International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749 (C.A.2 (N.Y.

), 1996)

INTERNATIONAL STAR CLASS YACHT RACING ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
TOMMY HILFIGER, U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 689, Docket 95-7547.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Decided April 4, 1996.

Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge, OAKES and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves the availability of monetary relief and attorney fees in a trademark infringement action
brought under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). The International Star Class Yacht Racing
Association ("ISCYRA") appeals from a portion of the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Robert P. Patterson, Jr., Judge ), entered on May 19, 1995. The district court, after a bench
trial, granted ISCYRA's application for a permanent injunction against use of its "STAR CLASS" mark by the
appellee Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc. ("Hilfiger") but denied injunctive relief as to ISCYRA's insignia, a solid five-
pointed star. The district court also denied ISCYRA an accounting of Hilfiger's profits, actual damages, and attorney
fees.
…
Because we find that the district court made erroneous and incomplete factual findings on the issue of
Hilfiger's bad faith, we vacate its denial of an accounting of profits and attorney fees and remand for reconsideration
of the bad faith issue. On the other two points, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
ISCYRA is a non-profit corporation founded in 1922 for the purpose of governing and promoting the sport of
Star Class yacht racing. Star Class sailboats are sophisticated one-design racing craft sailed in high-profile regattas
and championship series around the world, including the Summer Olympics. ISCYRA owns the rights to the design
of Star Class boats and closely monitors the construction, certification, and registration of each boat in the class. One
requirement of a genuine Star Class boat is that its main sail bear the solid red five-pointed star which serves as
ISCYRA's insignia or a star of green, blue, silver or gold awarded at ISCYRA championship races. The red star is
also used, along with the words "STAR CLASS," on the yachting hats, clothing, flags, decals and pins sold by
ISCYRA. ISCYRA permits yacht clubs hosting regattas to use the insignia and "STAR CLASS" on promotional
items, and has collected royalties for their use in jewelry and posters.
Hilfiger is a successful designer and marketer of men's clothing with sales of over $227 million in 1993. Its
1994 Spring Collection included garments bearing the words "STAR CLASS" with a solid red five-pointed star.
These garments were marketed as "classic nautical sportswear" with "authentic details taken from the sport of
competitive sailing" and "elements and patterns taken directly from actual racing sails." Hilfiger's Page 752 name
and flag trademarks also appeared prominently on all the garments, which were marketed in the United States and
abroad.
While designing the 1994 Spring Collection, Hilfiger requested a trademark screening search for the words
"STAR CLASS" from its attorneys. Hilfiger did not specify that it planned to use the words on "nautical" clothing
with details from "competitive sailing," and the search was limited to federal trademarks in class 25, a clothing
classification. The screening search did not reveal any identical registered or applied-for federal trademarks, but
Hilfiger's attorneys advised it to conduct a "full trademark search" before using the words "STAR CLASS." Hilfiger
did not conduct such a search until after it was sued by ISCYRA, at which point it learned that "STAR CLASS" was
indeed a mark in the yachting context.
In April 1994, ISCYRA initiated this action against Hilfiger for false designation of origin under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994), common law trademark infringement and unfair competition, and injury
to business reputation and trademark dilution under New York state law. Despite notice of ISCYRA's suit and the
results of the full trademark search, Hilfiger did not recall its allegedly infringing merchandise from retailers and

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had sold over $3 million worth of garments bearing the "STAR CLASS" mark by the time the case came to trial in
January 1995. No one from Hilfiger took the witness stand during the two-day bench trial.
The district court granted ISCYRA's application for a permanent injunction under the Lanham Act against use
of its "STAR CLASS" mark by Hilfiger, but denied injunctive relief as to ISCYRA's insignia, a solid five-pointed
star. The district court also denied ISCYRA's request for accounting of profits, actual damages, and attorney fees,
and dismissed ISCYRA's state law and unfair competition claims.
On appeal, ISCYRA argues that the district court erred in denying an accounting and attorney fees based on its
conclusion that Hilfiger did not act in bad faith in using the "STAR CLASS" mark. ISCYRA maintains that (1)
Hilfiger's failure to conduct a comprehensive trademark search; (2) Hilfiger's failure to recall garments bearing
"STAR CLASS" from its inventory and its continued sales of these garments after ISCYRA's lawsuit put it on notice
of ISCYRA's common law trademark; and (3) the evidence of Hilfiger's intentional copying of ISCYRA's mark
were sufficient to establish bad faith and warrant both an accounting of Hilfiger's profits and the award of attorney
fees. ISCYRA further argues that the district court clearly erred both in denying actual damages because no actual
confusion was caused by Hilfiger's merchandise and in finding that ISCYRA had no protectable trademark rights in
its five-pointed star insignia. We agree with ISCYRA that the district court's bad faith finding is based on
incomplete findings of fact and erroneous conclusions. We therefore vacate the denial of an accounting of profits
and attorney fees, which rested on the finding of an absence of bad faith, and remand the case to the district court for
reconsideration of Hilfiger's bad faith. We affirm the remainder of the district court's decision.

DISCUSSION
…

II. The District Court's Bad Faith Finding

The district court's conclusion that Hilfiger did not act in bad faith or willfully infringe in its use of the "STAR
CLASS" mark was based on several factual findings which we review for clear error. Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak
Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 854 (2d Cir.1995); Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.1993). For the
following reasons, we hold these findings to be clearly erroneous and incomplete, necessitating a remand to the
district court for further consideration of the issue.
Initially, we note a factual error in the district court's opinion which goes directly to the question of the
willfulness of Hilfiger's infringement. The district court stated that the trademark search conducted by Hilfiger prior
to its use of ISCYRA's "STAR CLASS" mark was of federal and state marks. In fact, the search was limited solely
to registered or applied-for federal trademarks; despite its attorneys' advice that a wider search be conducted,
Hilfiger did not do one until after ISCYRA filed its suit.
The district court relied on Hilfiger's limited first search as proof that Hilfiger did not "engage in a deceptive
commercial practice" or otherwise act in bad faith in using ISCYRA's mark. We are not convinced, however, that
such a limited search should exonerate Hilfiger, particularly when Hilfiger ignored the specific advice of its
attorneys to search more thoroughly.
The district court also found that although Hilfiger intentionally copied ISCYRA's "STAR CLASS" mark, it
did not intend to copy a trademark owned by another. The court recognized that Hilfiger's failure to offer a "credible
innocent explanation" for its use of ISCYRA's mark could support an inference of bad faith under Centaur
Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1228 (2d Cir.1987). The court nevertheless
concluded that Hilfiger had not willfully infringed on ISCYRA's mark, citing as evidence the limited trademark
search discussed above.
In light of Hilfiger's minimal efforts to ascertain whether "STAR CLASS" was, in fact, a trademark, we agree
with ISCYRA that the district court clearly erred in finding Hilfiger guilty only of simple copying and not of intent
to copy a mark. Given Hilfiger's awareness that it was copying "authentic details ... from the sport of competitive
sailing," it should have shown greater concern for the possibility that it was infringing on another's mark. Hilfiger's
choice not to perform a full search under these circumstances Page 754 reminds us of two of the famous trio
of monkeys who, by covering their eyes and ears, neither saw nor heard any evil. Such willful ignorance
should not provide a means by which Hilfiger can evade its obligations under trademark law.
In addition to the district court's two clearly erroneous findings, we believe that its analysis of Hilfiger's bad
faith was incomplete. First, the district court did not address the fact that Hilfiger failed to conduct a full trademark
search on "STAR CLASS" before using the mark in direct contravention of the advice of its attorneys. Other courts
have found that an infringer who "acts in reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel" generally cannot be said to
have acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 962 (7th Cir.1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1042, 113 S.Ct. 1879, 123 L.Ed.2d 497 (1993); Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int'l Corp.,

