But http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/136 sure looks like a real attack to me. OpenSSL had released mitigations for it in the past but had to turn them off for compatibility reasons.
Duong and Rizzo claim to be able to work out the session cookie in a few minutes from a network level MitM and they have come through on their promises before.
This is a very real and serious attack. The IV weakness of SSL looks very scary.
This MitM attack very feasible over wifi/corporate networks. For example, (simplifying a lot):
* Initial shopping session example.com (HTTP)
* User proceeds to payment stage payment.com
* Browser with auth cookie for SSL payment.com
* payment.com redirects to success page at example.com HTTP
* Attacker MitM success page adding HTTP iframe to payment.com
* Attacker serves fake iframe with JS code
* The iframe has same-origin to payment.com
* iframe does thousands of carefully crafted ajax/form requests to SSL payment.com
* Optional 1: attacker snoops those requests/response to hint JS iframe
* Optional 2: attacker blocks those requests
* Since it's local MitM thousands of requests can be fired in seconds
The attacker could use specially crafted URLs at https://payment.com and headers using XMLHTTPRequest.setRequestHeader() for the known plaintext.
Fundamentally is precisely the wrong word to use here.
It may be the case that this particular attack is not an issue -- I doubt it given the authors track record -- but the paper marshray links to is an actual real issue even if this particular practical exploit of it is flawed.
Fundamentally, TLS 1.0 is not secure ( formally INDCPA II). The correct thing to do is use something that is secure. Allegedly, TLS 1.1+ fits this bill (if one trusts Hugo Krawczyk proof that assumed fresh IVs).
Anyone working on an SSL/TLS stack should be working to get this supported and should know enough to realize that supposedly theoretical issues with crypto systems can quickly become real easily (e.g, bleichenbacher's attack against ssl in the 90s)
> Certainly it's not the case that anything is 'broken'.
Since others have found the links to the prior papers I don't have to worry about revealing anything by suggesting that there's prior work.
What I was trying to hint at (badly) while still giving the authors their presentation, is that there's a long history behind this. Any weaknesses in TLS 1.0 should be credited correctly (and I'm sure the authors will do so), but it makes me feel bad that it's getting lost in the coverage so far. There might be a neat demo on Friday (I don't know the details of that) but they didn't break anything themselves.
Note: I now have a draft of their paper but haven't read it yet.
I think it's open at this point that BEAST is substantially based on Bard 2004/2006. What's not clear is how much they've improved upon it. This is important for more than just assigning credit, it's important so we can decide how much resources to invest in reviewing the severity all over again.
* Rizzo and Duong have produced a working exploit. This is something Bard did not do. It's one thing to show something is possible and let the world forget about it soon after. It's another thing entirely to actually do it.
* Bard's papers, especially the first one, spends too much time talking about trojan browser plug-ins and Java applets. This minimizes the fundamental attack. Obviously a user who installs a browser plugin is pwned in far simpler ways than this.
* Rizzo and Duong have made some important improvements to the attack. It looks like Bard was heading in that direction in 2006 but did not get all the way. R&D are better at manipulating the underlying HTTP.
(Of course they need to go ahead and go public with the details already!)
Broken is when an attacker can decrypt your gmail without a fake cert. That's broken.
Are you saying that TLS 1.0 is not broken?
Sounds like instead you are saying that it's been broken for so long that this isn't breaking news. But "broken" as in "breaking news" is not at all how anyone parsing your initial post would grok it.
No details about this attack have been made available to anyone who can publicly corroborate them, and yet the researchers are doing press interviews and speaking publicly about how they've broken SSL. I have no idea what the details of this attack are, but in my experience, when people hype an exploit for weeks before making details available, it's because the exploit isn't really very good.
I realize that the security industry is built on hype, but this is fucking dumb.
I agree their disclosure strategy pretty effed up.
Nevertheless, if BEAST is basically an exploit on the Bard attack that's been known for years, perhaps it suggests that there was an insufficiency of hype around the original publication.
Maybe, we don't know. I'm guessing that @agl can't respond in detail, because he's likely bound by whatever disclosure agreement the Chrome team entered into, but he's a smart cookie and I'm inclined to trust his assessment.
I obviously have no way to know whether this is a big deal or not. These guys have a "proven track record" from the ASP.net thing, but remember that attack came after a number of less-than-earth-shattering releases from them around padding oracles in other circumstances.
I would go further and say anyone can claim they "broke" whatever system. Why do we even care about this. PoC or it didn't happen.
