewhere.
This possibility poses great challenges for the future dismantlement of all the
country’s nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.
54. The Panel believes that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must have
been developing its uranium enrichment programme for several years or even
decades. The historical data suggests that it usually takes 10 to 20 years from the
research and development stage for any country to reach an operational level of
industrial-scale pilot plant. 27 This timeframe would place the beginning of the
uranium enrichment programme in the 1990s, which is when the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea tried to strike a deal to barter its Nodong missiles. 28 In
exchange for supplying ballistic missile technologies to Abdul Qadeer Khan of
Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea might have been provided
with a starter kit of centrifuges and other components for a pilot centrifuge
infrastructure as well as grounds-on training. A. Q. Khan indicated that Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea technicians had access to the Khan Research Laboratory
as early as 1993 or 1994, where they received grounds-on training about centrifuges.
Pervez Musharraf, former President of Pakistan, confirmed that two dozen P-1/P-2
centrifuge, measuring equipment and assistance in centrifuge technology were
transferred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea around the year 2000.
55. Owing to the flat denial by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
lack of information, a majority of nuclear experts had estimated the current status of
the country’s uranium enrichment programme to range from a research and
development-level facility to a pilot-scale gas centrifuge plant. 29 The fact that the
actual capacities of the country exceed these analyses suggests that numerous illicit
procurement activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea over the years
__________________
27 See Global Fissile Material Report 2009, (International Panel on Fissile Materials, October
2009); available from www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf.
28 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may have explored gas centrifuges in the 1980s, but
quickly abandoned its efforts because of technological limitations. Reportedly, in 1992 the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea told Hans Blix, then Director General of IAEA, that it
had thought about uranium enrichment but did not go further because it was beyond its technical
capabilities and that it had no interest in enriching its own uranium as it was then seeking USSR
assistance in the construction of light water reactors. During his first trip to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea in June 2004, a Yongbyon official was reported to have told one of
Dr. Hecker’s colleagues that it had a uranium centrifuge programme in the 1980s, but gave it up
in favour of plutonium in the early 1990s. See Siegfried S. Hecker, “Redefining denuclearization
in North Korea”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 20 December 2010.
29 For example, “The publicly available evidence seems to indicate that North Korea has a very
limited capacity for enrichment: Hui Zhang, “Assessing North Korea’s uranium enrichment
capabilities”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 June 2009; “We believe that North Korea is
not technically prepared to enrich uranium beyond the laboratory scale”: Siegfried S. Hecker,
Sean C. Lee and Chaim Braun, “DPRK’s Choice: Bombs over Electricity”, The Bridge, vol. 40,
No. 10, (Summer 2010), pp. 5-12; “The evidence supports North Korea’s assertion about having
finished the experimental phase of its centrifuge program. In addition, it is probably moving to
enrich uranium on a larger scale. The existence of a pilot scale plant appears possible, but
determining its exact operational status or location remains uncertain”, David Albright and Paul
Brannan, “Taking Stock: North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program”, Institute for Science
and International Security (ISIS), 8 October 2010.

20 11-32818
 probably went undetected. A centrifuge typically contains around 100 separate
components, many of which require specialist production techniques. The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may have continued to procure illegally,
concealing and diversifying its acquisition of proscribed items by establishing its
own far-reaching network. In this regard, the Panel has identified some of the main
actors, including those who may have operated as procurement and sales agents for
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel has also identified some of
the methods which could be used by these agents in sanctions evasion and has
documented how they were able to exploit loopholes and vulnerabilities in the
global transport and trading system.
56. The possibility of exports of weapons-grade fissile material (HEU) or
centrifuge design and components to countries of proliferation concern also raises
new challenges to international non-proliferation efforts. The Libyan case was a
prominent one. Government agencies and independent experts agree that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was the source of the two tons of UF6
imported by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the early 2000s 30 via the Pakistani Khan
network. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also received many more UF6
casks than had been seen by IAEA inspectors when they had access to its nuclear
sites. 31 The Panel received information that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea was involved in the clandestine construction of a nuclear reactor in another
State. In this regard, the Panel had noted the report of IAEA. 32
57. In terms of the military application of the uranium enrichment workshop,
independent experts indicate that the 3-4 per cent LEU which could be produced by
that facility is nearly 70 per cent of the effort towards making weapons-grade
HEU. 33 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could at any time further enrich
LEU to weapons-grade HEU relatively quickly, either at Yongbyon or at an
undisclosed facility. The Panel believes both that, despite the assertions of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the contrary, its long pursuit of a uranium
enrichment programme was primarily for military purposes, and that the risk that
the uranium enrichment workshop could easily be converted for military purposes
should be underlined.
58. The Panel of Experts strongly believes that the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea should be compelled to abandon its uranium enrichment programme and
that all aspects of the programme should then be placed under international
monitoring, and suggests steps towards this in its recommendations.
__________________
30 See the reports to the IAEA Board of Governors on the implementation of the Safeguards
Agreement in the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya dated 1 June 2004 (Gov/2004/33),
and 12 September 2008 (Gov/2008/39).
31 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Taking Stock: North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program”
(see footnote 29 above).
32 See section VII.A. of the present report (Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile-related exports and imports).
33 See, for example, David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Disabling North Korea’s Uranium
Enrichment Program”, ISIS, 20 January 2011. They also estimate that, if the claims of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are true, the revealed uranium enrichment workshop has
approximately twice the actual capacity of the Iranian Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and that
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could produce enough LEU per year to produce,
after further enrichment, sufficient HEU for three nuclear weapons. They also raise the
possibility that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, like the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
received from the A. Q. Khan network a Pakistani centrifuge plant design for making HEU.

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 59. The Panel also recalls that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should
return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency-
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Safeguards Agreement (1992). The Panel
further believes that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should sign and
ratify the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)) at the earliest date. The
Panel considers that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea presents complex
challenges to IAEA monitoring and verification both because of the number and
sophistication of its facilities and because of possible proliferation activities. It is
therefore important to define the verification role of IAEA and its cooperation with
the Six-Party Talks, and the Panel hopes that IAEA will establish how it might
approach future verification work in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
60. Experts’ views vary as to why the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
showed Dr. Hecker its light water reactor and uranium enrichment workshop. A
symbolic achievement? An incentive for re-engagement? 34 The Panel considers that
it is important that intentions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be
clarified.

2. Light water reactor project

61. Dr. Hecker was also taken to an experimental light water reactor construction
site. 35 He was able to determine that the reinforced-concrete containment vessel,
which was built on a pad roughly 25 by 28 m, will be 22 m in diameter, 0.9 m thick
and 40 m high. The engineers asserted that the reactor was designed for a power
level of 100 MWt and to serve as a prototype for the construction of a bigger light
water reactor. The chief engineer explained that the construction had been started on
31 July 2010 and the target date for operation was set at 2012, which looks
unrealistic. Dr. Hecker and many other experts believe that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea uses its new light water reactor aspirations as a justification for
the existence of its uranium enrichment programme.
62. Dr. Hecker assesses that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea can
produce most of the required key components indigenously with varying degrees of
effort. The size of the experimental light water reactor seems reasonable, the
drawing simple enough, and safety does not appear to be a primary concern for the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The country could produce the fuel, 36 the
pumps and the electronic components. The only uncertainty appears to be the
country’s capacity to build the reactor vessel indigenously. 37 The vessel requires
very specific material as well as good welding techniques which the Democratic
__________________
34 Or was it because Ambassador Pritchard, who visited Pyongyang days before Dr. Hecker,
warned the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that the international community would be
sceptical of its claims that its enrichment efforts were for non-military purposes unless
international inspectors, or at least Dr. Hecker, were shown the new plant?
35 See annexes A.1 and A.3 for specific location and progress of the construction.
36 The chief engineer acknowledged to Dr. Hecker that they expected to have difficulty fabricating
the uranium dioxide fuel (UO2), which is different from the metal fuel used in the gas-graphite
reactor. They had not yet decided whether to use stainless steel or zircaloy cladding, neither of
which they have used before.
37 According to the chief engineer, the pressure vessel will be fabricated off site with high-strength
steel, possibly with a stainless steel liner. It will be transported by rail and welded on site. He
declared that they will produce all the pumps and other components domestically, and have the
requisite welding capacities.

22 11-32818
 People’s Republic of Korea may need some time to acquire. The general view is that
light water reactors are proliferation-resistant, thus the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea is not building this experimental reactor to produce weapons-
grade plutonium. As soon as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engineers
gain experience with the experimental light water reactor they plan to move on to
build larger light water reactors.

3. Plutonium production programme

63. For more than 20 years the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has run an
extensive plutonium-based nuclear programme at Yongbyon, 100 km north of
Pyongyang. Through three to four campaigns of spent fuel reprocessing, the country
is estimated to have extracted 30 to 50 kg of plutonium, sufficient for six to eight
nuclear weapons. Both the exact status of the separated plutonium and the extent of
its weaponization are unclear.
64. Dr. Hecker observed that the 5-MWe reactor had not restarted since July 2007
and the 50-MWe reactor under construction was being dismantled with large cranes.
As mentioned above, the former uranium metal fuel fabrication building had been
converted into the uranium enrichment workshop. There was no apparent activity at
the reprocessing plant, but he was told that this would be converted to receive the
spent fuel rods from light water reactors. Dr. Hecker still estimates that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could resume all plutonium-related
operations within six months and could make 6 kg of plutonium, roughly one
bomb’s worth, per year.
65. Both a Member State and Dr. Hecker have expressed concern about safety and
contamination levels at the decaying Yongbyon site. 38 The dormant 5-MWe reactor,
radiochemical laboratory (reprocessing plant), and spent fuel storage sites including
two undeclared ones pose a high risk of accident and contamination. The Panel
believes that safety issues should be discussed as an integral part of the
denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and further notes
that reckless decommissioning or dismantlement at Yongbyon could cause an
environmental disaster. 39

4. Other nuclear activities

66. The Korean Central News Agency announced on 12 May 2010 that “Scientists
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have worked hard to develop nuclear
fusion technology their own way” — “for obtaining safe and environment-friendly
new energy” and that “in this course, Korean style thermo-nuclear reaction devices
were designed and manufactured”. It claimed that the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea “made a definite breakthrough toward the development of new energy and
opened up a new phase in the nation’s development of the latest science and
technology.” 40 If this report is correct, this would constitute another violation of
Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

__________________
38 On 29 March 2011, during bilateral ministerial meetings in Beijing, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea raised the safety issues with his Chinese counterpart.
39 Dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex will create an enormous volume of radioactive
waste in addition to existing inventories of spent fuel and reprocessing wastes.
40 Korean Central New Agency, “DPRK succeeds in nuclear fusion”, 12 May 2010.

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 5. Disablement steps under the Six-Party Talks
67. In both resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) the Security Council called
upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return immediately to the Six-
Party Talks without precondition and to work towards the expeditious
implementation of the Joint Statement and other documents as agreed at the Six-
Party Talks. 41 In April 2009 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea suspended
all implementation of the Six-Party Talks agreements. During the reporting period,
despite all the efforts of intensive mediation and the active interactions among the
relevant Member States, owing to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s
lack of sincerity and failure substantively to engage, the Six-Party Talks remained
stalled.
68. The nuclear disablement process under the Six-Party Talks framework thus has
remained unclear. Of the three remaining disablement steps, it is unknown whether
the control rod drive mechanism of the 5-MWe reactor has been removed while the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s claim to have removed all 8,000 spent fuel
rods from that reactor and completed their reprocessing by August 2009 has yet to
be verified. The reported proposal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to
ship out or sell the 12,000 fresh fuel rods remains unconfirmed. The next and final
stage, after disablement, will be the decommissioning and dismantlement of the
weapons production facilities, encompassing the nuclear weapons and all existing
plutonium and uranium enrichment programmes. The terms of this enormous work
still need to be formulated and negotiated. This final stage may include an early
return of IAEA monitoring of the stock of weapons-grade fissile material and
verification of actual nuclear weapons dismantlement.

