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    No need to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing in Arizona tax court

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    No need to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing in Arizona tax court

    Copyright:

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    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    254 views8 pages

    Burlingame Indus. v. Maricopa County (AZ 1st Appeals)

    Uploaded by

    Paul Masters
    No need to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing in Arizona tax court

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 8

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE

    BURLINGAME INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation dba EAGLE ROOFING PRODUCTS-SOUTHWEST,

    ) ) ) ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) MARICOPA COUNTY, ) ) Defendant/Appellee. ) __________________________________)

    DIVISION ONE FILED: 08/23/2011 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK 1 CA-TX 10-0003 BY: DLL DEPARTMENT T O P I N I O N

    Appeal from the Arizona Tax Court Cause No. TX2008-000786 The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge REVERSED AND REMANDED

    Mooney, Wright & Moore, PLLC By Paul J. Mooney And Jim L. Wright Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Helm & Kyle, Ltd. By Roberta S. Livesay And Sally Worthington Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

    Mesa

    Tempe

    S W A N N, Judge 1 Assessor, After a miscommunication Industries with the Maricopa County a

    Burlingame

    (Plaintiff)

    appealed

    personal property valuation to the tax court.

    Because Plaintiff

    had not first appealed the valuation to a state or county board

    of equalization, the tax court dismissed Plaintiffs appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that A.R.S.

    42-15104(2) and -16201 establish a direct right to appeal a personal property valuation to the tax court, and that these provisions offer an alternative to the statutes that provide for administrative review. in these circumstances remedies, Because we conclude that judicial review is we not predicated and on exhaustion for of

    administrative proceedings.

    reverse

    remand

    further

    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 On September 3, 2008, Plaintiff petitioned the

    Assessor for a review of the valuation of Plaintiffs personal property, contending that the $8,668,786 valuation should

    instead be $2,600,636. by telephone on

    Plaintiffs agent and the Assessor met 22, and the Assessor informed The

    September

    Plaintiffs agent that the valuation would not be altered.

    Assessor claims to have mailed his decision to Plaintiff on September 23. Plaintiff claims never to have received that

    mailing, and did not learn that the Assessors decision had been mailed out until October 23 -- well after the 20 days allowed for an administrative appeal under A.R.S. 42-19052, -16101 through -16111, and -16151 through -16169. Plaintiff requested

    that the Assessor reissue the decision so that Plaintiff could file a timely appeal to the State Board of Equalization. When

    the Assessor did not respond, Plaintiff commenced this action in tax court on December 12, 2008. 3 Maricopa County (Defendant) moved to dismiss the

    valuation appeal with prejudice, contending that under A.R.S. 42-19052 the court had no jurisdiction to hear a personal property valuation appeal except from a decision by a state or county board of equalization. After briefing and oral argument,

    the tax court granted the motion in a detailed minute entry on March 31, 2010, and entered a signed judgment on June 17, 2010.1 Plaintiff timely appeals. DISCUSSION 4 The issue on appeal is whether a personal property

    valuation that has been affirmed on review by the assessor can be appealed directly to the tax court. The tax courts

    jurisdiction is a matter of statute that we review de novo. Sempre, 225 Ariz. at 108, 5, 235 P.3d at 261. statutes, we seek to ascertain and give In interpreting effect to the

    legislatures intent -- looking to the plain language of the statutes as the most reliable guide -- and to harmonize related

    We note that the trial court ruled shortly before we issued our opinion on June 22, 2010, in Sempre Ltd. Pship v. Maricopa Cnty., 225 Ariz. 106, 235 P.3d 259 (App. 2010). In Sempre we interpreted A.R.S. 42-15104(2) as creating a right to judicial appeal of a real property valuation even absent an administrative appeal. Id. at 109, 9, 235 P.3d at 262. Here we apply 42-15104 to personal property valuations.

    statutory provisions without rendering any portion superfluous. Id. I. TITLE 42 CREATES ALTERNATIVE RIGHTS OF APPEAL AND PROCEDURES FOR THEIR EXERCISE, INCLUDING THE DIRECT APPEAL OF THE ASSESSORS VALUATIONS TO THE TAX COURT. The right to appeal a property valuation exists only Sempre, 225 Ariz.

    when and to the extent authorized by statute. at 108, 5, 235 P.3d at 261. in A.R.S. Title 42.