-2-
580 F.Supp. 634, 637-39 (S.D.N.Y.1984). Conversely, the failure to follow the advice of counsel given before the
infringement must factor into an assessment of an infringer's bad faith.
Second, the district court gave no consideration to Hilfiger's conduct after ISCYRA brought suit for trademark
infringement. The suit gave Hilfiger notice of its potential trademark violation, and the full trademark search that it
conducted soon thereafter confirmed the existence of ISCYRA's mark. Hilfiger nonetheless continued to sell its
merchandise with the infringing mark, racking up over $3 million in sales, without regard for the rights of ISCYRA.
As counsel for Hilfiger admitted during oral argument, Hilfiger was betting on the fact that ISCYRA would not
prevail in its suit. Hilfiger lost that bet, and should not escape the consequences of its conduct. See Stuart v. Collins,
489 F.Supp. 827, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (finding willful infringement when defendant continued to use plaintiff's
mark after plaintiff's attorney demanded that it cease, thereby giving "short shrift to plaintiff's claim out of arrogance
and confidence that he would not mount any significant legal attack"); see also Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir.1986) (courts should remove economic incentive to engage in infringing activity);
W.E. Bassett Co., 435 F.2d at 664 (an accounting of profits serves to deter willful infringers).
As recognized by the Restatement, an accounting of profits should be limited to cases of fraudulent
infringement, i.e. "to acts intended to create confusion or deceive prospective purchasers," Restatement (Third),
supra, § 37 cmt. e, and not be awarded in cases where a defendant "deliberately but in good faith used a mark." Id.
We note that, under this standard, Hilfiger cannot lay claim to a "good faith" belief that it was not infringing on
ISCYRA's mark because it neither fully explored others' rights to "STAR CLASS" nor ceased its infringing behavior
when it was sued. See Nalpac, Ltd. v. Corning Glass Works, 784 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th Cir.1986) (exploitation of
another's mark after knowledge of its existence suggests bad faith).
We conclude that the district court, in determining whether Hilfiger acted in bad faith, relied on two clearly
erroneous factual findings and did not consider all the evidence pertaining to the willfulness of Hilfiger's
infringement. We therefore remand the issue of Hilfiger's bad faith for reconsideration in light of our analysis above.
As a result, we cannot review the district court's denial of an accounting of profits and attorney fees, but instead
must vacate the denial and remand.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the denial of an accounting of profits and attorney fees, and remand the
question whether Hilfiger acted in bad faith by using ISCYRA's "STAR CLASS" mark to the district court for
reconsideration. In all other respects, we affirm.

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 959 F.Supp. 623

INTERNATIONAL STAR CLASS YACHT RACING ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,

v.
TOMMY HILFIGER U.S.A., INC., Defendant.

No. 94 Civil 2663 (RPP).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.
March 4, 1997.

OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT P. PATTERSON, Jr., District Judge.

On April 4, 1996 the Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the judgment this Court
entered on May 19, 1995. The Second Circuit found that the District Court's conclusion that there was no evidence
of bad faith or wilful infringement in defendant Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc.'s ("Hilfiger") use of the "Star Class"
marks was based on two erroneous factual findings: (1) that the trademark search that defendant undertook was of
both federal and state marks, when in fact it was of federal marks only, see International Star Class Yacht Racing
Association v. Hilfiger, 80 F.3d 749, 752 (2d Cir.1996); and, (2) that although Hilfiger intentionally copied plaintiff
International Star Class Yacht Racing Association's ("ISCYRA") "Star Class" mark, it did not intend to copy a
trademark owned by another. Id. at 753. The Second Circuit found this to be clearly erroneous given Hilfiger's
minimal efforts to ascertain whether "Star Class" was a trademark. Id.
The Second Circuit also found that the District Court's analysis of Hilfiger's bad faith was incomplete, as the
District Court did not address Hilfiger's failure to conduct a full trademark search on Star Class "in direct
contravention of the advice of its attorneys," id. at 754, and did not take into consideration Hilfiger's continued sale
of allegedly infringing merchandise after initiation of this suit. Id.
On remand, the defendant moved to present additional evidence on the issue of its alleged bad faith and the
amount of damages to be imposed, based on the Second Circuit's statement that after plaintiff instituted this action
Hilfiger continued to utilize plaintiff's mark on its apparel, "racking up over $3 million in sales". Id.
The District Court granted defendant's motion and allowed the presentation of additional evidence on October
24, 1996. The evidence consisted of the testimony of Steven R. Gursky ("Gursky"), counsel to defendant, whose
testimony was designed to rebut the Second Circuit's statement that defendant ignored the advice of his firm in its
use of the "Star Class" mark. Also, a witness from Hilfiger's controllers' office presented records showing defendant
shipped only $818,492.85 worth of goods bearing the words "Star Class" after the commencement of the action
(Transcript of October 24, 1996 Hearing, "Hearing Tr." at 557-60), not the "over $3 million in sales" stated by the
Circuit Court.
The Court rejects in toto the testimony of Gursky at the October 24, 1996 hearing. Defense counsel had
adequate notice at trial of the plaintiff's claim of bad faith and made a record at trial as to the advice defendant
received from its counsel on the use of "Star Class". Contrary to defendant's contention in its Post-Trial
Memorandum of Law on Remand ("Post-Trial Mem." at 2-3 n. 1) requesting the evidentiary hearing, prior to trial
the plaintiff did raise the issue of the defendant's bad faith, albeit in a less direct fashion than suggested by the
Second Circuit. …
Accordingly, the evidence presented at the trial is the sole basis on which plaintiff's bad faith claim should be
evaluated, and only the evidence at trial (not the evidence at the October 24, 1996 hearing) will be reconsidered in
light of the Second Circuit's opinion.

Discussion
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Court did commit a clear mistake in finding that a
trademark search of federal and state registrations had been conducted by the defendant, as opposed to just a federal
trademark search.2 The Court's recollection of the nature of the "knock-out" trademark search conducted for the
defendant was clearly incorrect, but this error is not one of any moment, as a state trademark search would not have
revealed any trademark of plaintiff's (Plaintiff's Exhibit, "Pl.Ex." 79),3 and so this error by the Court does not bear
on the issue of defendant's bad faith.
The Second Circuit's suggestion that, in light of Hilfiger's minimal efforts to ascertain whether "Star Class" was
in fact a trademark, this Court erred in finding Hilfiger guilty only of simple copying and not intent to copy a mark,