B. Ballistic missile programmes

69. Following the launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of

seven ballistic missiles, including a long-range ballistic missile, the Security
Council adopted resolution 1695 (2006) demanding that the country suspend all
activities related to its ballistic missile programmes and re-establish its pre-existing
commitments to a moratorium on missile launches. By resolution 1718 (2006) the
Council further decided that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall
abandon its ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible
manner. However, on 5 April 2009, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
launched a multi-stage ballistic missile, 42 which it claimed was an effort to place an
experimental satellite into orbit. Subsequently, the Security Council by resolution
1874 (2009) demanded that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not conduct
any further launch using ballistic missile technology.
70. However, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has completed or is
about to complete the construction of a second launch site for long-range rockets
close to Tongchangdong on its west coast. 43 The installations appear bigger and
more sophisticated than its original site, located on the east coast, used for the 1998,
__________________
41 There have been reports that, since the adoption of those resolutions, both the context of and
approaches to the Six-Party Talks have changed.
42 Derived from the Taepodong-2 and officially identified by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea as Unha-2.
43 See annex A.4 for specific location and progress of the construction.

24 11-32818
 2006 and 2009 Taepodong missile launches. Although signs of construction were
visible in the early 2000s, the development of that facility accelerated only recently.
Owing to its possible contribution to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s
ballistic missile programme, the Panel considers that this facility could constitute a
violation of relevant Security Council resolutions. Further, any rocket launch from
this or any other facility, independently from its stated purpose, would also
constitute a violation of Security Council resolutions.
71. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea embarked on the development of
ballistic missiles based on Scud technology in the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, it
domestically produced and deployed 300-km-range Scud-Bs and 500-km-range
Scud-Cs. In the 1990s, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea succeeded in
test-firing a 1,300-km-range Nodong missile. By the end of the 1990s, it began
developing new intermediate and long-range missiles. During the military parade
celebrating the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party on 10 October
2010, it publicly displayed its new Musudan intermediate-range missile. It is
generally estimated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has deployed
600 Scuds and 300 Nodong missiles. The number of operational or deployed
Musudan is not known.
72. The indigenous infrastructure of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
has been supplemented by imports of specialized material and components. In an
effort to get hard currency and advance its own programmes, the country has been
actively engaged in the export of complete systems, components and technology to
numerous customers in the Middle East and South Asia. During a country visit, the
Panel received briefings from government officials indicating that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea had been continuing its proscribed ballistic-related
cooperation with several countries. According to the briefings, it employs various
techniques, including exchange of visits by scientists and technicians, exchange of
data, reciprocal participation in tests and analysis of results. Those indications were
echoed by observations made during the military parade of 10 October 2010.
Alongside the Musudan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea displayed a
new warhead for its Nodong missile, which presented a strong design similarity with
the Iranian Shahab-3 triconic warhead.
73. The capacity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to develop nuclear
weapons small enough to be fitted in its missiles, whose range is increasing, is a
subject of uncertainty and concern. Many experts believe that the country has
engaged in the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (> 5,500 km). In
doing so the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would certainly have to
overcome technological hurdles related to the development of a sophisticated
guidance system, warheads able to support extra-atmospheric re-entry and more
advanced propulsion systems.

11-32818 25
 C. Other existing weapons of mass destruction programmes

74. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has neither signed nor acceded to
the Chemical Weapons Convention. 44 However, it is a party to the Geneva Protocol
of 1925 45 and to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 46 Despite its
denials, it is suspected to possess a large stockpile of chemical weapons, and of
maintaining a biological weapons programme to independently cultivate and produce
agents such as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox and cholera since the 1980s. 47
75. Unclassified estimates of its chemical arsenal are imprecise, but it is broadly
believed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea possesses 2,500 to 5,000
tons of chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun
and other persistent nerve agents. Those weapons could be delivered using long-
range artillery, rockets, ballistic missiles or aircraft bombs. It is estimated that at
least eight production facilities are involved, including the Chungsu Chemical Plant
and the Eunduk Chemical Plant.
76. According to information provided to the Panel by a Member State, the Second
Economic Committee of the National Defence Commission, through its Fifth
Machine Industry Bureau, and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences are
believed to play leading roles in activities related to the production, import and
export of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s chemical and biological
weapons programmes. Green Pine Associated Company, which replaced KOMID
after its designation by the Committee in April 2009, is deeply engaged in the illicit
procurement of chemical material and other specialty items abroad. 48
77. Before the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006), several acquisitions by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of material and equipment with chemical or
biological weapons applications had been widely documented. However, no official
allegations have been presented to the Committee concerning the provision of
proscribed chemical or biological items to or from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea since the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009). Nevertheless, the
Panel notes that in October 2009 the Government of the Republic of Korea informed
the Committee that it had seized four containers of working protection garments that
were deemed to have military utility for chemical protection. Reportedly, the
shipment was en route from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the
Syrian Arab Republic. 49

__________________
44 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which entered into force on 29 April 1997.
45 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which entered into force on 8 February 1928. The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea acceded on 4 January 1989.
46 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which entered into
force on 26 March 1975. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea acceded on 13 March
1987.
47 See for example the “Defense White Paper” published in 2010 by the Ministry of National
Defense of the Republic of Korea.
48 The Second Economic Committee of the National Defence Commission, the Second Academy of
Natural Sciences and Green Pine Associated Company were designated autonomously by the
United States on 30 August 2010 and the European Union on 22 December 2010.
49 The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic disavowed the shipment.

26 11-32818
 VII. Export and import-related measures
78. Trade-related measures adopted by the Security Council in resolutions 1718
(2006) and 1874 (2009) are aimed at convincing the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea to comply with its international obligations, as well as inhibiting its ability
to acquire equipment, material, technology and financial and other resources which
could contribute to its nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile programmes. These measures include:
• A ban on the provision to or the procurement from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as
specified in the resolutions, by the Security Council or the Committee, which
could contribute to the nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-
related, or ballistic missile-related programmes of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.
• A ban on the provision to or the procurement from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea of all arms and related materiel (with the exception, subject
to notification requirements, of the provision to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea of small arms and light weapons and their related materiel).
• A ban on the transfer to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision,
manufacture, maintenance or use of all the items cited above (except for small
arms and light weapons provided to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea).
• A ban on the provision of luxury goods to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea.

A. Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-

related exports and imports

79. In June 2010, the Committee was informed of a first case of attempted
violation. A Member State reported that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
attempted to acquire items, technology and know-how which could have contributed
to its nuclear-related programmes. The report stated that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea Chamber of Commerce proposed a joint venture project to a
private company that encompassed several areas of cooperation related to the
extraction of graphite and production of graphite-related products. The proposed
areas of cooperation encompassed the development of a graphite mine, the
construction of a magnesia-graphite brick factory, the construction of a graphite
electrode factory, the provision of a complete set of equipment for processing
expansible graphite and impalpable graphite powder, and the provision of a
complete set of ultrapure graphite concentrate processing equipment. According to a
senior representative of the company whom the Panel met, the management of the
company considered that ultrapure graphite concentrate could have a utility in
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear programmes 50 and decided, on its
__________________
50 The supply of nuclear grade graphite to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has
been prohibited because of its applications in the functioning of a nuclear reactor (see
INFICIRC/254/Rev.9/Part1, annex B, section 2).

11-32818 27
 own initiative, not to pursue cooperation of any kind with the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea in relation to that proposal. 51
80. This is an instructive example of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s
approach to evading sanctions. The country sought to acquire processing equipment
to produce ultrapure graphite concentrate with a stated minimum purity level slightly
lower than that banned by the Security Council through INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1.
The export might therefore have been legally defensible, even though the company
considered that it could be used in nuclear programmes. (Although graphite can be
used in industrial applications ranging from furnaces and electrodes to pencils, none
of these requires graphite of this purity.) The Panel considers that this case shows
again the desirability of a “catch-all” approach to sanctions implementation that
would prevent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from exploiting of such
legal niceties.
81. It was also publicly reported that, in mid-2010, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea illegally imported two proscribed computer-controlled machine
tools. According to the information available, 52 the machine tools were acquired
from a trading company based in a neighbouring country, through a firm managed
by a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national linked to the military. The
Panel has not been in a position to confirm this information from relevant
authorities.
82. During the reporting period, other probable incidents of prohibited exports by
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea came to the attention of the Panel. It
was publicly reported in September 2010 that the Greek authorities, acting in
accordance with paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), had intercepted
and seized a shipment suspected to contain items prohibited by the Security
Council. This shipment was reportedly en route from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to the Syrian Arab Republic. The Greek authorities confirmed to
the Panel the inspection and seizure and indicated that they would be reported to the
Committee as soon as the analysis and investigations had been concluded.
83. Recently, the Panel also learned of a potential incident of non-compliance
which occurred at some time between the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006) and
the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009). According to the information available to
the Panel, two States inspected and seized a shipment containing propellant for use
in Scud-type missiles, en route from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to a
Middle Eastern country.
84. During the reporting period, the Panel obtained other information from various
sources which indicates past and ongoing involvement of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea in the nuclear and/or ballistic missile-related programmes of
certain countries in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

__________________
51 The Panel notes that graphite and graphite components or products could also have applications
in other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. The Committee
prohibited the supply to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of dual-use
chemical equipment made of graphite (see S/2006/853 and Corr.1), as well as other graphite-
related products, owing to their potential applications in the production of structural materials
and composites for ballistic missiles (see S/2009/205 and S/2009/364).
52 See “Official confirms raiding firm over N Korea sales”, Taipei Times, 8 September 2010.

28 11-32818
 85. The Panel received information and briefings on the Dair Alzour site in the
Syrian Arab Republic. According to the briefings, this installation, destroyed by
Israel in September 2007, had been a nuclear reactor and it had been built with the
assistance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In this regard, the Panel
notes that the Syrian Arab Republic has consistently maintained since May 2008
that the destroyed building was a non-nuclear military installation and that the
Syrian Arab Republic had no nuclear-related cooperation with the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. However, the Panel notes also the concerns and other
elements presented in the latest IAEA report in that regard. 53
86. The Panel held discussions with experts on the possible involvement of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Myanmar’s alleged nuclear-related
activities. It was explained that, although there was no compelling evidence that
Myanmar was building secret nuclear reactors or fuel cycle facilities, and although
its Government denied the allegations as “merely groundless”, extreme caution was
required to prevent cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
from leading to proliferation, including in the ballistic-missile field, especially
taking into consideration the strengthening of the military cooperation between the
two countries.
87. In this regard, the Panel notes the results of an investigation conducted by a
Member State on illicit shipment and attempted shipment to Myanmar between
September 2008 and January 2009 of a magnetometer and a cylindrical grinder.
Those items may have nuclear and ballistic missile-related applications 54 and were
reportedly shipped upon instruction of an entity controlled by the Second Economic
Committee. 55 While acknowledging the possibility that Myanmar was the end user
of this dual-use equipment, several experts also raised the possibility that it was
serving as a trans-shipment point for delivery to the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea. 56

__________________
53 It is stated in the report that “[w]hile Syria has indicated that its efforts to procure pumping
equipment and large quantities of graphite and barite were civilian and non-nuclear in nature,
the Agency has assessed that these items could also support the construction of a nuclear
reactor”. Further, IAEA states that “the involvement of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission
(AECS) in some of the procurement and the inconsistency between end use information
provided by the AECS and other information available to the Agency raise further questions
regarding Syria’s declarations of the civilian and non-nuclear nature of this procurement”.
Finally, IAEA indicates also that “Syria has not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 in
connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site” and that “[i]t is critical
(…) that Syria actively cooperate with the Agency on these unresolved safeguards
implementation issues without further delay”. (Report to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (GOV/2011/8,
25 February 2011)).
54 These items were not on the Member State’s domestic control list, but were subject to licence
requirement under a “catch-all” clause.
55 The Second Economic Committee of the National Defence Commission plays in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea the largest and most prominent role in nuclear, other weapons of
mass destruction and missile-related developments, as well as in arranging and conducting arms-
related exports. It was designated autonomously by the United States on 30 August 2010 and by
the European Union on 22 December 2010.
56 See, for example, Stephanie Lieggi, Robert Shaw and Masako Toki, “Taking control: Stopping
North Korean WMD-related procurement”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 66, No. 5
(2010).