    The pertinent statutes are found

    The right to appeal from a valuation by the The right to appeal the titled tax court is Tax

    assessor is established by 42-15104. subsequent established administrative in Title 42, decisions Chapter to 16,

    Property

    Appeals and Review, and Chapter 19, Article 2, titled Personal Property Tax Appeals. 6 Title 42 also establishes a set of procedural

    requirements for appeals of administrative valuations to the tax court: Any taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the valuation or classification of the taxpayer's property may appeal to court only in the time and manner prescribed in chapter 16 of this title. A.R.S. 42-11005(D) (emphasis added). Whether the

    taxpayer seeks judicial review of an administrative valuation under Chapter 14, 15, 16 or 19, the time and manner of the appeal must conform to the requirements set forth in Chapter 16. See A.R.S. 42-14005, -15104, -16056, -16111, -16168 and

    -19052(B)

    (requiring

    that

    judicial

    appeals

    be

    made

    pursuant

    to, as provided by, or as prescribed by Chapter 16). II. 7 A.R.S. 42-16201 PROVIDES A RIGHT TO APPEAL THE ASSESSORS VALUATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY DIRECTLY TO THE TAX COURT. A.R.S. 42-16201(A) provides: A property owner who is dissatisfied with the valuation or classification of the property as determined by the county assessor may appeal directly to the court as provided by this article on or before December 15 regardless of whether the person has exhausted the administrative remedies under this chapter, except as provided in subsection B of this section. (Emphasis added.) This language is clear on its face -- despite

    the paths to administrative review available to taxpayers, those who meet the requirements of 42-16201 may proceed directly to the tax court. 8 In Sempre we held that A.R.S. 42-16201 and -15104

    permitted an appeal directly to the tax court of a valuation of real property without exhaustion of administrative remedies.

    225 Ariz. at 109, 8, 235 P.3d at 262. we concluded that the provisions

    There, as in this case, for administrative to

    allowing not

    appeals

    provided

    alternative

    remedies,

    prerequisites

    judicial review. 9 valuation. as well as Sempre arose in the context of a real property

    But Chapters 15 and 16 of Title 42 apply to personal real property. See, e.g., A.R.S. 42-15053

    (requiring reporting of taxable personal property); -15059 and -15060 (establishing liability and a presumption of ownership for personal property); -15152(B) (requiring inclusion of

    taxable personal property on the tax rolls); -16251 (defining assessor errors to include mistakes relating to real and

    personal property).

    And nothing in 42-15104 or -16201 limits

    to any specific type of property the right to direct appeal to the tax court. Absent any restriction of the right to direct

    appeal, we conclude that these statutes - and the reasoning of Sempre - apply equally to challenged valuations of real and personal property. III. THE RIGHT TO APPEAL A PERSONAL PROPERTY VALUATION TO THE TAX COURT UNDER A.R.S. 42-15104(2) IS NOT LIMITED BY 42-16157(D). 10 The Assessor contends that A.R.S. 42-16157(D)

    eliminates any right of appeal under 42-15104(2). 11 Section 42-16157(D) reads: A property owner whose petition is denied, in whole or in part, pursuant to 42-19051 may only appeal the valuation or legal classification to the state board as provided in subsection A of this section within twenty days after the date of the assessor's notice of refusal or decision. Defendant reads this language as extinguishing all other rights of appeal of a personal property valuation once a taxpayer has petitioned the assessor for review. We reject this

    interpretation.

    12

    A.R.S. 42-16157(D) must be read in the context of First, 42-19052 the result of a

    the statutory scheme of which it is a part. provides that a person dissatisfied with

    petition to the assessor under -19051 may appeal to the state or county board of equalization, and then to the court if the administrative process does not satisfy the taxpayer. There is

    nothing in the language of -19051 to suggest that the term may appeal should be read the to mean may as only appeal, a and we

    therefore

    interpret

    section

    creating

    nonexclusive

    avenue to administrative review. 263. Section 42-16157(D) review by further

    Compare Sempre, 235 P.3d at defines that the procedure for

    administrative

    providing

    personal

    property

    valuation appeals made to the state board pursuant to 4219051 are made as provided in subsection A of this section, but may only instead be of made within the 20 more days of the 25 assessors days that

    notice,

    within

    generous

    subsection A allows for real property appeals.

    That section We

    contains no mention of the county boards or the tax court.

    therefore conclude that the restrictive term only in -16157(D) limits the time right for to appeals proceed to to the the state county board board - or not the the tax

    taxpayers court.

    CONCLUSION 13 that Because we hold that the tax court erred in concluding Plaintiff before was required a to exhaust its administrative we vacate the

    appeals

    pursuing

    judicial

    appeal,

    judgment of the tax court and remand for further proceedings, including a determination whether Plaintiffs appeal was timely under A.R.S. 42-16201. Plaintiff has requested attorneys

    fees pursuant to A.R.S. 12-348 at such time as it prevails . . . on the merits. Such an award is premature at this time. Plaintiff is

    Sempre, 225 Ariz. at 112, 24, 235 P.3d at 265.

    entitled to recover its taxable costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21(a).

    /s/ ___________________________________ PETER B. SWANN, Presiding Judge

    CONCURRING:

    /s/ ____________________________________ PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge

    /s/ ____________________________________ DIANE M. JOHNSEN, Judge

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