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does not take into account the change in industry practice in trademark searches that took place in the late 1980s and
early 1990s of which the District Court was aware.
Corsearch v. Thomson & Thomson, 792 F.Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y.1992), an antitrust case, was tried before this
Judge over a period of about four weeks in late 1991. In that case it was uncontested that after the fall of 1989
industry practice in trademark searches underwent a significant metamorphosis following the general release by the
federal patent and trademark office of its computerized data base of all federally registered marks and pending
applications. See Corsearch v. Thomson & Thomson, 792 F.Supp. at 308, 323-25. Thereafter, several firms,
including Corsearch, Mead Data Central and Dun & Bradstreet, entered the trademark screening search field in
competition with Thomson & Thomson which had held "monopoly power in the `comprehensive trademark search
market'" and had had an exclusive right, as had Trademark Research Corporation, to license the computerized
version of the federal trademark search which they helped develop. Id. at 308. Testimony in Corsearch revealed that
a number of "trademark search firms" now offer only screening searches of the federal data base, id. at 323, and that
such firms are widely used by in-house and trademark counsel to conduct "knock-out" or "rule out" searches of
names and symbols, and comprehensive or "more sophisticated searches are reserved for marks which have passed
knock out tests and are being seriously considered for trademark Page 626 registration." Id. at 311 (quoting
Affirmation of Dr. Marion Stewart ¶¶ 21-22).
Indeed, industry statistics demonstrated that a multitude of federal trademark applications are regularly filed
without a full search being conducted.4 Id. at 307. It was thus common practice for businesses to use trademarks and
apply for federal registration without conducting a full trademark search and to rely instead on computerized
screening searches, or "knock-out" searches, comprised only of federal trademarks and pending applications, before
such use and registration. Id. at 307.
Indeed, the Court has been unable to find any case prior to the Second Circuit decision which has held that a
party in Hilfiger's position had a duty to conduct a full search of prior uses of a trademark before use, and has only
found two explicitly requiring the search for existing registered marks. See Sands, Taylor & Wood. Co. v. Quaker
Oats, Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.1992) cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1042, 113 S.Ct. 1879, 123 L.Ed.2d 497 (1993) (aff'g
1990 WL 251914 at * 20 (N.D.Ill. Dec.20, 1990)); see also Zazú Designs v. L'Oreal, 979 F.2d 499, 504 (7th
Cir.1992) ("Firms need only search the register before embarking on development."); Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys,
Ltd., 858 F.2d 70 (2nd Cir. 1988) (upholding lower court finding that search limited to only registered marks was
not bad faith). Court opinions such as these, although principally dicta, evidently were relied upon in business and
by trademark counsel, especially by those anxious not to maximize their costs with full searches and anxious not to
delay production while a comprehensive search was conducted.
In light of the common practice in the industry as revealed in Corsearch and supported by the case law,
defendant's efforts to ascertain whether "Star Class" was a mark of another do not appear to be inadequate.
Moreover, defendant's conduct does not appear in any other way to evince an intent to copy the mark of another.
There is no question Hilfiger advertised the Nantucket Line as "combining classic nautical sportswear with a variety
of authentic details taken from the sport of competitive sailing." (Trial Tr. at 34, 229.) There was no evidence,
however, that Hilfiger had reason to believe that the designation "Star Class" was anything other than a certain type
of sailboat used in racing. Hilfiger's designer admitted examining Stars and Stripes: The Official Record, a coffee
table book published by Dennis Connor Sports, a recognized authority on sailboat racing (Pl.Ex. 88; Trial Tr. at
230), which referred to Star Class racing and Star Class boats but gave no indication of the affiliation of that phrase
with ISCRYA, and treated the phrase generically on many of its pages. See International Star Class Yacht Racing
Association v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 1995 WL 241875 at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1995). Designer Sondag
stated that he had not determined that Star Class as a class of sailing yachts existed.5 (Trial Tr. at 233-34.) There
was no showing that the defendant knew ISCRYA existed. Even Burstein, who was a member of a yacht club,
testified he had no such knowledge (Id. at 330, 339), and plaintiff offered no evidence anyone else at Hilfiger had
such knowledge.
…
As the Second Circuit stated, the fact that Hilfiger went ahead with the use of the phrase "Star Class" after
receiving defendant's counsel's letter of August 6, 1993 to Hilfiger trademark liaison Kathleen Luparello
("Luparello") must be considered in evaluating Hilfiger's bad faith. (Letter of Gursky & Blau to Luparello of August
6,, 1993, Pl. Ex. 74.) Prior to sending the letter, defendant's counsel had performed a trademark screening search by
computer of federal trademark registrations and pending applications for the trade names "Star Class" and
"Haberdasher". (Pl.Ex. 72.)7 It advised its client in the letter of August 6, 1993 against the use of the trade name
"Haberdasher" because of prior use. (Pl.Ex. 74.) With respect to "Star Class" it advised: “The screening search for
the mark STAR CLASS did not reveal any identical federal trademark registrations or applications in class 25 which
would bar your proposed use of this mark. At this point, we would not necessarily rule out your use and registration

-5-
of this mark subject to our usual disclaimers regarding the need to first obtain and review a full trademark search.
Also to be considered is the fact that STAR CLASS would be a rather weak trademark. This is because the words
"STAR" and "CLASS" are non-distinctive terms used extensively in other fields by third parties. Please do not
hesitate to call me directly if you have any questions about the screening search. If you want to proceed with a full
search for STAR CLASS, please advise.” (Pl.Ex.74)(emphasis in text).
Defendant's reaction to this letter must be considered in light of the growing use of knock-out searches and the
greatly reduced use of full searches by businesses and law firms after 1989. See. e.g., Corsearch v. Thomson &
Thomson, 792 F.Supp. at 307, 321 (Thomson & Thomson's revenues from full searches dropped from ninety-five
percent to sixty percent of total revenues between 1983 and 1991). In light of this custom and practice in the
trademark search field, the underlined section in the letter need not be interpreted as advice to conduct a
comprehensive trademark search before any use of "Star Class" but more as a "cover your backside" lawyer's
disclaimer of responsibility, intended to protect the lawyer in the event of adverse consequences from the adoption
of the mark, rather than to advise the client to conduct a full search before using and registering8 "Star Class" as a
trademark. Indeed, Luparello, in the pretrial deposition read into the record by plaintiff's attorney, testified she
regarded the disclaimer language as "attorney paranoia". (Trial Tr. at 354 (quoting Luparello Deposition).) At trial,
Burstein, the author of the Page 628 letter, explained the disclaimer as follows during cross-examination:
Q: ... Would you please tell me ... what the "usual disclaimers" regarding a need to first obtain and review a full
trademark search were?
A: Well, generally before a mark is used and registered as a stand alone mark, we recommend that a full
trademark search be conducted. It's pretty much the gist of the disclaimers. (Trial Tr. at 327.)
Here, Star Class was not used as a "stand alone mark" by Hilfiger to identify the source of goods or to identify
a line of goods, nor was it intended to be "used and registered". The T/H circle symbol, which contains the name
"HILFIGER" in good-sized type, was used for decoration, evidently to give the goods "panache". Another
decorative symbol used in a similar manner was a decorated crest bearing the word "NANTUCKET", under which
were two small flags, one of which contained "T ★ H". The decoration which gave rise to this suit was a yacht club-
type pennant bearing the initials "TH" and the number 42 (Hilfiger's age), capped by the words "TOMMY
HILFIGER" in large letters and underlined by the words "STAR ★ CLASS" in slightly smaller letters. On the left
side of the pennant was the notation "EST.", and on the right, "MCMLXXXV". The most logical interpretation of
this decoration was that the product was from Hilfiger's best class of products. The name "Star Class" was not
registered or attempted to be registered by Hilfiger, and the words were not for use to designate a class of goods.
The line of goods was called the "Nantucket Line", and Hilfiger prominently displayed its stand-alone mark, the
name "Tommy Hilfiger", in large letters on the outside surface of its goods in addition to labeling them inside the
collar. If the mark was not intended to be "used and registered as a stand alone mark", then, according to Burstein's
testimony, there was no reason for Hilfiger to order its law firm to undertake a full search.
Burstein's trial testimony supports the conclusion that his letter was not intended to advise Hilfiger to have a
full search done before using "Star Class" unless it was to be used as a "stand alone mark". While Burstein's
testimony as to the meaning of his firm's disclaimer represents more conservative advice than industry practice in
late 1991 and, inferentially, in 1993, since full searches were no longer ordered as a matter of course even when a
mark was intended to be used and registered, that advice is not inconsistent with industry practice when the mark
was not intended to be used and registered and only used for decoration. Thus, since Hilfiger was only using "Star
Class" as a decoration and not as a trademark, its subsequent use of "Star Class" without ordering a full search is not
inconsistent with its attorney's advice and was consistent with a common industry practice.
…
Accordingly, the Court finds the plaintiff did not prove defendant's bad faith in its use of "Star Class" on its
garments offered for sale prior to this Court's decision, and denies plaintiff's request for an accounting of Hilfiger's
profits. Plaintiff's request for an award of attorneys' fees is denied as well.10
Since the Circuit may not agree with this Court's finding that plaintiff offered insufficient evidence of
defendant's bad faith, the Court will make findings on the evidence of damages. As shown by Defendant's Exhibit 45
(Hearing Tr. at 438-45), the defendant shipped only $818,419.85 worth of goods bearing the phrase "Star Class"
after March 31, 1994, two weeks after plaintiff's cease and desist letter dated March 16, 1994 (Plaintiff's Revised
Post-Trial Brief at 23) and two weeks before the filing of this lawsuit. Defendant offered no evidence of its costs
attributable to these sales. Accordingly, no deduction will be made for such costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117; see also
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 765 F.2d 966, 973 (2d Cir.1985).