11-32818 29
 88. Finally, during a country visit, the Panel was briefed by Government officials
of a Member State in the Middle East region, who asserted that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea had been continuing its proscribed cooperation in
ballistic missile-related development with several countries in the region. According
to the briefings, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea employs various
techniques in this regard, including exchange of visits by scientists and technicians,
exchange of data and reciprocal participation in tests and analysis of results. These
indications are consistent with other information collected by the Panel as well as
observations made during the military parade of 10 October 2010. As noted, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea displayed a new warhead for its Nodong
missile, which presented a strong design similarity with the Iranian Shahab-3
triconic warhead. 57

B. Arms exports and imports

89. While calling upon all States to exercise vigilance over the supply, sale or
transfer to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of small arms and light
weapons, the Security Council in paragraph 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), prescribes
that States shall notify the Committee at least five days prior to selling, supplying or
transferring small arms or light weapons to that country. To date, there has been no
report from any State to the Committee on the supply, sale or transfer to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of any small arms and light weapons and
their related materiel.
90. Four incidents relating to non-compliance involving exports of arms and
related materiel have already been reported to the Committee since the adoption of
resolution 1874 (2009). These incidents have been documented to the extent
possible with the partial information discovered and received by the Panel, and
presented in its final report pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009). 58
91. The incidents reported to the Committee and the information collected by the
Panel of Experts through its investigations and research confirm that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea has been — and remains — actively engaged in illicit
trade in arms and related materiel in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874
(2009). Although the precise income earned by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea by illicit arms sales is subject to debate, there is no question that the
leadership uses it as one of the country’s principal sources for obtaining foreign
currency. 59
92. Through its ongoing investigative work, the Panel has gathered additional
elements indicating that several of the reported interdicted shipments were, in fact,
__________________
57 Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea on ballistic missiles after the adoption of resolution 1695 (2006) would be a violation of
resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
58 See in particular S/2010/571, paras. 61-64 and annex B.
59 Reported transactions on the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
(COMTRADE) involving arms exports by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from
2000 to 2009 amount only to some US$ 22.9 million. Most experts consider this dramatically
underreported. See, for example, “N. Korea Diversifies Export Markets for Weapons”, Dong-A
Ilbo, 17 December 2009; “N. Korea ‘Earning $2 Billion a Year in Arms Deals with Iran’”,
Chosun Ilbo, 16 July 2009.

30 11-32818
 parts of larger operations. 60 In its investigation of the shipment interdicted by the
Government of South Africa in the port of Durban on 20 October 2009, 61 the Panel
learned that several prior shipments from the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea containing arms-related material had gone undetected. Those shipments were
part of a broad operation conducted by a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
company and aimed at the reconditioning of more than 100 pieces of artillery
materiel and armoured vehicles in the Republic of the Congo.
93. In a separate incident reported by Thailand of arms and related material seized
on 11 December 2009 at Don Mueang Airport, the markings of the crates suggest
that the 35 tons of arms were probably part of multiple shipments. There were also
multiple disparities in number among rockets, rocket launchers and warhead fuses,
as well as disparities between TBG rocket-propelled grenade munitions and
head/tail fuses. Similar markings and disparities in numbers were observed in
another incident reported by the United Arab Emirates in August 2009. This
suggests that these single shipments were part of a larger deliveries scheme. In this
regard, information has recently come to light suggesting that Union Top
Management, the shell company registered in Hong Kong which chartered the
aircraft impounded by Thai authorities, planned five different flights, the impounded
flight being the first one. 62 The Panel is currently trying to ascertain the veracity
and meaning of this information.
94. In addition, the Panel collected varied and partial information about other
incidents which may be incidents of non-compliance. The Panel notes that
considered together these cases confirm that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea had been and remains actively engaged in the marketing of arms and related
materiel. For example, the Panel recently learned that weapons which would have
been delivered to Burundi in October 2009 by a Ukrainian company, possibly using
the same aircraft that was impounded two months later in Thailand, originated from
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel is also currently trying to
ascertain the veracity of this information.
95. During the reporting period, the Panel of Experts made several country visits
to investigate the incidents of non-compliance reported to the Committee and to
inspect physically the illicit cargo seized. The Panel also requested additional and/or
complementary information from several Member States. Because some of these
requests have yet to be answered, and owing to particular time constraints during the
reporting period, the Panel has so far been able to provide only one specific incident
report to the Committee in relation with the working protection garments that were
deemed to have military utility for chemical protection and interdicted by the
Government of the Republic of Korea in September 2009.

__________________
60 See annex B to the present report for further details. Annex B is a separate, confidential annex
containing supplementary information which is available to the members of the Security
Council.
61 This cargo was trans-shipped through another Member State which has yet to submit a national
implementation report.
62 Peter Danssaert, Sergio Finardi and Brian Johnson-Thomas, Mapping the Labyrinth: more on the
strange weapons flight of 4L-AWA, joint report published by International Peace Information
Service (IPIS) UZW (Antwerp) and TransArms-Research Center for the Logistics of Arms
Transfers (Chicago), October 2010.

11-32818 31
 96. These illicit transfers of arms and related material by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea could have endangered the civilian aircraft or the shipping
vessels. In the case reported to the Committee by the United Arab Emirates, the
cargo consisted of ten 20-foot containers packed with a total of 90 tons of explosive
ammunition consisting of 11,000 TBG-7 munitions, 120,000 head/tail TBG-7 fuses
and approximately 10,000 warhead fuses for 122-mm rockets. Owing to the lack of
specific markings, national authorities and cargo handlers at transit or trans-shipment
points were not able to take necessary precautionary measures in handling those arms
and munitions, including fuses and warheads which are highly sensitive to
temperature and impact. 63

C. Ban on luxury goods

97. In its 2010 final report the Panel documented six illicit purchases or attempts
to purchase luxury goods by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Those
purchases or attempts included, among other things, luxury vehicles or other
transport equipment (2 yachts, 12 Mercedes Benz vehicles), electronic items (high-
end electrical/electronic apparatus for recording and reproducing sound and
images), musical instruments (37 pianos) and cosmetics. 64 Most of these luxury
goods reached or would have reached the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
after transiting through a neighbouring trans-shipment hub.
98. Japanese authorities informed the Panel that they had uncovered during the
reporting period additional illicit export of luxury goods. On three occasions, in
November 2008 and in February and May 2009, Japanese trading companies had
exported luxury goods, namely, pianos and cosmetics, to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea through the same neighbouring trans-shipment hub. As for the
previous cases reported and documented by the Panel, legal proceedings have been
undertaken against the persons involved. 65
99. Italy also recently published details about attempts by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to purchase luxury goods which were successfully interdicted by
Customs. In May 2009, a shipment of electronic items, including a projector, some
amplifiers and other electronic equipment suitable for a cinema hall seating 1,000
people, of a total value of some €130,000, was blocked at Fiumicino Airport
(Rome). In August 2009, 150 bottles of cognac and 270 bottles of whisky with a
total value of some €12,000 were confiscated in the Port of Ancona. Finally, in
December 2010, a shipment of high-quality tap-dancing shoes was blocked at Orio
al Serio Airport (Milan). In these cases, interdictions of the shipments followed
inspections prompted by risk criteria generated by the Customs information system.
100. In addition, the Panel collected varied and partial information about other
possible incidents of non-compliance involving luxury goods, namely, cars,
watches, spirits or food. The Panel also learned that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea circumvented the luxury items ban by exploiting the loopholes in
__________________
63 The documents seized in one case together with the cargo indicated that head and tail fuses for
TBG-7s should be stored at temperatures between -30° and +50° Celsius. They also indicated
that the warhead fuses for 122-mm rockets should be handled carefully and stored separately
from explosive materials.
64 See S/2010/571, paras. 67-69 and annex B.
65 See annex B to the present report.

32 11-32818
 its application and turning to new suppliers. The Panel is currently trying to
ascertain the veracity and meaning of this information. In this investigation the
Panel is heavily dependent on the timely and substantive response of Member
States.
101. This information and the cases documented above confirm that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea remains actively engaged in the illicit procurement of
luxury goods. Some of these luxury goods, such as the acquisition of the two luxury
yachts, were facilitated by Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party and obviously
destined for use by senior regime figures. 66
102. Since the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006), a number of questions have been
raised by Member States seeking to clarify precisely which items are to be
considered covered by the luxury goods ban. After long-term discussion over this
matter, the Chair of the Committee, on behalf of the Committee, sent on 16 April
2007 a letter to the Member States indicating that “any definition of luxury goods as
may be necessary for Member States to implement this provision of the resolution
would be the national responsibility of individual Member States”. He also
reaffirmed in the letter that the measure on luxury goods should be implemented in a
manner consistent with the objectives of the resolution and that it was not intended
that this prohibition would restrict the supply of ordinary goods to the wider
population of the country or have a negative humanitarian impact on the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. The letter also referred Member States to national
reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 1718 (2006) as indications
of the way this provision was being implemented by Member States.
103. The Panel’s review of national implementation reports by Member States
reveals three problems that consistently undercut the effectiveness of the luxury
goods ban. First, a considerable number of Member States omit any mention of
luxury goods in their report. Secondly, many Member States have yet to introduce
national control measures over such exports to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. Thirdly, national definitions of luxury goods differ from country to country67
and the measures of national export controls have been implemented in an uneven
manner. These potential gaps and inconsistencies, especially in definition and the
application of the ban, are aggravated by the fact that most Member States do not
exercise any control over the re-export and diversion of luxury goods through third
countries.
104. To close these gaps and to resolve these inconsistencies, the Panel
recommended in its report submitted to the Security Council in May 2010 a series of
principles to be taken into account by Member States in the application of the
measures on luxury items. The Panel also proposed that Member States should be
encouraged to include in their national implementation reports an indication of the
goods considered by them to fall within the category of luxury goods, as well as to
engage in consultations, as necessary, with any Member State prohibiting a certain
type of luxury goods prior to authorizing the export of essentially identical items to

__________________
66 Office 39 is responsible for earning foreign currency for the senior leadership of the Korean
Workers’ Party through illicit activities such as narcotics trafficking. It was autonomously
designated by the United States on 30 August 2010.
67 See the illustrative list of items designated by the Member States as luxury goods as at 30 April
2011 in annex A.5.

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 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 68 Subsequently, the Panel submitted for
the consideration of the Committee a discussion paper (21 May 2010) and a draft
implementation assistance notice (3 December 2010) on the application of the
measures on luxury goods. The Panel reaffirms its recommendation that the
Committee adopt an implementation assistance notice on the application of the
measures on luxury goods.

VIII. Interdiction
105. The Security Council in resolution 1874 (2009) significantly strengthened the
tools available to interdict the shipment of proscribed items. It called upon all States
to inspect all cargo to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in their
territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, with the consent of
the flag State, if there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that cargo may contain
proscribed items. If the flag State denies that permission, it must direct the vessel to
proceed to a port for inspection. Instances where the flag State does not cooperate
should be reported to the Committee. Finally, it is specified in resolution 1874
(2009) that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea vessels shall be denied
bunkering or other services if there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that they are
carrying proscribed cargo until it has been inspected, or unless such services are
necessary for humanitarian purposes.