Also, 'SSL broken' it's a way abusive title to whatever hack relying on non encrypted http requests, javascript injection and so on.
But the real question: why do people pay so much attention to this here at HN? Why does it gets discussed as if would be given for a fact when all we have are rumors?
I think people just like to talk vaguely about crypto, throwing a few concepts and hypothesis around migt be enough for many to feel intelligent...?
A demo is due on Friday, that's hardly a "weeks" timeframe. Browser vendors have been contacted, and and far as I've been reading details given on interviews by Juliano and Thai are straight to the point. The hyping up is being done by journalists, and by people on the security-conference biz (Dragos, i'm looking at you...), those are businesses relying on hype, not security itself.
I find you own attitude on the mater as a security researcher rather unprofessional. I beleive you are speculating hardly on this not being a serious matter, and are in fact as detail-less as the journalists hyping this up.
The hype is indeed a little absurd. But look at it another way: Bard's paper enumerated a very potential exploit i 5 years ago .Issues with the IV were disclosed on the openssl list 3 years before that.
For the past 8 years TLS was know to be theoretically insecure and yet the fix was not widely adopted. I would have hoped we had outgrown ignoring "academic" issues with crypto systems after the debacle with non provably secure RSA signatures in SSL/the Bleichenbacher attack that necessitated OAEP in the 90s.
Maybe the security community deservers the world it lives in where this kind of hype is acceptable and productive? Certainly it could have been avoided by paying attention to these issues in the first place.
Surmising from this and the scant details released: It is a chosen-plaintext attack. Requests to the logged-in SSL site are made by injected Javascript in a separate non-SSL page. By changing the length of the requested URL (easily done by appending GET variables), the authentication cookie header is pushed out so that the first unknown character is right at the end of a cipher block. This allows us to make guesses at that character, testing each guess using the method described by Wei Dai in the linked email (using another crafted request to the server). Once we've found the first character, we push the cookie one byte further back and work on the second character, repeating until we have the entire unknown portion of the cookie.
If this turns out to be somewhat accurate, a workaround could be to have the browser force the HTTP headers to be block-aligned, by inserting a dummy first header if necessary.
I think you would need to have the last unknown character at the start of the next cipher block as you would need to control the content of the cipher block directly after that.
The idea is that if you force the browser to produce the ciphertext of a block like "kie: sessionid=f", where the first 15 characters are already known, then you don't have to try many candidate plaintext blocks through your adaptive-chosen-plaintext oracle to find that unknown 16th character.
1. A user opens any HTTP website like http://google.com/ in Iran (for example)
2. Government-controlled Iranian ISP intercepts HTTP traffic and injects some rogue JS code.
3. Rogue JS code opens https-AJAX-connection to https://gmail.com/ and transmits some constant nonsense there (chosen plaintext attack).
4. The key point of TLS 0.x-1.0 vulnerability is deterministic calculation of IV in all sessions except first one. Initialization vector (IV) is computed using (pseudo)random numbers for the first session, and subsequent connections to the same website use new IVs computed with deterministic algorithm from previous IVs, without using random numbers.
It's a specific form of key integrity probably intended to counteract partial MitM. Or at least that way it was thought in 1994 by Netscape.
5. Rogue Iranian ISP intercepts resulting https traffic for https://gmail.com/ and by comparing known (chosen) plaintext versus ciphertext, computes initial IV. Here is where the novelty of the research is: popular belief in 2006 was this computation requires 2^1000 operations, in 2011 it turns out that could be handled in 10 minutes [see my remark below].
6. User navigates to https://gmail.com/ to read email. Browser chooses new IV different from old one, but Iranian ISP can compute it independently because algorithm is deterministic and previous IV is known to them.
7. By knowing second IV, Iranian ISP is able to decrypt all https traffic of the second session and extract user cookies from it. (Not necessarily in real time.)
8. Now Iranian government is able to read user's email by substituting his cookies on any computer and navigating to https://gmail.com/.
You may replace Iranian govt in this story with your neighbour in public WiFi, equipped with enhanced version of FireSheep.
---
My remark: I think this is fixable on the client side and somehow related to low-entropy PRNG used to generate IV for the first TLS session.
It's not session resumption that is the problem - even when TLS sessions are resumed, new connections still generate new keys. Rather, it's new requests on the same HTTPS connection (HTTP keepalive). The problematic predictable IV is at the start of each HTTPS record within a single connection.