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant acted in

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bad faith in using plaintiff's trademark. Accordingly, plaintiff's request for an accounting of defendant's profits or an
order that defendant pay attorneys' fees is denied.
In any event, plaintiff has not shown damages of more than $818,419.85. No evidence has been offered as to
the attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiff in this action, so no determination of fees can be made at this time.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Page 630
---------------
Notes:
1. Sondag reported directly to Tommy Hilfiger. (Trial Tr. at 227.)
2. Two trademark search companies, Thomson & Thomson, through Dialog Information Services, Inc., and
Trademark Research Corporation, did offer both federal and state trademark screening searches for all fifty states at
the time. See Corsearch v. Thomson & Thomson, 792 F.Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1992)(discussed infra).
3. A full search performed after the initiation of this lawsuit by Thomson & Thomson revealed only common law
trademark use by plaintiff. (Transcript of January 9, 10, 1995 Trial, "Trial Tr." at 317; Pl.Ex. 79.)
4. As the Corsearch opinion stated:
[T]housands of federal trademark applications are filed each year without ordering a full search from any
trademark information service.. Corsearch and [Thomson & Thomson] combined performed only approximately
60,000 comprehensive searches in 1990, a substantial number of which did not result in trademark applications.
127,000 trademark applications were filed with the [United States Patent and Trademark Office] in
1990. Corsearch, 792 F.Supp. at 307.
…
---------------

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International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1998)

INTERNATIONAL STAR CLASS YACHT RACING ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
v.
TOMMY HILFIGER U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 97-7761, 97-7799.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Decided May 29, 1998.

Before OAKES, NEWMAN and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge:

The International Star Class Yacht Racing Association ("ISCYRA") appeals from the decision of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Robert P. Patterson, Jr., Judge, denying ISCYRA
monetary relief and attorney fees for the infringing use of ISCYRA's mark "Star Class" by Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A.,
Inc. ("Hilfiger"). The district court held that ISCYRA had failed to demonstrate that Hilfiger used the mark in bad
faith. Hilfiger cross-appeals the district court's calculation of damages without considering evidence of Hilfiger's
costs or the percentage of profits from sales attributable to Hilfiger's mark rather than ISCYRA's, and its decision to
strike the testimony of Hilfiger's lead trial counsel. We vacate and remand the court's findings as to Hilfiger's bad
faith because the district court improperly relied on factual findings from an earlier, unrelated antitrust case. We also
vacate the district court's determination as to Hilfiger's costs and deductions, but affirm the decision to exclude the
testimony of Hilfiger's counsel.

I. BACKGROUND
ISCYRA is a non-profit corporation created to govern and promote the sport racing of a class of sail boats
known as "Star Class" yachts. ISCYRA owns the rights to the design of Star Class boats, and monitors the
construction, certification, and registration of vessels in this class. One hallmark of a Star Class vessel is that it must
display a solid five-point star on its main sail. ISCYRA also uses the star along with the words "Star Class" on hats,
clothing, pins, and decals sold to the public. ISCYRA permits yacht clubs hosting regattas to use the star insignia
and the term "Star Class" on promotional materials, and collects royalties for the use of these marks on clothing and
other marketable materials. ISCYRA has never registered "Star Class" for federal trademark protection.
In March 1994, ISCYRA learned that Tommy Hilfiger, a leading designer and marketer of men's clothing, was
manufacturing and selling garments bearing the words "Star Class" with the star insignia. Promotional materials
issued with the collection described the clothing as "classic nautical sportswear" with "authentic details taken from
the sport of competitive sailing" and "elements and patterns taken directly from actual racing sails." 1 Hilfiger's
name and logo also appeared on most of the garments.
While designing the clothes, Hilfiger had requested from its attorneys a trademark screening search for the
words "Star Class." Hilfiger did not specify its intended use of the words, nor did it reveal that it had taken the term
from "the sport of competitive sailing." Page 69
The search was thus limited to registered federal trademarks, with a particular emphasis on trademarks in
class 25, a clothing classification. One of Hilfiger's attorneys, Neil A. Burstein, reported to Hilfiger that he had
found no competing marks in his search, and stated, "At this point, we would not necessarily rule out your use and
registration of this mark, subject to our usual disclaimers regarding the need to first obtain and review a full
trademark search." (emphasis in original). Hilfiger did not conduct a full search of all prior commercial uses of the
term until after it was sued by ISCYRA, at which point it learned that "Star Class" was a mark in the yachting
context.
On April 13, 1994, ISCYRA sued Hilfiger for false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1994), common law trademark infringement, and injury to its business reputation and trademark dilution
under New York state law. On April 25, 1995, the district court granted ISCYRA a permanent injunction to bar
Hilfiger's use of the mark "Star Class," but declined to award monetary relief or attorney fees because it determined
that ISCYRA had not sustained any actual damages and that Hilfiger had not used the mark in bad faith.