A. Trade and transportation infrastructure

106. As previously indicated by the Panel, the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea relies on a limited number of shipping means and routes to handle its exports
and imports, whether licit or illicit. These include a small number of maritime ports,
international air connections, as well as rail and road connections to China and the
Russian Federation. 69
107. Owing to limited land transportation options, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea relies mainly on sea shipping means and routes and to a lesser
extent on air shipping. Foreign maritime trade is channelled through eight ports of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and through the port of Dalian, which
serves as an important neighbouring trans-shipment hub. Nampo, located on the
west coast, is the largest general port in the country. As indicated in its previous
final report, the Panel undertook to examine in more detail sea and air shipping
means of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as the vulnerabilities
within the international maritime and air transport system which the country has
been able to exploit.

__________________
68 See S/2010/571, paras. 74 and 75.
69 There are three railway lines connecting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to China
and one to the Russian Federation. There are 11 roads linking the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea and China but owing to mountainous and poor road conditions in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, relatively little cargo is moved along these routes. Road traffic
plays a limited role, with road carriage of cargo for export usually accounting for short distances
to ports or rail links. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also has rail links with the
Republic of Korea, but little cargo is now moving in this direction. See map in annex A.7 for
further details.

34 11-32818
 Maritime transport infrastructure
108. Over the reporting period, the Panel engaged Lloyd’s List Intelligence (LLI),
one of the world’s largest providers of global maritime data, to develop the Panel’s
knowledge and analysis of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea international sea
shipping means and patterns. The Panel concentrated its efforts on merchant vessels
involved in international seaborne trade which are owned by and/or sail under the
flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 70
109. Information provided by LLI indicates that the majority of ships owned by
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entities also sail under its flag. Only a
limited number of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-owned ships sail under a
different flag. 71 At the end of 2010, according to LLI information, the effective
number of operating ships of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stood at
237, comprising 155 cargo vessels (with or without container capacity), 22 tankers,
7 bulk carriers, 3 container vessels and a limited number of other miscellaneous
cargo-carrying vessels. Historical analysis shows that this fleet grew regularly from
160 vessels in 2000 and reached a number close to its actual level in the mid-2000s.

Figure II
Major categories of active ships in the civilian fleet of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea

180
155
160
Number of ships

140
120
100
80
60
32
40 22
20 7 3 8 2 7
1
0
er
o

o
er

r
l

er
g

se

ge
lke

-R
rg

in

ef
nk

th
es
Ca

sh

en
Ro
Bu

Re

O
Ta

rV
Fi

ss
al

Pa
ne
er
en

ai
nt
G

Co

Total active ships: 237

110. The ships owned by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are 30 years
old on average and generally poorly maintained. It is not uncommon for vessels that
undertake long voyages to require repairs en route. Inspections of Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea-owned vessels result regularly in the discoveries of
numerous deficiencies which lead to detention in port. 72 This may explain why at
__________________
70 Lloyd’s List Intelligence monitors self-propelled sea-going merchant vessels over 100 gross tons.
71 The number of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-owned ships sailing under foreign flags
remained stable over the last five years (20 to 25). They sail mainly under the flags of China, the
Comoros, Mongolia, Panama, the Republic of Korea or Sierra Leone.
72 See for example the annual reports on the Port State Control activities of the members of the
Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control; available from
www.iomou.org.

11-32818 35
 any given time only about a half to two thirds of the cargo vessels owned by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are observed in operation. However, the
possibility also exists that they are engaged in sea shipping activities not easily
traceable.
111. These ships are owned or operated by more than 100 different Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea companies. Presumably most — if not all — of the
companies listed as owners or operators are either owned, controlled by or closely
affiliated with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regime. Accordingly, the
Panel is trying to ascertain their role in illicit deliveries and the extent to which any
of these companies are linked to entities designated by the Committee or by entities
or persons acting on their behalf or at their direction.
112. It is not uncommon for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to rename
vessels following cases of interdiction. The Kuwolsan which was found by Indian
authorities in 1999 to be transporting ballistic missile-related items to the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya was subsequently renamed. Similarly, the So San, which was
intercepted in 2002 by the Spanish navy with Scud missiles hidden beneath bags of
cement and bound for Yemen, was later renamed Chang Dok. However, the limited
recourse to foreign flags would suggest that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea relies less on its owned vessels for illicit shipments and/or that the flag of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is seen as offering the best available
protection against boarding on the high seas.
113. Information provided by LLI also indicates that a number of foreign
companies, most of whom are based in the Syrian Arab Republic, use the flag of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a flag of convenience. The numbers of
foreign ships using that flag has evolved considerably over the past 10 years.
Starting from 43 vessels in 2000, it reached a peak of 309 in 2006, before
decreasing constantly since 2007 to 116 vessels. The port call information available
indicates that they operate in their greatest majority in the Mediterranean, Red and
Black Seas, as well as in the Persian Gulf. The sudden decrease since 2007 indicates
that the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was used mainly by
companies preferring to avoid the scrutiny attached to it since the adoption of
resolution 1718 (2006). This suggests that foreign ships that use or have used the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea flag are likely to be involved in smuggling
but are not of concern for the transport of proscribed items to or from that country.

Air transport infrastructure

114. The only commercial airline based in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea is Air Koryo, the State-owned national air carrier. Air Koryo and all airports
or airfields within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are controlled by the
Korean People’s Air Force through its Civil Aviation Bureau. Reportedly, all
personnel are members of the Air Force and all in-country maintenance is conducted
by Air Force engineering staff. All civilian aircraft registered in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea are operated by Air Koryo and were purchased from the
Soviet Union and later from the Russian Federation. In the 1970s and 1980s,
TU-134 and TU-154 jets were added to a small fleet of propeller-driven AN-24s and
old IL-18s. More recently, four long-range IL-62, three IL-76 large cargo aircraft
and two long-range TU-204 were acquired. According to information from ICAO,
Air Koryo currently possesses 23 aircraft, of which 20 are passenger aircrafts and

36 11-32818
 three are cargo carriers. 73 However, it is probable that a limited number of these
aircraft are currently operational or in operation.

Table 1
Air Koryo aircraft fleet as at the end of April 2011
Aircraft equipment model Number Range

Passenger aircraft
AN-24 5 750-2,400 km
IL-18 4 4,300-6,500 km
IL-62 4 ~ 10,000 km
TU-134 2 1,900-3,000 km
TU-154 3 2,500-3,900 km
TU-204 2 4,300-5,800 km
Cargo aircraft
IL-76 MD 3 ~ 3,650 km with maximum payload (~50 tons)

Total 23

115. Air Koryo is based at Sunan International Airport, located 24 km north of

Pyongyang. As at 30 April 2011, Air Koryo operates weekly scheduled flights from
Sunan to Beijing, Shenyang, Vladivostok, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. 74 Recently
Air Koryo had two TU-204 aircraft removed from the European blacklist. However,
it has not recommenced regular scheduled flights to Europe. 75 Air China is the only
foreign airline operating weekly scheduled flights from Beijing to Pyongyang.
116. Air Koryo also operates occasional non-scheduled or charter passenger flights,
mainly to Central European countries, the Middle East, South-East Asia and Africa.
In some instances, on the basis of concerns that such flights might be carrying
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea personnel involved in ongoing ballistic or
other proscribed cooperation, overflight rights were denied.
117. In the absence of information on scheduled flights by the three IL-76 large cargo
aircraft (tail numbers P-912, P-913 and P-914), it can only be assumed at this stage
that they are used exclusively for chartered flight or not in operation. In addition to
Air Koryo’s involvement in sanctions evasion, the interdiction in December 2009 of
an aircraft carrying 35 tons of arms demonstrated that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea relies also on chartered aircraft owned and operated by foreign
airlines for proscribed exports and activities. Accordingly, enhanced vigilance is
required to monitor and prevent illicit activities by Air Koryo and other foreign
chartered aircraft to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
__________________
73 Other sources, such as AeroTransport Data Bank, indicate an equivalent number of owned
aircraft, but with slightly different distribution between the different categories (AN-24 and
TU-154).
74 Previous scheduled services to Dalian, Moscow, Khabarovsk, Macau, Shenzhenand other
destinations have been terminated.
75 Owing to safety requirements, all operations of Air Koryo had been subjected to a ban within the
European Union in March 2006. Under the new Commission Regulation No. 791/2010 of
6 September 2010, all of the Air Koryo fleet remains subject to a ban, except the two recently
purchased modern TU-204 (tail numbers P-632 and P-633).

11-32818 37
 118. The Panel has not yet been able to gather reliable statistics on the number of
passenger or cargo chartered flights to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea operated by Air Koryo or any other foreign companies. The Panel intends to
further explore that issue in collaboration with authorities controlling air traffic in the
flight information regions neighbouring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 76

B. Patterns of sanctions evasion

119. In analysing incidents of non-compliance reported to the Committee, the Panel

made complementary findings of the techniques used by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to circumvent sanctions measures imposed by resolutions 1718
(2006) and 1874 (2009). Some of them confirm the extensive and systematic uses of
previously reported techniques, others show adaptation and new sophistication on
the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in sanctions evasion.

General patterns
120. In these incidents, the cargo was falsely described in the bill of lading as either
“oil-boring equipment”, “oil industry spare parts”, “mechanical parts” or “spare
parts for bulldozer”. The extensive use of false labelling is further demonstrated by
the recent discoveries in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of rockets packed in crates
labelled as containing “bulldozer parts” or by other past cases. 77 The manifests and
packing lists covering seized shipments were also falsified to reflect the false cargo
description, while matching the correct number, weight and dimensions of the
crates. Information on the original consignor and ultimate consignee were also
obscured, altered or falsified. The true origin of the cargo was further blurred by
subsequent changes of documentation as the containers passed through key trans-
shipment hubs in North-East Asia.
121. During its physical inspections of impounded cargo, the Panel also established
that in most cases concealment measures were taken to deceive cursory physical
inspections of the goods by Customs or other officials. In one case, where the
weapons were placed in standard maritime containers, the weapons crates were
placed in larger, innocent-looking crates or hidden behind false walls. In another
case, of transport by air, the most sensitive items, such as a rocket launcher and
rocket tubes, were placed in metallic crates which were totally enclosed. Those
crates, as well as the wooden crates containing other items, lacked any specific
markings which could reveal the true nature of the goods enclosed.
122. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea uses various additional evasion
methods to circumvent Security Council sanctions measures. These include
dispatching engineers and technicians to transfer sensitive technology and know-
how to illicit trading partners and the establishment of assembly lines abroad to
produce conventional arms locally. This latter method also includes the transfer of
“knock-down kits” which can be delivered to foreign assembly plants, for
production completion by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea technicians and
specialists or local staff. The Panel already reported that such an operation,

__________________
76 The Shanghai, Shenyang, Vladivostok, Fukuoka and Incheon flight information regions.
77 The ballistic missile-related items carried by the Kuwolsan were declared as “water-refining
equipment”.

38 11-32818
 including the participation of technicians and specialists of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, was used in the reconditioning of artillery materiel and
armoured vehicles in the Republic of the Congo, as well as with regard to the
ballistic missile cooperation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the
Islamic Republic of Iran and in the alleged nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour in the
Syrian Arab Republic.
123. The Panel also found that a number of front and offshore companies had been
involved. Those companies are used to carry out the procurement of proscribed
items with the real operators hidden. Investigations related to the aircraft impounded
in Thailand confirm that nine distinct entities, including several front companies,
were involved. In other cases, they are used to give the impression to suppliers that
they are engaged in a domestic transaction. Once the item has been procured it is
transferred by the offshore entity to one or more middlemen overseas. These same
front and offshore entities could also be used to handle financial transactions to
support such procurement activities, as well as illicit sales activities. In many cases,
the funds are deposited and held in overseas accounts in the name of the offshore
entity. The entity then receives directions from the original financial controller to
disperse the funds.
124. Through its investigation of recent nuclear programme developments in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Panel also learned that the illicit re-
exportation of prohibited goods has been occurring as purchasing companies in a
number of countries sign end-use certificates, only to later send the unused items to
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with no bill of sale recorded. There are
also indications that illicit sensitive nuclear items can be bought over the counter
and shipped to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by various means,
including diplomatic cargo. 78 The Panel of Experts also learned that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea has tried to evade sanctions by using foreign local
suppliers of sensitive items. In most cases, these local suppliers are small and
medium-sized companies which have insufficient knowledge and expertise about
export control. In the long process of developing technologies related to uranium
enrichment and the light water reactor, it seems very likely that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea has acquired advanced technology from both public and
private laboratories and universities in the industrialized countries. In this age of the
information communications technology revolution, it becomes more and more
difficult to control the intangible transfer of technical data.