So if this is a problem with subsequent IVs, wouldn't turning off SSL session caching server side mitigate the attack as well? Highly loaded servers wouldn't be able to handle this, and it degrades the experience for high-latency users, but it does force a new session on every connection.
This description of the attack suggests a stream of ajax requests to a site to detemine the PRNG. Does that mean that it would be possible to create rainbow tables (or equivalent) for all common implementations of the PRNGs, or certainly for targeted sites e.g. banks, PayPal etc etc?
No, it's not an attack on the PRNG in the usual sense.
One way to think about it though is that CBC mode "sort of" uses the previous ciphertext block as the output of a PRNG which is used to randomize the plaintext before it's encrypted with the block cipher. However, the way TLS 1.0 uses it, the attacker is able to learn the output of that PRNG well in advance of when it can be used. If he can choose some plaintext during that time, this adaptive chosen plaintext attack is made possible.
If I'm reading this correctly, the attack requires specially crafted JS to be slipped into the target browser. But aren't you already screwed if third parties can slip arbitrary JS into your pages? It would be great if somebody could explain this in more realistic terms.
Someone with access to any unencrypted HTTP stream - think ISP or wifi-sharer or (especially) government or cybercriminal - can slip in javascript that, in one browser window, gives the attacker the information needed to decrypt the secure streams in other browser windows.
They do not need to find an exploit in your browser to jump from an insecure browser session to your secure sandbox beside it.
How would they jump sandboxes? Wouldn't that require a browser-specific attack? For example, how would some injected code on HN jump over to my secure banking tab, in another chrome process?
Presumably the injected code creates specially crafted requests to the SSL site being attacked - it can't read the results of those requests, but that doesn't matter: its only purpose is to create some adaptively-chosen known plaintext for the sniffer.
No, it wouldn't. With AJAX, the request always goes out, and is received and processed by the server if they choose to (most never check the request origin).
Then, the server can decide whether or not to attach cross origin resource sharing headers to the response. If those headers exist, the response is exposed to JavaScript. If not, they are swallowed by the browser.
In the case of Chrome (and other browsers are moving in the same direction), you should be able to check the pid of the instance you're dealing with. At least, I assume that's the case if they're offering native c++ support.
Presumably running a plugin like noscript or disabling JS would mitigate this attack, then.
I wonder if at some point we're going to have a backlash against JS apps, which are really just the fat clients of the 1990s in a new container, as attackers discover more and more exploitable weaknesses in client JavaScript implementations.
One of the main purposes of SSL is to prevent someone who may control the route from server to client from eavesdropping or injecting their own data, so the article assumes this situation: only the server and client are trusted. It's trivial to inject something into an unencrypted stream if you own the network, but they're saying they can slip in some arbitrary JS to an encrypted stream with about 10 minutes of work.
If somebody injects JS into your stream, you are most likely screwed, but it doesn't mean your cookies can be stolen. Cookies can be set to HttpOnly (and should be, if you're trying to operate a secure site).
No, the attack is against SSL and Man-in-the-Middle. They just make the browser send SSL requests with those cookies, and then guess the cookie (sent inside the SSL session).
It looks like it uses a chosen plain text attack that exploits the multiplexing of multiple requests over the same SSL socket level connection that by design share the same key.
They still require access to your browser to, I'm assuming, modify certain data in some way such that they can actually perform the chosen plaintext attack on the encrypted cookies.
". We present one application the attack: BEAST. BEAST focuses on SSL implementations on browsers which is HTTPS. BEAST works for most major browsers and websites."
The researchers said that the browser-based attack is just one variant. They said they also could implement a similar attack against other services that use SSL, such as instant-messaging clients or VPNs."
Please read the article linked to by the original post, not the article linked to by another commenter. The article on The Register which was linked to says nothing about VPNs or instant messaging clients.
Duong and Rizzo said the underlying vulnerability BEAST exploits is present in virtually all applications that use TLS 1.0, making it possible to apply the technique to monitor private communications sent through many instant messenger and Virtual Private Networking programs.
I didn't even see there was a page 2 on the Register article, so mea culpa on that (though the parent's quote was indeed not from that page, but from one another commenter linked to).
It claims to be a practical working attack, and it says they haven't found a practical solution. The title accurately reflects how I interpret the gist of the situation.
Quite possibly, but this is about BEAST and the ability of loading malicious Javascript. Performing the feat of code injection on a non-browser application is something completely different. If something is injecting code into your native application or throwing known plaintext into your socket streams then you've already been compromised.