-8-
 ISCYRA appealed to this Court, which affirmed in part and vacated in part. See ISCYRA v. Tommy Hilfiger,
U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749 (2d Cir.1996). We ruled that the district court had made erroneous and incomplete findings
of fact and remanded for further consideration of whether Hilfiger had willfully infringed ISCYRA's mark. In
particular, we held that the district court should have considered as evidence relevant to determining bad faith
Hilfiger's failure to follow its attorneys' advice to conduct a full search and Hilfiger's continued marketing of the
"Star Class" clothing after ISCYRA had filed suit. Id. at 754.
On remand, the district court again determined that insufficient evidence existed to show that Hilfiger had used
ISCYRA's mark in bad faith. The district court initially allowed Hilfiger to reopen the record to present additional
testimony by Hilfiger's lead counsel, Steven Gursky, relating to the legal advice received by Hilfiger prior to using
ISCYRA's mark. However, in its opinion issued on March 4, 1997, the district court rejected this new testimony in
toto, reasoning that Hilfiger was on notice in the first trial that bad faith was at issue, and should have introduced all
relevant evidence then. The court then considered the two elements deemed important by this Court--the failure to
conduct a full search in contravention of the disclaimer contained in Burstein's letter, and the continued sale of
garments after the commencement of the suit. As to the failure to conduct a full search, the district court evaluated
the disclaimer letter in light of the court's understanding of prevailing industry practice in trademark searches. To
establish industry custom, the district court took judicial notice of facts and testimony from Corsearch v. Thomson
& Thomson, 792 F.Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y.1992), an antitrust case that the district judge had tried in 1991 concerning
trademark search firms. The court found that standard industry practice was to conduct only "knock-out" or "rule-
out" searches of names and symbols in the database of federally registered trademarks before using a contemplated
mark, and that comprehensive or more sophisticated searches were reserved, when ordered at all, for marks that
were seriously being considered for trademark registration. ISCYRA v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 959 F.Supp.
623, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (citing Corsearch, 792 F.Supp. at 311). The court therefore interpreted Burstein's
disclaimer as boilerplate cautionary language, referring to the need to conduct a full search only if Hilfiger intended
to register the term "Star Class" and use it as a stand-alone trademark. As Hilfiger claimed to use the term "Star
Class" only as decoration and not as a stand-alone trademark, the court concluded that "there was no reason for
Hilfiger to order its law firm to undertake a full search," and that its failure to do so was not inconsistent with its
attorneys' advice. ISCYRA, 959 F.Supp. at 627-28.
…

II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, ISCYRA contends that the district court relied on erroneous conclusions of law and fact in making
its determinations. Among other claims, ISCYRA argues (1) that it was improper for the court judicially to notice
facts from Corsearch that were outside the record of this case, and (2) that the court erred in not considering all of
Hilfiger's profits as evidence of damages, rather than just profits from sales made after receipt of ISCYRA's cease-
and-desist letter. Hilfiger cross-appeals the decision to disregard the testimony of its counsel, Steven Gursky, and the
court's failure to consider evidence of Hilfiger's costs contained in one of ISCYRA's exhibits, and evidence of sales
due to the appeal of Hilfiger's mark in calculating damages.

A. Judicial Notice
…
In this case, the district court relied on statements of fact contained in its 1992 Corsearch opinion to establish
prevailing trademark search practices in 1993. 2 This was error. As we stated in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rotches
Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir.1992), "A court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another
court 'not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation
and related filings.' " Id. at 1388 (holding that facts contained in a bankruptcy court order were an improper subject
for judicial notice) (quoting Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.1991)). Facts adjudicated in a
prior case do not meet either test of indisputability contained in Rule 201(b): they are not usually common
knowledge, nor are they derived from an unimpeachable source. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549,
1553 (11th Cir.1994) (holding that findings concerning the defendant's work habits made by another district court in
a separate litigation were not sufficiently indisputable to be Page 71 judicially noticed); Holloway v. Lockhart, 813
F.2d 874, 879 (8th Cir.1987) (declining to allow judicial notice of finding in a related litigation that use of tear gas
against a group of inmates was reasonable and necessary because that fact could only be ascertained by independent
examination and evaluation of witnesses); Ujvari v. United States, 212 F.Supp. 223, 228 (S.D.N.Y.1963) (refusing
to take judicial notice of exchange rates found in previous Tax Court cases because court must independently
determine questions of fact in case before it). 3 The suggestion has also been made that allowing courts to rely on
factual findings from previous cases could render the doctrine of collateral estoppel superfluous, see 21 Charles

-9-
Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5106 at 245 (Supp.1998);
Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553, though this may overstate the case.
Moreover, prevailing trademark search practices may well have changed or developed in the intervening years
between the Corsearch trial and the events at issue in this case. ISCYRA cites to at least one article on the subject,
published in 1994, stating that the "usual" practice for trademark counsel is to conduct a full search once a mark
passes its initial screening. See Glenn A. Gundersen, Trademark Searching: A Practical and Strategic Guide to the
Clearance of New Marks in the United States 17 (1994). Since the industry practice is subject to dispute, ISCYRA is
entitled to "have its 'day in court,' and, through time-honored methods, test the accuracy of [Hilfiger's] submissions
and introduce evidence of its own." Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1086
(2d Cir.1982) (favoring this course to judicial notice where secondary sources are disputed). 4
Hilfiger claims that a remand is unnecessary since the district court relied on Burstein's trial testimony and
prior case law, as well as facts contained in the Corsearch opinion, to ascertain that defendant's minimal trademark
search efforts did not constitute willful infringement. While the district court did consider these other materials, it
used these sources primarily to bolster the conclusions found in the Corsearch opinion. See ISCYRA, 959 F.Supp. at
626, 627-28. For instance, the court evaluated Burstein's testimony in light of its agreement with the trade practices
revealed in Corsearch. Id. at 628. Because the district court did not independently evaluate the significance of this
other evidence, we cannot say that the court would have reached the same conclusions without relying on the
Corsearch findings. We therefore vacate the lower court opinion without reaching the bulk of ISCYRA's other
claims, and remand for further proceedings.
…

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the opinion of the district court, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
---------------
1 Hilfiger's designer admitted at trial to examining books and other materials on sailboat racing which referred to
Star Class racing and Star Class boats while designing the collection. See ISCYRA v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc.,
No. 94 Civ. 2663, 1995 WL 241875, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1995).
2 The court considered such evidence relevant to interpreting the disclaimer contained in Burstein's letter and in
evaluating Hilfiger's response to the letter. While we agree that industry custom is relevant to determining whether
Hilfiger engaged in 'willful blindness' by refusing to conduct a more comprehensive search, such evidence would
not necessarily be dispositive of the question. For instance, even if 'knockout' searches are sufficient in the usual
case, here Hilfiger was aware that it was lifting "authentic details from the sport of competitive sailing." As we said
in ISCYRA I, "Given Hilfiger's awareness that it was copying ... 'from the sport of competitive sailing,' it should
have shown greater concern for the possibility that it was infringing on another's mark." 80 F.3d at 753. We believe
that Hilfiger's failure to conduct a full search therefore must be evaluated not only in light of industry
custom, but also in light of its knowledge that 'Star Class' might be a mark in the yachting context, together
with any other factors that might prove or negate bad faith.
…

- 10 -
Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1998)

STREETWISE MAPS, INC., Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant,

v.
VANDAM, INC., a corporation of the State of New York, and
Steven Meuth, also known as Stephan Van Dam,
Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees.

Docket No. 97-7943.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Decided Oct. 27, 1998.

Before: CARDAMONE, WALKER, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

Streetwise Maps, Inc. had a great idea when it began developing its simplified, foldable, laminated street map.
But, as with most good ideas, imitators were quick to follow. This litigation concerns plaintiff Streetwise's attempt
to eliminate from the marketplace one such imitator's product--defendants' StreetSmart maps. To accomplish that
purpose, plaintiff brought an action against defendants under the Lanham Act and copyright law.
Competitors, by copying and underselling a product's originator, enjoy a "free ride" on an originator's efforts.
Yet, since the common law favors competition, unless a plaintiff can establish that the defendant encroached on its
trademark or copyright, the law will tolerate such conduct. Because plaintiff failed to make out a viable claim for
either trademark or copyright infringement, we affirm the district court's dismissal of its complaint.