Patterns of sea shipment

125. Several incidents involving inspection and seizure of proscribed items in ports
were reported to the Committee. In all these cases, the illicit cargo was found packed
into standard-size maritime shipping containers carried by foreign-owned and
-flagged ships. Further analysis indicated that, in all these cases, the consignor or the
entities or persons acting on its behalf or direction took charge of the loading of the
containers before clearing them through Customs in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea. The containers were presumably rented under Full Container Load
contracts, as opposed to Less than Container Load contracts under which the items
are loaded in containers with extraneous items by the carrier or the freight forwarder.
__________________
78 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Taking Stock: North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program”
(see footnote 29).

11-32818 39
 126. After Customs clearance, the containers were shipped to a neighbouring
trans-shipment hub on board Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-owned ships
for onward transport on foreign-owned and -flagged vessels all the way to their final
destination. 79 The multiple layers of intermediaries involved in onward operations
(shipper, freight forwarder and/or Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier), and the
numerous changes in documentation further blurred the true origin of the cargo
beyond the first trans-shipment point.
127. Since the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), no cases of interdiction on the
high seas have been reported to the Committee. This would indicate that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea relies only to a very limited extent on its
own vessels to deliver illicit shipments to a recipient country. Indications gathered
by the Panel suggest that this option is considered only when routes are short
enough to avoid port calls in foreign countries during which the vessel could be
subjected to inspection resulting in seizure of the illicit cargo.
128. So far, the information available on cases of direct delivery by Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea-owned ships does not suggest that there is a pool of
merchant vessels owned by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reserved for
transporting prohibited cargo. On the contrary, they appear to be chosen on an ad hoc
basis. As such, there is a large number vessels owned by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea which could potentially be used to deliver prohibited cargo.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea merchant vessels which were interdicted
were rarely fully laden, and generally do not carry commercial cargo to the same
destination or to a destination on the way so as to reduce as much as possible the
number of port calls and risks of inspection. However, such vessels do engage in
commercial activity on their way back to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, once they have delivered their cargo, in order to generate hard currency.

Patterns of air shipment

129. For the air shipment of cargo whose illicit nature could resist the level of
monitoring and scrutiny attached to passenger flights, such as certain dual-use
items, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is reported to use regular Air
Koryo scheduled passenger flights. Considering the limited number of foreign
international airports served by regular Air Koryo passenger flights, such cargo
would in most cases pass through those airports and be trans-shipped on to other
regular scheduled passenger flights all the way through to their final destination.
Prohibited ballistic missile-related items are suspected to have been transferred
between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of
Iran on regular scheduled flights of Air Koryo and Iran Air, with trans-shipment
through a neighbouring third country.
130. For the shipment of cargo, like arms and related materiel, whose illicit nature
would become apparent on any cursory physical inspection, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea seems to prefer chartered cargo flights. Cargo aircraft
fly generally from or to air cargo hubs which lack the kind of monitoring and
security to which passenger terminals and flights are now subject. Air Koryo having
only a very limited number of aircraft capable of operating intercontinental flights
and those aircraft being subject to particular scrutiny, the Democratic People’s
__________________
79 See in particular S/2010/571, paras. 61-64 and annex B.

40 11-32818
 Republic of Korea relies also on foreign-owned chartered aircraft, such as the one
impounded in Bangkok in December 2009.
131. In addition, to avoid the level of scrutiny which would be attached to chartered
cargo aircraft operating ostensibly between the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and other countries of concern, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
seems to resort to well-known and documented diversion tactics such as point of
departure diversion or post-delivery onward diversion. 80 In the first case, the
aircraft divert, en route, to a destination other than that stated in the filed flight plan.
In post-delivery onward diversion, the aircraft may either (a) play no role in the
diversion process and simply deliver the shipment to the destination named in the
transportation documentation, from where the shipment will be picked up and
redelivered, or (b) follow the intended flight plan, land in the ostensible delivery
State but then depart that State in order to transfer the shipment to a destination not
stated in the transportation documentation. The inconsistencies regarding the final
destination of the shipment impounded in Bangkok in December 2009 strongly
suggest that the cargo would have been diverted to the Islamic Republic of Iran after
delivery to its stated destination.
132. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seems also to have resorted to
chartered passenger flights to transport personnel known or suspected to be involved
in ongoing illicit cooperation with other countries of concern lacking direct regular
international air connections with Sunan International. Chartered passenger flights,
like chartered cargo flights, are subject to less scrutiny than scheduled flights and
thus are often used to transport individuals who prefer to avoid such scrutiny. The
Panel notes that the aircraft whose overflight permission was revoked by the Indian
authorities early in August 2008 was an Air Koryo IL-62 passenger aircraft
operating a chartered round-trip flight between the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

C. Interdiction actions

133. Since the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), several incidents involving
inspection and seizure of proscribed items in ports or airports have been reported to
the Committee. In addition, during the reporting period, other interdiction cases of
proscribed exports by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which have yet to
be reported to the Committee came to the attention of the Panel. As the lack of
timely and substantive reporting by Member States can hamper the work of the
Committee and the investigations of the Panel, the Panel recommends to the
Security Council to consider the adoption of a mechanism similar to the one
specified in paragraph 17 of resolution 1929 (2010). 81
__________________
80 See, for example Hugh Griffiths and Mark Bromley, “Air transport and destabilizing commodity
flows”, SIPRI policy paper, 24 May 2009.
81 By paragraph 17 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council requires any State, when it
undertakes an inspection, to submit to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737
(2006) within five working days an initial written report containing, in particular, an explanation
of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection and whether or not cooperation
was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, further requires such States to
submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details
on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description
of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report.

11-32818 41
 134. An analysis of the cases reported to the Committee continues to indicate that
interdiction of proscribed shipments originating from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea once they have entered the flow of international commerce is
heavily reliant on (a) intelligence, (b) information-sharing, (c) the cooperation of the
ship or aircraft owner/operator and/or the flag State or State of registry and of
shipping and/or forwarding companies and (d) inspection by relevant authorities in
subsequent ports of call. In each of the cases reported to date, the countries
undertaking the inspection of the cargoes were advised in advance of concerns that
proscribed cargoes had been secreted on board using false labelling and
documentation.
135. Moreover, the prevention of proscribed exports destined for the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea remains heavily dependent on the establishment of
regulatory export control regimes, and effective national monitoring and export and
Customs controls. As demonstrated by the illicit attempted acquisition of graphite,
this is most effective when principles of due diligence, “catch-all rule”, and “know
your customer” rules are applied and when local suppliers of sensitive dual-use
items consult with export licensing authorities as early as possible with regard to
non-repetitive export transactions that may raise “red flags” because of their novelty
or circumstance.
136. The Panel of Experts followed up on its recommendations that procedures be
adopted, in accordance with local norms, to exercise extra vigilance at the first
overseas maritime port handling shipments originating from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea and to study what steps might be taken to ensure that
onward trans-shipment ports are aware of the cargo’s origin in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel has been examining numerous instruments,
existing or in development, such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Safe Framework of
Standards (SAFE) and the Approved Economic Actors programme of the World
Customs Organization. Their primary purpose is counter-terrorism (use of ships as
target or means of delivery) or illicit trafficking activities (drug, human or weapons
traffic) by non-State actors. These instruments work on the assumption that effective
Customs controls are applied at the point of origin and delivery. Accordingly, how
to facilitate the capacity of these and other instruments to counter illicit shipments
between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other countries of concern
needs further exploration.
137. The Panel followed up also on its recommendations to develop monitoring and
inspection methodologies for air cargo. During its study of the incident reported by
Thailand, the Panel learned that only limited information on the aircraft cargo is
provided to the transit airports and/or the relevant authorities of the countries whose
airspace is used. These lacunae result in insufficient control on cargo transported by
air and could be used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its attempt
to circumvent the Security Council measures. The Panel of Experts reiterates its
recommendation that vigilance should be exercised to monitor and prevent illicit
activities being conducted by Air Koryo and other foreign aircraft engaged on
non-scheduled flights into and out of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by
countries over whose territory such aircraft may fly, stop or transit, and that cargo to
and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be declared before overflight
clearance is provided.

42 11-32818
 138. During the reporting period the Panel gathered information from international
organizations, Member States, research institutions and at international conferences
regarding their findings and experience of patterns of sanctions evasion by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and actions taken to combat it. From those
meetings, the Panel has noted a steady and somewhat significant strengthening of
the resolve of a number of Member States, both in the East Asia region, and at major
trans-shipment hubs, which has in turn led to an increase in their capacity for goods
inspection and in regional and international cooperation with the highest standards
of safety and control. This will provide the necessary infrastructure for a more
robust system of sanctions implementation than has been available to date. The
further strengthening of these measures, and especially by a greater number of
Member States, would help to stifle the masking techniques and evasive practices
that have been used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to subvert the
sanctions regime.

IX. Financial measures

139. In paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) the Security Council called upon
all Member States to freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources
of “persons or entities” designated by the Committee or the Council as being
engaged in the nuclear-related, other existing weapons of mass destruction-related
and ballistic missile-related programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. In paragraph 18 of resolution 1874 (2009) the Council called upon all
Member States to prevent and freeze all financial transfers, assets or related
monetary transactions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that might
contribute to nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile-related
programmes. Further, in paragraph 19 of the resolution, the Council called upon
Member States and relevant financial institutions not to enter into new
commitments, and reduce current commitments, for grants, financial assistance or
loans except for humanitarian and denuclearization purposes. Finally, in paragraph
20 of the resolution, the Council called upon Member States to refrain from
engaging in financial servicing of trade that might be related to such proscribed
programmes.
140. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea does not make publicly available
statistical information concerning its trade, international financial dealings and
banking accounts held outside its own boundaries. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain
the contribution of trade — whether legal or illicit — to the country’s financial
flows or liquidity, or to assess how it finances trade that is permitted under
resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). As previously indicated by the Panel of
Experts, during the past 10 years the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has
needed to raise anywhere from half a billion to a full one billion dollars per year to
fund its merchandise trade deficit. 82
141. Beyond earning foreign currency via legitimate trade — which has declined
significantly in the past year — there are only two essential methods whereby the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea can accumulate much-needed hard currency.
The first is to engage in profitable illicit trade, while the second is to secure an

__________________
82 See S/2010/571, para. 43.

11-32818 43
 influx of direct foreign assistance, loans or investment. 83 As regards the former,
analysis of recent cases reveals that the country continues to develop adaptive and
inventive practices to circumvent the financial measures imposed. As regards the
latter, balance of payments assistance from China has been of particular importance
to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

A. Illicit financial transactions

142. From information provided by Member States and research studies, the Panel
has learned that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea maintains a wide
network of trade offices which work in close conjunction with its diplomatic
missions overseas. These offices are charged with both procurement and developing
select trade opportunities of interest to the leadership of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, including arranging and handling the country’s illicit trade and
covert acquisitions. Of special concern is the number of registered “business
merchants” who hold diplomatic passports and work in banking centres in Asia
which do not have or enforce strict banking rules. Some of the activities of these
“merchants” have been aimed principally at identifying opportunistic markets for
both licit and illicit exports. While much of the country’s illicit or covert acquisition
activities are handled by these offices, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
has also established links with overseas criminal networks to carry out these
activities, including the transportation and distribution of illicit and smuggled cargo.
These merchants — and the companies for which they work — appear connected to
Office 39 and other suspicious Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entities. This
increases the likelihood that the illicit trade run through these entities also includes
sensitive goods as well as arms and related materiel smuggling.
143. On the basis of its first-hand investigations of successful interdictions, the
Panel has concluded that this extensive enterprise for earning foreign exchange, for
instance through the export of arms, continues to exist and may be only partly
constrained by the sanctions. This is particularly true in the area known as the
“second economy” of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in which the
military sector must be self-sustaining and raises an important part of its revenues
from foreign trade. Similarly, interdictions of attempted importation of luxury goods
reveal a network of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea procurement agents
with substantial financial resources. Sanctions have raised the cost of conducting
illicit business to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but they have not
halted that business.
144. In its previous reports, the Panel described various cases that demonstrated the
creativity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in generating financial
resources via illicit trade by creating a web of multiple-stop transactions, facilitated
most often by resort to existing or newly created shell companies, falsified financial
agents for some transactions, and at some point to the use of major banks to facilitate
the appearance of legality. Here again, loose enforcement of banking regulations in
certain places is exploited by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
__________________
83 Because in resolution 1874 (2009) the Security Council called upon Member States not to enter
into new commitments, and to reduce current commitments, for grants, financial assistance or
concessional loans to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, except for humanitarian and
denuclearization purposes, within the second option only direct foreign investment remains.