You don't need to inject code, you need to inject traffic. Injecting code into client is only one way to do that. For example in many VPN deployments you can inject traffic into secure channel directly.
We won't know for certain until details are released but their claim that "exploit works even against sites that use HSTS, or HTTP Strict Transport Security" is disturbing.
Did anyone really trust it anyways? I mean, with fake certs floating around, in order for it to really be secure you need to guarantee that the cert you got is the real cert anyways, which most people (read: average users) don't bother with.
But even if we get the CA issue sorted out somehow, or even if someone really only uses trustworthy certificates, SSL is still broken. That's why this is news. It's an attack on the confidentiality of SSL which (I think) has never been done before.
As mentioned in the article, the attack only works on TLS 1.0 (and below). Now the question would be, why are we still stuck with TLS 1.0 (at least with Mozilla's NSS) and not migrated to newer versions of the protocol,
RequestPolicy users should be safe from this attack. The attacker can inject arbitrary javascript into a http page, but RequestPolicy will by default block that javascript from causing any cross site requests to the target https site.
Another MitM attack using the browser's inability to force you to only use SSL for a given domain. We need a function in our browsers to specify domain XYZ only should use SSL. I know it sounds ghetto, but I would love to force domains matching "ssl.* . *" in my browser to only work with strong SSL on port 443 and nothing else (by default).
I know, why not just use https:// ? But it's hard to train users to act a different way and understand what's going on under the hood when they leave out a single letter in the protocol prefix. Just giving them a new address which they type in verbatim anyway seems like an easier fix. Plus, you disable all unencrypted connections for that domain and you don't need to worry about complex attacks like the current one and previous ones.
But besides that, as I understand it, this attack doesn't require an HTTP request to the victim site; it only requires an HTTP request to any site, followed by an HTTPS request to the victim site, so STS wouldn't be much help here unless all websites turn on SSL and adopt STS. (Though someone should correct me if I'm wrong.)
This vulnerability works by injecting HTML and JS purporting to be from a plaintext version of the site being attacked. In other words, the browser has to accept non-SSL pages from the domain. If your browser just threw away all unencrypted requests for the domain this would never work. Neither would sslstrip or a handful of other tools; the improper handling of SSL certs would have an impact, however.
I could have read that draft wrong but it looks like it depends on headers from the victim site to determine if all traffic should be encrypted. MitM would defeat this.
Someone listening in on your connection could take over your bank account session, pay pal session etc. It's unclear from the article how practical it is though, since it seems to require a JS injection on the attacked site.
Not on the attacked site, no. Sounds like it would suffice to serve custom JavaScript to any unencrypted page running in the same browser, and sniff all the traffic going between an encrypted site and that browser.
How exactly would you sniff traffic between an encrypted site and the browser, without running JS in that encrypted site, or without exploiting the browser (in which case you already won and don't need need to break SSL)? Is this some sort of man-in-the-middle hybrid that uses JS as an attack vector?
Let's say an ISP in an oppressive country is hooked up to a government system which sniffs all traffic. It's able to record all your SSL traffic but is unable to decrypt it since it doesn't know the session key that was used for encryption.
At the same time you're browsing on the SSL-secured site, you're also using a site which isn't SSL-secured in another tab. The ISP can inject the unsecured site with specially crafted javascript for your browser to execute. This javascript fetches data from the SSL-secured site using specific known plaintext[0] and the ISP records the resulting traffic. Presumably this separate tab would not have to renegotiate the SSL handshake from scratch, thereby reusing the previously randomly generated session ID.[1] By doing this very deliberately with specially chosen plaintext, over time you have enough data to reverse engineer what key was used to encrypt the data.
[0] I'm guessing it takes the form of a GET request to non-existent resources. You know part of the input, and the resulting 404 page is almost always the same so you know part of the output.
Oh, come on. the same bullshit as openssh 0-day. Have you ever tried to imagine how many audits have been done on SSL protocol and most common implementations by all those corporations, banks, and other organizations with a lots of money and time? And how many individuals spend weeks with sources and debuggers and wiresharks?
Unless you're complete idiot (who uses weak ciphers or allows re-configuration) current SSL implementations will suit you well.
The linked article is sensationalist nonsense, but one should give the authors the benefit of the doubt because the press can be like that.
Fundamentally there's nothing that people should worry about here. Certainly it's not the case that anything is 'broken'.