…
Factor # 6--Van Dam's Good Faith
This factor examines whether defendants "adopted [their] mark with the intention of capitalizing on plaintiff's
reputation and goodwill and any confusion between [their] and [plaintiff's] product." Lang, 949 F.2d at 583; see also
Arrow Fastener Co., 59 F.3d at 397. The district court found defendants acted in good faith when they adopted the
StreetSmart trademark. Like other map manufacturers, Judge Chin reasoned, defendants probably copied the size
and concept of Streetwise's map, but not in an effort to mislead consumers into believing that they were buying
Streetwise Manhattan. The intent to compete by imitating the successful features of another's product is vastly
different from the intent to deceive purchasers as to the source of the product. See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral,
Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1541 (2d Cir.1992) ("Absent confusion, imitation of certain successful features in another's
product is not unlawful and to that extent a 'free ride' is permitted."). The trial judge concluded that defendants' lack
of bad faith was a "significant factor" in rendering its decision in favor of defendants.
Unlike the issue of actual confusion, Streetwise vigorously disputes this finding on appeal. It declares that
defendants acted in bad faith because they adopted the StreetSmart trademark despite knowing that the trademark
was registered and without first seeking the advice of trademark counsel. Streetwise relies on International Star
Class Yacht Racing Assoc. v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753-54 (2d Cir.1996), to support its
argument. In that case, clothing designer Tommy Hilfiger copied verbatim for his line of sportswear the plaintiff's
trademark, "Star Class," used in yacht racing. Hilfiger limited its trademark search solely to registered or applied-for
federal trademarks, despite its attorney's specific advice that a wider search be conducted. Holding that Hilfiger
acted in bad faith, we stated that its choice not to perform a more thorough trademark search "remind[ed] us of two
of the famous trio of monkeys who, by covering their eyes and ears, neither saw nor heard any evil." See id. at 753-
54.
The instant case is distinguishable. Defendants did not copy an identical trademark as did Hilfiger, but rather
concocted a different name by combining a descriptive word, "street"--commonly used in map products--with
another word they had used in previous Page 746 projects, "smart," to indicate what the user would become if he
purchased the product. See Arrow Fastener Co., 59 F.3d at 397 (stating that a finding of good faith may be
supported by the defendant's selection of a mark that reveals the product's attributes). They did not believe this mark
infringed on plaintiff's because of differences between the two marks. Defendants' failure to perform an official
trademark search, even with the knowledge that plaintiff marketed its maps under the Streetwise name, does not

- 11 -
standing alone prove that they acted in bad faith. Cf. id. ("Prior knowledge of a senior user's trade mark ... may be
consistent with good faith.").
…
Because the determination of good faith, "like many intent issues, is best left in the hands of the trier of
fact," Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 964, we will not disturb as clearly erroneous the finding of defendants' good faith.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

- 12 -
Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1996)

The SPORTS AUTHORITY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
PRIME HOSPITALITY CORP., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 145, Docket 95-7161.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Decided July 23, 1996.

Before MESKILL, MAHONEY, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.

WALKER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff The Sports Authority, Inc. ("TSA") brought this action for violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1051 et seq., and New York's anti-dilution statute, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d, against defendant Prime Hospitality
Corp. ("Prime") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. TSA alleged that Prime's
use of the words "sports authority" in the name of its sports-oriented restaurants and in its advertising and signs both
constituted an infringement of and diluted the value of TSA's registered trademarks. Finding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact remaining for a trier of fact to decide, the district court … granted summary judgment
to Prime and dismissed the action. See Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 877 F.Supp. 124
(S.D.N.Y.1995). Because we believe that genuine issues of material fact exist, we vacate the district court's order
and remand for further proceedings.

…
6. Good Faith.
Under this factor, we look to "whether the defendant adopted its mark with the intention of capitalizing on
plaintiff's reputation and goodwill and any confusion between his and the senior user's product." Lang, 949 F.2d at
583 (quoting Edison Bros. Stores v. Cosmair, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 1547, 1560 (S.D.N.Y.1987)). "Prior knowledge of a
senior user's trade mark does not necessarily give rise to an inference of bad faith and may be consistent with good
faith." Arrow Fastener, 59 F.3d at 397.
As the district court noted, "Prime began the use of marks very similar to the one at issue here ... in 1989, with
no knowledge of TSA's mark." Sports Auth., 877 F.Supp. at 130. In fact, there is no evidence in the record that
Prime had any knowledge of TSA's mark until it received TSA's cease and desist letter in September 1991, five
months after Prime had opened its first "Sports Authority" restaurant.
On the other hand, there is little evidence of good faith on the part of Prime. "Good faith can be found if a
defendant has selected a mark which reflects the product's characteristics, has requested a trademark search or has
relied on the advice of counsel." W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., 984 F.2d at 575. Here there is no dispute that in
adopting the name "Sports Authority Food, Spirits & Sports," Prime neither consulted with an attorney nor
conducted a trademark search, and the use of the words "sports authority," while they reflect the sports-oriented
theme of Prime's restaurants, does not compel a finding of good faith. The evidence also shows that Prime continued
to expand its restaurants and, in particular, advertised on radio under the name "sports authority" after receiving
notice of TSA's use of the mark "The Sports Authority." Taken as a whole, the evidence does not conclusively point
to a finding of either good or bad faith, and this issue, like many intent issues, is best left in the hands of the trier of
fact. See McGregor-Doniger, 599 F.2d at 1137. Therefore, we conclude that the district court, for purposes of
Prime's motion for summary judgment, should have drawn the inference in favor of non-movant TSA.
…
CONCLUSION
The order of the district court granting summary judgment to Prime is vacated and the case is remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

- 13 -
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439 (2nd Cir., 2004)

SAVIN CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
THE SAVIN GROUP, Savin Engineers, P.C., Savin Consultants, Inc. d/b/a Savin Engineers, P.C., and JMOA
Engineering, P.C., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 03-9266.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Decided: December 10, 2004.

Before: MESKILL, MINER, and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

MINER, Circuit Judge.

…
6. Good Faith
The good-faith factor "considers whether the defendant adopted its mark with the intention of capitalizing on
[the] plaintiff's reputation and goodwill and [on] any confusion between his and the senior user's product." W.W.W.
Pharm. Co., 984 F.2d at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants acted in bad faith because (i) Dr. Nivas "had knowledge of [Plaintiff's]
products and services for approximately ten years"; (ii) Savin Engineers "never performed a search or investigation
prior to adopting and launching their trade names incorporating the term SAVIN"; and (iii) Savin Engineers were
aware of Plaintiff's "savin.com domain name prior to registering their thesavingroup.com and savinengineers.com
domains." Therefore, Plaintiff argues, the District Court clearly erred in finding that Defendants did not act in bad
faith.
Notably, however, the District Court also found, in particular, that Defendants:
had no reason to believe that they might be infringing another's marks [,] because they were not copying the
mark from another entity. In fact, [D]efendants' founder was not even aware of [P]laintiff's existence at the time he
adopted his mark, and arrived at the name "Savin" independently by reversing the spelling of his nickname "Nivas."
2003 WL 22451731, at *10. Moreover, as the District Court observed, even if Defendants had conducted a
trademark search, they would have discovered only that the "Savin" mark was registered for photocopiers and
related goods and services and, hence, would have had no reason to believe that using the same name for
professional engineering services would infringe Plaintiff's marks. Id. at *11.
In any event, "failure to perform an official trademark search, ... does not[,] standing alone[,] prove that
[Defendants] acted in bad faith." Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir.1998). Nor is
"[p]rior knowledge of a senior user's trade mark" inconsistent with good faith. See Arrow Fastener, 59 F.3d at 397.
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court was correct in determining that Plaintiff has failed to raise a
material issue of fact regarding Defendants' alleged bad faith.