44 11-32818
 145. Through its investigations of the shipment which was seized on landing at
Bangkok Airport in December 2009, the Panel learned that (a) the financial
transaction between Air West Ltd. (the lessor) and SP Trading Ltd. (the lessee) 84
was priced in United States dollars; (b) JP Morgan Chase Bank of New York was
listed as the intermediary Bank for Air West Ltd; and (c) SP Trading Ltd. claimed at
the time to hold a bank account with the Estonian branch of Sampo Bank, which is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Danske Bank. In turn, Sampo Bank used its
correspondent relationship with Deutsche Bank to clear the transaction. The Panel
continues to investigate to what extent the financial transactions between the parties
involved in the illicit transfer of cargo were executed, in whole or in part. 85 But
because the leasing transaction was listed in United States dollars, the full force of
the United States Office of Foreign Asset Control requirements applied to all parties
engaged in the transaction, including the clearing banks in the United States and the
banks located outside the United States.
146. Recent indications suggest also that, to further subvert detection in the
international banking sector, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engages
increasingly in direct barter trade and also requests that payments be made in cash
(usually in United States dollars or euros) the exact source of which is unknown.
These transactions are believed to involve a small number of “executive managers”
working under the overall direction of several designated entities such as KOMID, 86
which are well placed in several countries across different regions to receive the
cash payments and arrange for their transfer. Funds from various transfers are
accumulated and then transferred by courier in bulk amounts to previously indicated
banks. Many of these funds are ultimately channelled into deposits held for the
benefit of Tanchon Commercial Bank, which was designated by the Committee as
an entity subject to the Security Council measures. A variety of cases illustrates this
continuing pattern which is difficult to discern and which has been pieced together
by Panel investigation.
147. The lack of transparency on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and its projected financial needs pose a major dilemma regarding one of its
most lucrative export commodities — conventional arms and missiles and missile
technology — which are prohibited as trading items by the sanctions. In reaction to
recent interdictions, it would seem that the country has adapted its masking
techniques and shipping methods. More problematic is the expansion of the number
of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea front companies involved in such
transactions. The recognition of this trend and the absence of new designations by
the Council and the Committee have led numerous Member States to designate
autonomously an increasing number of entities and individuals.
148. The Panel has continued to follow developments that were reported to the
Committee late in 2009 and in 2010 for which further details have emerged. In one
case, a luxury goods transaction had been arranged by an Austrian businessman on
behalf of a client in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The sale and export
__________________
84 See S/2010/571, para. 64.
85 According to the information uncovered by IPIS/TransArms, Union Top Management had
arranged to pay the freight forwarder in cash, which should also have raised suspicions, with a
down payment sufficient to cover the cost of chartering the IL-76 aircraft used to carry the
shipment.
86 KOMID was designated by the Committee on 24 April 2009 and is subject to the measures
imposed by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006).

11-32818 45
 of two luxury yachts destined for an ultimate buyer in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea were blocked. Investigations revealed that the transaction was
channelled through an Austrian intermediary who made the original contact with the
yacht builder for the purchase. The Austrian national initially received an amount of
€3.3 million in multiple transfers (the smallest amount transferred being €50,000)
from various companies located in different countries, over a period of
approximately three months. Considering that the transfers were from multiple
sources and that the initial payment was made more than two months prior to the
signature of any contract, the bank filed a suspicious transaction report. During the
investigation that followed, the Austrian national confessed that he had been in
contact with several nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
that the country of final destination for the yachts was the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.
149. Early in March 2011, the Panel was made aware of an interdiction case by a
Member State which froze US$ 170,000 in funds that had been remitted to it in
October 2010 by the “Myohyang Bureau”, an entity presumably linked to Office 39 of
the Korean Workers’ Party. The asset freeze was occasioned by the recognition that
the money was originally transferred via a secret account held under a false name in
Latvia; and the monies were — in part — to purchase “special gifts”, thus raising the
likelihood that a luxury good transaction may have been involved. The Panel is
making a number of inquiries and undertaking further research into this case.
150. A recent research report documents that Myanmar and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea have engaged in both barter trade and cash transactions.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-owned ships, as was recently the case of the
Du Man Gang, asked to pay port fees of US$ 30,994 in cash rather than make a
bank transfer. Evidently other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ships have
made similar requests. This practice has developed as one of mutual utility owing to
the two countries’ shared ostracism from international financial institutions that
result from sanctions. These barter and cash transactions are not traceable and thus
become an effective method of sanctions evasion.
151. The Panel notes and continues to express concern that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea has not accepted standards embraced by other Member States as
set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regarding anti-money-laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism and proliferation financing. FATF has recently
promoted more explicit guidelines for proliferation financing that the Panel believes
may be used to draft an implementation assistance notice to Member States to
strengthen the deterrence and capture of illicit financing. The Panel has also noted
with interest the increased banking designations by various Member States and the
European Union.

B. Foreign investment in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

152. The planned economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is

suffering from a number of setbacks due to inappropriate prioritization in economic
planning, disproportionate distribution of national income, and the recent currency
revaluation. To redress the economic difficulties facing it, the country is again
actively seeking direct foreign investment to bolster its ailing economy. Earlier this
year, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea established the State Development
Bank to serve as a comprehensive financial institution making investment in major

46 11-32818
 economic development projects. It also established the Korea Taepung International
Investment Group, which is intended to be an economic complex to attract
investment and finances to the State Development Bank. 87
153. The Panel notes with concern that the National Defence Commission of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 88 plays a central role in each institution. 89
In the Panel’s final report of May 2010, it was noted that agencies under the
National Defence Commission were most active in the acquisition, marketing and
sale of nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-related
equipment, as well as arms and related materiel. Because the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea is a highly centralized State-owned economy and its leadership
has developed other sanctions evasion tools, the prospect of diversion of investment
revenue for illicit ends is extremely likely. The Panel believes that special attention
is warranted by the Committee and Member States to ensure that all investments in
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea do not to contribute to its nuclear, other
weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile-related programmes.
154. Two of the most significant investment relationships which sustain the
economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are with the Republic of
Korea and China. The former exists mainly in the Kaesong Industrial Zone 90 while
the latter’s investment activities are substantial and diversified but concentrated in
mineral resource development. 91
155. In response to the second nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea in 2009 and the subsequent adoption of Security Council
__________________
87 In this regard, the Panel of Experts notes that Pak Chol-su, Chairman of Taepung International
Investment Group, revealed during an interview on 17 April 2010 that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea had launched a new economic revival project. The 10-year plan has a
US$ 120-billion investment plan and aims to rebuild infrastructure in eight of the country’s
major cities.
88 The National Defence Commission is the highest guiding organ of the military and the managing
organ of military matters in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Currently, chairmanship of
the National Defence Commission is held by Kim Jong-il, the leader of the country.
89 The board of directors of the State Development Bank is made up of representatives of the
National Defence Commission, the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, the Ministry of
Finance, the Korea Taepung International Investment Group and two independent directors. In
the case of the Korea Taepung International Investment Group, the board of directors consists of
representatives of the National Defence Commission, the Cabinet, the Ministry of Finance, the
Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee and the Korea Taepung International Investment Group.
90 In its sixth year of operation, the Kaesong Industrial Zone is a vast joint venture industrial park
located within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that was intentionally developed to
model what economic reunification would produce. The complex contains about 120 small to
medium-sized Republic of Korea companies, which employ approximately 47,000 citizens of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Its output nears US$ 325 million.
91 For historical and geographical reasons, China has extensive trade exchanges with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in order to stabilize the border region and lessen
pressure on migration from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Chinese companies
have made major investments aimed at developing mineral resources located in the northern
region of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. By November 2010, trade between the
two countries had reached US$ 3.06 billion, an increase of 9.6 per cent from 2008. Experts
indicate that about 30 per cent of exports to China from the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea are mineral resources. The largest single non-Chinese investment in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea came in 2008, when the Egyptian firm Orascom Telecom made a
US$ 400 million investment for a four-year exclusive right to develop a high-speed cell phone
network, servicing mostly Pyongyang. The agreement grants Orascom a 25-year licence.

11-32818 47
 resolution 1874 (2009), compounded by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
military actions taken against the Republic of Korea during 2010, virtually all direct
loans, development assistance and related exchanges to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea from Japan and the Republic of Korea came to a halt during the
reporting period.

X. Designation of goods, entities and individuals

156. In resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), the Security Council placed
special emphasis on several targeted measures intending to maximize the effect of
sanctions by focusing coercive pressure on those responsible for wrongdoing, or by
restricting the measures to selected items or activities, while minimizing unintended
negative impacts on innocent and vulnerable populations. 92
157. By paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) all Member States are directed to
freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources on their territories
that are owned or controlled by the “persons or entities” designated by the
Committee or by the Council as being engaged in the nuclear-related, other existing
weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Under paragraph 8 (e) all Member States
are requested to take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through
their territories of the “persons” designated by the Committee or the Council as
being responsible for such activities. Furthermore, the Council and the Committee
are expected under paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) to designate
additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could
contribute to the nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-
related programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

A. Designation of entities and individuals

158. As emphasized by the Panel, designation remains one of the most effective
tools to impede illicit activities. Since 2009, eight entities of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea 93 and five individuals 94 have been designated by the
Committee and subject to travel ban and/or assets freeze. This limited number of
designations understates the number of known entities and individuals engaged in
proscribed activities.
159. The Panel believes that the list of designated entities and individuals should be
considered on a regular basis and updated as necessary to include the names of those
involved in proscribed activities, particularly those implicated in incidents of
non-compliance reported to the Committee, as well as to prevent designated entities
__________________
92 Member States should be invited to regularly check with the website of the Committee for newly
designated goods, entities and individuals. (www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/index.shtml).
93 Designated entities: Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation; Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation and Tanchon Commercial Bank; Namchongang Trading Corporation; Hong Kong
Electronics; Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation; General Bureau of Atomic Energy; and Korea
Tangun Trading Corporation.
94 Designated individuals: Yun Ho-jin, Director of Namchongang Trading Corporation; Ri Je-son,
Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy; Hwang Sok-hwa, Director in the General
Bureau of Atomic Energy; Ri Hong-sop, former Director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research
Centre; and Han Yu-ro, Director of Korea Ryongaksan General Trading Corporation.

48 11-32818
 from circumventing the sanctions by the use of aliases, intermediaries, affiliates or
substitutes. The Panel has information on these entities and individuals and remains
ready to assist the Committee in that regard.
160. On the basis of recent developments, the Panel believes that the designation of
entities and individuals engaged in the development of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s nuclear programmes or in related procurement activities should
be considered a priority. Even though the country has admitted advanced
development of its uranium enrichment programme, the Panel believes that it still
has to resolve various technical problems. In this context, there must be a group of
high-ranking officials and experts who are entrusted with resolving such problems.
These individuals should be closely monitored and, if necessary, should be subject
to Security Council measures.
161. As indicated earlier by the Panel, the Second Economic Committee of the
National Defence Commission (headed by Paek Se-bong) plays the largest and most
prominent role, in nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and missile-related
developments, as well as in arranging and conducting arms-related exports. 95 The
Military Arms Production Department of the Korean Workers’ Party (headed by Pak
Do-chun, the successor of Jun Byung-ho), 96 also plays a central role in both the
nuclear and missile programmes, as well as in weapons sales and procurement. 97
The General Bureau of Atomic Energy (headed by Ri Je-son) 98 and the Yongbyon
Nuclear Research Centre (headed by Ri Sang-kun), 99 one of the Bureau’s centres
where the new Uranium Enrichment Workshop is located, are the key organizations
implementing the nuclear development programmes. The Second Academy of
Natural Sciences is in charge of research and development, and exports of missiles
and parts, services and assistance related to maintenance and use of such
missiles. 100 Considering that some of the mechanical engineering and metallurgy
applied to missile development have utility in the installation and operation of gas
centrifuges, it is also possible that the Second Academy of Natural Sciences
participates in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s uranium enrichment
programme. It is also suspected to play a leading role in activities related to the
production, import and export of the country’s chemical and biological weapons
programmes. The General Bureau of Surveillance of the Korean People’s Army 101 is
involved in production and sales of conventional arms.
__________________
95 The Second Economic Committee of the National Defence Commission was autonomously
designated by the United States on 30 August 2010 and by the European Union on 22 December
2010. Paek Se-bong was autonomously designated by the European Union on 22 December 2009.
96 Jun Byung-ho was autonomously designated by the European Union on 22 December 2009.
97 The Military Arms Production Department of the Korean Workers’ Party is also known as the
Munitions Industry Department, the Defense Industry Department or the Military Supplies
Industry Department. It was autonomously designated by the United States on 30 August 2010.
98 The General Bureau of Atomic Energy, its Director-General (Ri Je-son) and one of its Directors
(Hwang Sok-hwa) were designated by the Committee on 16 July 2009.
99 Its former Director, Ri Hong-sop, was designated by the Committee on 16 July 2009. The
Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre was autonomously designated by the European Union on
22 December 2009.
100 The Second Academy of Natural Sciences was autonomously designated by the United States on
30 August 2010 and by the European Union on 22 December 2010.
101 The General Bureau of Surveillance of the Korean People’s Army, which is also known as the
Reconnaissance General Bureau, is commanded by General Kim Yong-chol. They were both
autonomously designated by the United States on 30 August 2010.

11-32818 49
 162. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will need various materials and
components for maintenance and expansion of its existing uranium enrichment
facilities. It relies on front and offshore companies, particularly those affiliated with
the Namchongang Trading Corporation, the Korea Mining Development Trading
Corporation (also known as KOMID and Changgwang Trading Corporation) and the
Korea Tangun Trading Corporation. 102 These companies have procured nuclear-
related items, concealing the original purchasers. They could also be used to handle
financial transactions to support such procurement activities, as well as illicit sales
activities. These and other companies, such as Green Pine Associated Company
(headed by Jun Hak-bum), are also key players in the arms trade. Over the reporting
period, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seems to have moved further to
circumvent the Security Council measures by substituting other companies to
assume their activities and/or to act on their behalf or through the use of aliases. The
Panel is concerned by widespread reports that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s diplomatic missions are also brokering arms trade and other illicit
transactions in the countries where no trade office is established. Some of these
aforementioned companies have been designated by the Committee or are publicly
known to be engaged in proscribed transactions. Below is a partial list of the recent
aliases and substitutes used by some of these companies indicated by several
Member States.

Table 2
Partial list of aliases used by designated companies
Aliases included in the designation list of the Aliases not included in the designation list of the
Name of the entity Committee Committee a

Korea Mining Development Changgwang Sinyong Corporation Changgwang Trading Corporation

Trading Corporation
Democratic People’s Republic of Gap Mun Trading
Korea Mining Development Trading
Cooperation Gapmun Trading

External Technology General Green Pine Associated Company

Corporation Hesong Trading
KOMID Heungjin Trading

Hung Jin Trading

Kapmun Tosong

Kapmun Trading

North Korea Mining Development

Trading Corporation
Taesong Trading

Tosong Trading

__________________
102 These three entities were designated by the Committee on 24 April or 16 July 2009.

50 11-32818
 Aliases included in the designation list of the Aliases not included in the designation list of the
Name of the entity Committee Committee a

Green Pine Associated Ch’o’ngsong Yo’nhap

Company
Cho’ngsong United Trading Company

Chongsong Yonhap

Chosun Chawo’n Kaebal T’uja Hoesa

General Precious Metal Complex

Green Pine Associated Corporation

Green Pine International

Greenpine International

Jindallae

Ku’nhaeryong Company Ltd.

Myong Dae Co.

Natural Resources Development and

Investment Corporation
Paeksan Associated Corporation

Saeingp’Il Company

Saeng Pil Trading Company

a
Some of the entries cited in this column could be intermediaries or affiliates acting for or on behalf of the Korea Mining
Development Trading Corporation or the Green Pine Associated Company.

163. The Panel of Experts also notes that a number of Member States and the
European Union have designated additional entities and individuals of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to supplement those designated by the
Committee. 103 As indicated by the Panel, some of these entities and individuals play
an important role in nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile
or arms transfers to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and could
be considered as potential candidates for designation by the Committee.
164. In this context, the Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States
should be invited to provide to the Committee for its consideration all names and
other identities of entities and individuals of concern. In this regard, the Panel draws
the attention of all Member States to the guidelines of the Committee, adopted on
20 June 2007 and available on the Committee’s website, 104 on how to present a
request for designation.

__________________
103 As at 30 April 2011, at least 32 entities and 19 individuals had been autonomously designated by
one or several Member States. For an updated list of autonomous designations see annex A.6.
104 www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/guidelines_20_jun_07.pdf.

11-32818 51
 B. Designation of goods

165. Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) place special emphasis on inhibiting
the ability of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to acquire and to provide
to others nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile items,
technology and know-how. In this regard, the Security Council and the Committee
have banned numerous items through extensive lists such as that in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, S/2006/853 and Corr.1, as
well as S/2009/205 and S/2009/364. However, no updates or additions have been
made by the Committee since 16 July 2009.
166. Taking into consideration the recent development regarding the uranium
enrichment programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Panel
believes that it is critical to identify and control more vigorously priority goods,
materials and technologies required by the country to support and expand its
uranium enrichment programme. Such “choke point” items which could be
considered for restriction under paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) might
include the following, with specific parameters: flow-forming machines; maraging
steel; high-strength aluminium alloy; frequency changers (converters or inverters);
bellows-sealed valves, fibrous or filamentary materials, and prepregs; filament
winding machines and related equipment; perfluorinated lubricants; ring magnets;
and semi-hard magnetic alloys in thin strip form. 105 The Panel also hopes to
highlight specific items on the present proscribed lists (INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1,
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2) which could directly support the centrifuges facility of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
167. In view of recent indications that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
has completed or is about to complete the construction of a second launch site for
long-range rockets, the Panel believes also that additional ballistic missile items
should be considered for restriction under paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718
(2006) in addition to those listed in document S/2009/205 and those designated by
the Committee on 16 July 2009 through S/2009/364. 106 Such items could be, for
example, the following with specific parameters: nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless
steel (N-DSS); austenitic stainless steel; 5-mm or thinner stainless steel sheets;
aerospace-grade aluminium in bar and sheet form. All those non-listed items could
have direct applications in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s missile
programmes, particularly in the production of liquid propelled ballistic missiles.
168. In addition, taking into consideration that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea could continue its nuclear and ballistic missile-related programmes by
acquiring proscribed materials and components, or materials and components which
are below the required precision parameters, and especially because the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea established a small industrial-scale enrichment facility
in this way, strengthened export and Customs controls that include dual-use items
which are below required precision parameters (“catch-all” control) are required.
169. Since the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), some of the lists of items
adopted by the Security Council and the Committee for restriction have been
__________________
105 One of these items (flow-forming machines) is already included in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2.
Others are partially or not included in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2.
106 The Committee prohibited the supply to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of
“graphite designed or specified for use in Electrical Discharge Machining (EDM) machines” and
of “para-aramid fibre (Kevlar and other Kevlar-like), filament and tape”.

52 11-32818
 updated. 107 The Panel also noted that different versions of the same list were used
by different sanctions Committees. 108 The Panel believes that further consideration
should be given by the Council and the Committee to adopting updated lists taking
into consideration the experience of other control regimes, as well as adopting
standardized lists across different sanctions regimes.

XI. Unintended impact

A. Unintended impact on the humanitarian situation

170. In the preamble to resolution 1874 (2009) it is stated that measures imposed by
the resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the
civilian population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In addition,
paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 17 and 19 of
resolution 1874 (2009) provide detailed guidelines to Member States to eliminate
the unintended impact of the sanctions measures, including that exceptions could be
applied for humanitarian purposes when implementing certain measures. In its final
report submitted to the Security Council on 12 May 2010, the Panel recommended
that effective implementation of the Security Council measures should take into
consideration the impact such measures may unintentionally have on the overall
humanitarian situation prevailing in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 109
171. At several meetings of the Committee, Member States expressed their
concerns about the possible adverse impacts of the sanctions measures imposed by
the relevant resolutions and tasked the Panel to investigate this issue. The
deteriorating food situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has
increased this concern.
172. Accordingly the Panel engaged in research to assess if Security Council
sanctions have had adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population in
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea specifically in the current food crisis.
The standard methodology for assessing sanctions impact has been codified in the
Sanctions Assessment Handbook developed by the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. 110 The proposed
methodology for assessing the humanitarian implications of sanctions consists of
several steps which require the availability of a wide array of data, including on the
situation prior to the imposition of sanctions. In applying its template for assessing
humanitarian impact it demands two necessary conditions: (a) site visits to the region
or State under sanctions; and (b) a detailed assessment of socio-economic data
provided by the targeted region or State and analysis of data in the socio-economic
area as available from international agencies. Unfortunately, neither of these data
collection methods so essential for humanitarian assessment and impact
__________________
107 For example, INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 was updated to INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2 in June 2010.
108 The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) adopted in May 2010 a new list
of items related to ballistic missile programmes referred to in resolution 1929 (2010), which is
an updated version of S/2009/205.
109 S/2010/571, recommendation 6.
110 Produced by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in collaboration with
members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee; available from www.humanitarianinfo.org/
sanctions/handbook/index.htm.

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 measurement is available to the Panel at this time. Thus the Panel is able neither to
determine the current status of humanitarian conditions in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea nor to distinguish between the effects of sanctions and the effects
of other factors that influence the humanitarian situation in the country as described
in the background section above. Consequently, the Panel is not yet able to provide
the kind of detailed sanctions impact analysis which the Committee and the Panel
itself would desire, but hopes to take this forward over the next year through
interviews with relevant parties.

B. Unintended impact on diplomatic missions

173. The Committee and the Panel of Experts received information from certain
Member States that their missions in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
were facing operational difficulties, which they attributed to the lack of access to
required financial and other services and supplies from abroad. This has been
attributed, in part, to the reluctance of a number of foreign private sector financial
and other entities to engage with individuals or entities located in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea.
174. On 21 May 2010, the Panel submitted for the consideration of the Committee a
discussion paper with a view to determining what steps might be taken to alleviate
such unintended difficulties without jeopardizing the application and integrity of the
Security Council measures. Among other things, the Panel recommended sending a
questionnaire to interested Member States in order to obtain further specific
information concerning the problems encountered by diplomatic missions and their
staff members in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. During the reporting
period, the Panel remained available to the Committee and its members to provide
any further assistance.