- 14 -
Star Industries v. Bacardi & Company Ltd., Bacardi, 412 F.3d 373 (Fed. 2nd Cir., 2005)

STAR INDUSTRIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
BACARDI & COMPANY LIMITED, BACARDI U.S.A., and Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 04-0831-CV(L).

Docket No. 04-1753-CV(CON).
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Decided: June 22, 2005.

NEWMAN, POOLER and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

POOLER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Star Industries appeals from a …

6. Bad Faith
Star failed to meet its burden to prove that Bacardi adopted its "O" design in bad faith. Bad faith generally
refers to an attempt by a junior user of a mark to exploit the good will and reputation of a senior user by adopting the
mark with the intent to sow confusion between the two companies' products. See, e.g., Lang, 949 F.2d at 583.
"Selection of a mark that reflects the product's characteristics, request for a trademark search and reliance on the
advice of counsel are factors that support a finding of good faith." Id. Star concedes Anheuser-Busch's good faith,
but contends that Bacardi adopted its "O" design in bad faith. Star does not contend that Bacardi intentionally copied
Star's design, but rather that it was "willfully blind" in that its decision makers knew or should have known of Star's
"O" but failed reasonably to investigate.
As noted by the district court, Bacardi conducted a trademark search prior to adopting its "O" mark. As noted
above, the fact that Bacardi conducted a trademark search would normally be held to militate for a finding that
Bacardi adopted its "O" design in good faith. Star contends, however, that the trademark search was obviously
flawed and that Bacardi's failure to remedy it by ordering a new trademark search is evidence of "willful blindness."
Star contends, accordingly, that Bacardi's reliance on the advice of counsel should not be held, as it normally would
be, to support a finding of good faith, because counsel relied on the clearly flawed search. Bacardi responds that any
flaw in its trademark search is somewhat beside the point, as Star made no attempt to register its "O" design as a
trademark until after the commencement of the instant litigation-no trademark search, no matter how perfect, would
have discovered Star's "O" design trademark.
This Court has never held adoption of a mark with no knowledge of a prior similar mark to be in bad faith even
in the total absence of a trademark search, much less on the basis of an allegedly flawed trademark search. See Savin
Corp., 391 F.3d at 460. Furthermore, in some cases even where a trademark search resulted in knowledge of the
earlier mark, in the absence of additional evidence indicating an intent to promote confusion or exploit good will or
reputation, this Court has found the junior user to be in good faith. See W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 984
F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir.1993), limited on other grounds by Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 46 (2d
Cir.1994).3
… Star has not met its burden of proving bad faith.

- 15 -
24 Hour Fitness Usa v. 24/7 Tribeca Fitness, 447 F.Supp.2d 266 (S.D.N.Y., 2006)

24 HOUR FITNESS USA, INC., Plaintiff,

v.
24/7 TRIBECA FITNESS, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 03 Civ. 4069(RLE).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.
August 7, 2006.

OPINION & ORDER

ELLIS, United States Magistrate Judge.

…
If a defendant "adopted its mark with the intention of capitalizing on plaintiffs reputation and good will and any
confusion between his and the senior user's product," the court may find bad faith, and therefore, a likelihood of
confusion. Lang, 949 F.2d at 583 (quoting Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 1547, 1560
(S.D.N.Y.1987)). Prior knowledge of another's trademark and continued use after notice from the plaintiff may
support a finding of bad faith. Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 258; Stern's Miracle-Gro Prod., Inc. v. Shark Prod., Inc.,
823 F.Supp. 1077, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). If a plaintiffs mark is long-standing and the marks are very similar, a
defendant must provide "a reasonable explanation of its choice [in order] to establish lack of intent to deceive."
Stern's Miracle-Gro, 823 F.Supp. at 1087. Factors that support a finding of good faith include "[s]election of a mark
that reflects the product's characteristics, request for a trademark search and reliance on the advice of counsel."
Lang, 949 F.2d at 583.
…
While 24/7 is charged with constructive knowledge of 24 Hour's trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1072, the
evidence showed that the individuals responsible for choosing the 24/7 mark did not have actual knowledge of 24
Hour's trademark when selecting the 24/7 name. Washington subscribes to the Club Business Industry magazine in
which 24 Hour has been featured regularly, see Tr. at 101-02; PX 546, but this does not clearly demonstrate that he
had previously noted the company's trademark use of "24 Hour." Washington testified that he first heard of 24 Hour
when he saw their logo during a televised 2002 playoff game between the Yankees and the Angels. Tr. at 358, 364-
65.2 24 Hour also points out that Barbara and Adolphus Holden, two of 24/7's employees, stated that they had
previous knowledge about 24 Hour Fitness. JX F at 42; JX G at 11-12, 30. Barbara Holden agreed she had known
about 24 Hour "for awhile," JX G at 11-12, 30, and Adolphus Holden said he knew about the company since it
changed from "Family Fitness" to "24 Hour Fitness," JX F at 42, which could have been around 1995. See Tr. at 32.
However, there was no evidence these employees had any input in creating the name for 24/7.
24/7 did not do a trademark search before adopting the name. After receiving a cease and desist letter from 24
Hour, the company decided to undertake a search and its attorney, Earl Wilson, also a former partner in the 24/7
clubs, found the results inconclusive. JX L at 27-28 ("maybe you could get this name and maybe you can't, we're
just not sure"). Washington and Williams told Wilson that his search was sufficient. Id. at 32, 52.
While this trademark search may have been incomplete, [the Second Circuit] has never held adoption of a
mark with no knowledge of a prior similar mark to be in bad faith even in the total absence of a trademark search,
much less on the basis of an allegedly flawed trademark search.. .. Furthermore, in some cases even where a
trademark search resulted in knowledge of the earlier mark, in the absence of additional evidence indicating an
intent to promote confusion or exploit good will or reputation, th[e] Court has found the junior user to be in good
faith. Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 388 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Because the legal
advice 24/7 received upon conducting a trademark search was inconclusive, the company's decision to continue to
use the name, even in the face of possible litigation, is not evidence of bad faith.
…
The Court is required to consider a defendant's conduct after being notified of an infringement claim. See Int'l
Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger, USA, Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir.1996) (remanding on the
issue of bad faith and finding that the district court gave no consideration to defendant's conduct after litigation was
initiated). In Int'l Star Class, the defendant had copied the name of the plaintiffs yacht racing association word-for-
word, as well as its solid red five-pointed star logo, and applied it to a line of "classic nautical sportswear" with
"authentic details taken from the sport of competitive sailing" and "elements and patterns taken directly from actual