XII. Recommendations
175. In resolution 1874 (2009) the Security Council mandated the Panel of Experts
to make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member
States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in
resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). On the basis of the work of the Panel, its
findings and conclusions reflected in this report, the Panel of Experts presents the
following recommendations to the Security Council, the Committee and Member
States for their consideration:

Monitoring and oversight

Recommendation 1
The Committee should call upon all Member States, relevant United Nations
bodies and other interested parties to increase their cooperation and
communication both with the Committee and with the Panel of Experts
regarding existing or potential sanctions violations in a timely and full manner.
The importance of the cooperation of all States, relevant United Nations
bodies and other interested parties with regard to sanctions on the Democratic

54 11-32818
 People’s Republic of Korea, in particular the sharing of intelligence and
information, cannot be overemphasized.

Recommendation 2
The Security Council should consider the adoption of a mechanism of timely
submission regarding initial reporting of inspections conducted in accordance
with paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution 1718 (2006)
The Committee has experienced delayed reporting from Member States
regarding inspections, which can hamper its work and the investigations of the Panel.

Recommendation 3
The Committee should refine and expand the reporting mechanisms specified by
resolution 1874 (2009) to require the provision of information on illicit
movements of goods and related financial transactions whether these are
(i) accomplished (when proscribed items are known to have been supplied to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); (ii) attempted (when the export of
proscribed items to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is stopped before
the items actually enter into international commerce); or (iii) denied (when
acquisition or export permission is sought but immediately denied by private
companies or the relevant authorities).
The ability to detect and then deter illicit activity is directly related to full
documentation of all existing cases of non-compliance, including those which do not
fall into the categories defined by paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1874 (2009).

Recommendation 4
The Committee should continue to request national implementation reports from
all countries that have not yet provided such reports, and to remind them
regularly to submit these.
Outreach activities undertaken by the Committee, or the Panel at its request,
would prove useful. Such outreach could include briefings by the Committee and
participation in or organization of regional or subregional seminars and conferences.
Coordinated outreach activities with other committees of the Security Council and
their Experts might also prove beneficial. The Committee might also consider
asking the Panel of Experts to enter into a dialogue with, or provide assistance to,
non-reporting/late-reporting Member States.

Recommendation 5
The Committee should monitor the effective implementation of sanctions to
confirm that they do not worsen the humanitarian situation in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. To assess the unintended impact of sanctions on the
diplomatic missions, the Committee should consider inviting relevant Member
States to complete the available questionnaire to obtain further specific
information concerning the problems encountered by diplomatic missions and
their staff members in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
To achieve the goal of targeted sanctions, the effect of the Security Council
measures both on the common population in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and on diplomatic missions should be continuously monitored and, if
unintended impact is found, this should be remedied to its maximum extent.

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 Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles programmes

Recommendation 6
The Panel recommends that the Security Council consider calling on the DPRK
to cease immediately any uranium enrichment programmes and any other
related activities, and to halt the construction of the experimental light water
reactor. The Panel believes that these are violations of Security Council
resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
Recommendation 7
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should be required to place all aspects
of its nuclear programmes, including its uranium enrichment programme, under
IAEA monitoring and to provide IAEA with immediate and full access to all
nuclear-related facilities, sites and other locations.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is obligated under Security
Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) to provide IAEA transparency
measures extending beyond the requirements of the terms and conditions of its
IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including such access to individuals, documentation,
equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by IAEA. The
Panel further believes that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should sign
and ratify the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) at the earliest date. In
this regard, the Panel considers it urgent that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea submit a complete and correct declaration on all its nuclear programmes,
including its uranium enrichment programme. The Panel hopes that IAEA will
establish its potential approach on future verification work in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea.

Recommendation 8
Safety issues should be discussed as an integral part of the denuclearization of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
The Panel is concerned about the decaying Yongbyon nuclear complex, which
poses a high risk of accident and contamination. The Panel further notes that
reckless decommissioning or dismantlement at Yongbyon could cause an
environmental disaster.

Export and import-related measures

Recommendation 9
Member States should strengthen their national export-import control systems as
well as Customs control systems in order to block illicit trade by the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, with special attention to dual-use goods and
technologies of critical importance in the production of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction and missile systems.
The interdiction of proscribed exports destined for the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea remains heavily dependent on the establishment of regulatory
export control regimes, on effective national monitoring and Customs controls, and
on capacity-building in this regard. Member States, including the neighbouring
countries, should continue their efforts to apply stringent export controls.

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 The Panel of Experts learned that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
has tried to evade sanctions by using local suppliers of sensitive items that had
insufficient knowledge and expertise about export control. Therefore, Member
States should establish consultation mechanisms between these local suppliers and
licensing authorities as early as possible.

Recommendation 10
Member States that have not yet introduced the system of “catch-all” export
control should strengthen their domestic mechanisms, including re-export and
diversion controls.
Considering the possibility that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
could use not only proscribed materials and components but also materials and
components which are below the precision parameters specified in the Security
Council resolutions, strengthened export and Customs controls are required to effect
“catch-all” control.

Recommendation 11
Private companies in relevant industries, as the first line of defence in export
controls, should also be encouraged to engage with the enforcement authorities of
Member States to ensure the early detection of potential intended proliferation.
The private sector has an important role in the prevention of illicit exports to
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. For this purpose, internal compliance
programmes within private companies should be well-established and exercised.
The provision of the necessary information to the relevant governmental agencies
when a suspicious procurement inquiry occurs is important.

Recommendation 12
Member States should cut off assistance, and particularly exchanges of personnel,
related to technology, technical know-how, training and maintenance for all
entities and individuals associated with the uranium enrichment activities of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
During its investigation, the Panel learned that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea exchanged scientists and key technical personnel for the transfer of
sensitive technology related to proscribed items. This measure will be effective
because the scientists and engineers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
lack know-how not only in uranium dioxide fuel (UO2) production but also in various
other processes related to uranium enrichment. As part of this measure, more broadly,
intangible technology transfer that can assist the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s nuclear programme should be closely examined and strictly controlled. In
paragraph 28 of resolution 1874 (2009) the Security Council called upon all Member
States to exercise vigilance and to prevent specialized teaching or training of
nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea within their territories or by
their nationals, in disciplines which could contribute to the proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Luxury goods

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 Recommendation 13
Member States should include in their reports pursuant to paragraphs 11 of
resolution 1718 (2006) and 22 of resolution 1874 (2009) a list of the goods
considered by them to fall within the category of luxury goods and engage in
consultations as necessary with any Member States prohibiting such items prior
to authorizing the export of essentially identical items.
Recommendation 14
The Committee should provide to Member States more detailed guidelines
concerning the definition of luxury goods in order to foster a more uniform
application of these measures. Such guidelines could be based on the principles
proposed by the Panel.

Interdiction

Recommendation 15
All Member States should strengthen efforts to block the illicit flow of proscribed
items through maritime transit and/or trans-shipment to and from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. All Member States are requested, in accordance with
resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), to inspect all cargo if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains the proscribed items.
Extra vigilance should be exercised in accordance with local norms at the first
and subsequent overseas maritime port handling Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea shipments or trans-shipments with regard to containers carrying cargo
originating from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Each Member State in
the region should strengthen its regulations on ground, maritime and air
transportation and actively engage in regional cooperation to constrain sanctions
evasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Recommendation 16
All Member States should exercise enhanced Customs vigilance at all airports
where Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-chartered or flagged aircraft land.
Recommendation 17
Vigilance should be exercised to monitor and prevent illicit activities from being
conducted by Air Koryo and other foreign aircraft engaged on non-scheduled
flights into and out of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by countries
over whose territory such aircraft may fly.
Recommendation 18
The Committee should prepare an implementation assistance notice for Member
States regarding the disposal of goods seized in an interdiction.
Several government officials have requested guidelines or information on the
disposal of the seized proscribed items. It was frequently mentioned that the lack of
relevant guidelines caused enormous inconvenience to the Member States and the
parties concerned.

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 Designation of goods, entities and individuals

Recommendation 19
The Security Council and the Committee should consider updating lists
of sensitive items by taking into consideration the experience of other
control regimes, as well as by adopting standardized lists across different
sanctions regimes.
Recommendation 20
The Committee should identify and Member States should control more
vigorously priority goods, materials and technologies required by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to support and expand its uranium
enrichment programme.
Items which could be considered for restriction under paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of
resolution 1718 (2006) might, with specific parameters, include flow-forming
machines; maraging steel; high-strength aluminium alloy; frequency changers
(converters or inverters); bellows-sealed valves, fibrous or filamentary materials,
and prepregs; filament winding machines and related equipment; perfluorinated
lubricants; ring magnets; and semi-hard magnetic alloys in thin strip form.

Recommendation 21
Additional ballistic missile items should be considered by the Committee for
restriction under paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006).
Such items could be, for example, the following with specific parameters:
nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steel (N-DSS); austenitic stainless steel; 5-mm
or thinner stainless steel sheets; aerospace-grade aluminium in bar and sheet form.

Recommendation 22
The Committee should update regularly the sanctions designation list so as to
prevent entities and individuals already listed by the Committee from
circumventing the Security Council measures through the use of aliases,
intermediaries, affiliates or substitutes.
In order to counter the use of aliases by designated entities, Member States
should be invited to provide as much information as possible to assist in the
identification of the designated entities and individuals, or of those substituting for,
or acting for or on behalf of those designated entities and individuals. The Panel has
provided in this report an updated partial list of aliases that might assist the
Committee and Member States.

Recommendation 23
Member States should be invited to provide to the Committee the names and
other identities of those entities and individuals that have not yet been designated
but have been involved in the development of prohibited nuclear and missile-
related programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. After due
diligence, the Committee should designate the entities and individuals it deems to
be violating Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s long pursuit of its clandestine
uranium enrichment programme highlights the importance of incapacitating main
actors. The Panel has information on these entities and individuals and remains

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 ready to assist the Committee in that regard. For example, Member States should
consider the following names: the Second Economic Committee of the National
Defence Commission headed by Paek Se-bong, the Military Arms Production
Department of the Korean Workers’ Party headed by Pak Do-chun, the General
Bureau of Atomic Energy headed by Ri Je-son, and the Yongbyon Nuclear Research
Centre headed by Ri Sang-kun, play central roles in the nuclear, chemical and
biological programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as well as in
the ballistic missile programme. Among these key organizations and individuals, the
Committee has designated only the General Bureau of Atomic Energy and its
Director-General (Ri Je-son), one of the directors of the General Bureau of Atomic
Energy (Hwang Sok-hwa) and the former director of the Yongbyon Nuclear
Research Centre (Ri Hong-sop).

Recommendation 24
Member States should also be invited to provide to the Committee the names and
other identities of those entities and individuals that have been engaged in the
illicit procurement and sales activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea over the years or otherwise implicated in incidents of non-compliance
reported to the Committee.
Establishing industrial-scale centrifuge facilities would have required the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to procure a variety of specialized goods
abroad. Initial procurement for this project was assigned to the Namchongang
Trading Corporation. Since the Namchongang Trading Corporation and its director
(Yun Ho-jin) have been designated by the Committee, other entities and individuals
might be engaged in procurement and sales of proscribed goods and technology. In
this regard, the Panel draws special attention to the Green Pine Associated Company
(headed by Jun Hak-bum), which is now responsible for about half of the arms and
related materiel exports of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, because it is
deeply engaged in illicit procurement of chemical material and other specialized
items abroad.

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Annex A.1
Imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre

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Annex A.2
Imagery of the fuel fabrication complex

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