- 16 -
racing sails." Id. at 751. In noting that the district court should have considered the defendant's persistence in using
the mark in the face of litigation as evidence of bad faith, the court stated, "Hilfiger was betting on the fact that
ISCYRA would not prevail in its suit. Hilfiger lost that bet, and should not escape the consequences of its conduct."
Id. at 754.
On its face, 24/7's conduct seems similar in that the company has conducted itself as if it will prevail here.
When given notice of 24 Hour's claim, Williams briefly explored plaintiffs claim by conducting an initial trademark
search, which revealed inconclusive results. 24/7 continued to advertise its gyms, and initiated a website. Williams
then offered to settle for half the cost of litigation, which 24 Hour characterizes as extortion. 24 Hour Brief at 16.
With no prospect of settlement on his terms, Williams dug in his heels and trial ensued. 24/7 presents a number of
statements from Williams and his employees which show his intent to fight. At his deposition, Williams said "[W]e
offered to change our name to 24/7 Gym,3 and you people turned it down, my impression was that you were pigs,
inconsiderate and deserved for me to put a fight up because it was inappropriate and bullying." JX K at 299-300.
One of his employees said Williams did not really care about the name but that "He wants to get paid for it." JX F at
81. Williams admitted that physically changing the name would be easy. Tr. at 212, 215. Williams also testified that
his belief in his position was strengthened when 24 Hour's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied. Id. at
228. Page 285
In any case, Williams's conduct is not as egregious as in Star Class, and arises in a somewhat different factual
context. The infringement in that case was clearly deliberate. Even if Hilfiger assumed its use of the words from the
mark of a sailing company was legal, the fact that the defendant had adopted the plaintiff's logo was virtually
admitted because the company advertised its line of clothing as containing details from competitive sailing. See Int'l
Star Class, 80 F.3d at 752 (district court issued permanent injunction enjoining Hilfiger's use). Hilfiger's trademark
search was only for marks within a clothing classification and did not specify that the company planned to use the
mark on nautical clothing with details from competitive sailing. Id. at 753. Furthermore, Hilfiger went against the
advice of its counsel, who told the company to do a wider search before proceeding. Id. Finally, the court found that
Hilfiger had failed to give a "credible innocent explanation" for the use of the Star Class mark. Id. (citations
omitted).
Here, in contrast, the Court has found that 24/7 has offered a credible and reasonable explanation for its use of
the term 24/7. In addition, 24/7 did not go against the advice of counsel in deciding to persist in testing its rights and
go to trial in this case. Williams's statements lambasting 24 Hour for filing suit against him, while perhaps in poor
taste, do not support a finding that 24/7 adopted its name with intent to trade on 24 Hour's reputation. Instead, they
are consistent with his belief that his use of 24/7 does not infringe and that, if 24 Hour wants to preclude him from
using the term, he should be compensated.
The Court sees Williams's offer to settle for half the cost of litigation, which amounted to a demand of between
$250,000 and $750,000, JX K at 300; Tr. at 224-26, in the same light. A reasonable belief that one is acting within
one's rights may mitigate against a finding of bad faith. See New York State Soc. of Certified Pub. Accountants v.
Eric Louis Assoc., Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 331, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (citing E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del
Gallo Nero, 782 F.Supp. 472, 475 (N.D.Cal. 1992)). On the other hand, failing to consult trademark counsel and
persisting in pressuring a plaintiff to purchase a mark or name can show not only that one's belief is not reasonable,
but also bad faith. Id. Williams did seek counsel's advice by doing a trademark search, which was inconclusive. He
could have pursued further advice, but subsequently obtained counsel to litigate this case on his behalf. He framed
his offer to settle in reference to the costs of litigation, not an unreasonable basis upon which to start if one believes
in one's legal position. Cases in which exorbitant demands contribute to a finding of bad faith involve stronger
additional evidence of intent to confuse. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Comm., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 103
(2d Cir.2001) (company registered 66 domain names after receiving cease and desist letter and and then offered to
sell 16 or more names in a package of around a half million dollars in exchange for plaintiff's domain name); Toys R
Us Inc. v. Abir, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1944, 1948 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (defendants admitted to intending to confuse).
…
To conclude, the Court finds insufficient likelihood of confusion to warrant relief on 24 Hour's claims.
Judgment is therefore entered in favor of 24/7.

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Constellation Brands v. Abbor Hill Associates, 535 F.Supp.2d 347 (W.D. N.Y., 2008)

CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC., Plaintiff

v.
ARBOR HILL ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant.
v.
Nixon Peabody LLP, f/k/a Nixon Hargrave Devans & Doyle LLP, Third-Party Defendant.
v.
Harter, Secrest & Emery LLP, Brian Shaw, and Stephen B. Salai, Fourth-Party Defendants.

No. 02-CV-6498 CJS.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.
February 26, 2008.

DECISION AND ORDER

CHARLES. J. SIRAGUSA, District Judge.

BACKGROUND
This action primarily involves a dispute between Constellation and AHA over the use of three federally-
registered wine trademarks containing the word "arbor." Specifically, AHA owns the trademark "Arbor Hill", while
Constellation owns the marks "Arbor Valley" and "Arbor Mist." Unless otherwise indicated, the following are the
undisputed facts of the case.
...
Constellation registered the name Arbor Mist as a federal trademark in 1998. Prior to adopting the Arbor Mist
mark, Constellation had its trademark attorneys perform a trademark search for the name "Arbor Mist," to see
"whether [that name was] available for use as a brand name." (Fondiller Dep. at 16, 18). Constellation did not,
however, have its attorneys specifically render an opinion as to whether the name Arbor Mist would infringe the
Arbor Hill mark, though it was aware of the nearby Arbor Hill Grapery. (Fondiller Dep. at 53-54, 60).
On or about January 13, 1999, AHA applied for trademark registration for the name Arbor Hill for wine, which
the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") granted on June 27, 2000, although as already mentioned, AHA had been
using the Arbor Hill mark for wine since at least 1989.
…
Good faith
The sixth Polaroid factor asks "whether the defendant adopted its mark with the intention of capitalizing on
plaintiff s reputation and, goodwill and any confusion between his and the senior user's product." W.W.W. Pharm.
Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d at 575. In that regard, "[g]ood faith can be found if a defendant has selected a
mark which reflects the product's characteristics, has requested a trademark search or has relied on the advice of
counsel." Id. Mere knowledge of the senior user's similar mark does not necessarily establish bad faith. Id.; see also,
Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., Ltd., 412 F.3d at 388 ("[I]n some cases even where a trademark search resulted in
knowledge of the earlier mark, in the absence of additional evidence indicating an intent to promote confusion or
exploit good will or reputation, this Court has found the junior user to be in good faith.") (citations omitted).
Here, AHA concedes that Constellation was not attempting to benefit from Arbor Hill's goodwill when it
selected the Arbor Mist name. (Brahm Reply Affidavit, ¶ 63) ("[G]iven that Constellation intended to market Arbor
Mist nationally, it is apparent that Constellation could not have expected that the goodwill associated with Arbor
Hill in western New York, would help Constellation sell bottles of Arbor Mist elsewhere in the country.").
Nevertheless, AHA insists that Constellation acted in bad faith, since it was aware of the Arbor Hill mark when it
selected the Arbor Mist mark. However, it is undisputed that neither Encherman nor Vlosky was aware of Arbor Hill
when they selected the name Arbor Mist. See, Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Ltd., 412 F.3d at 389 (Finding no
evidence of bad faith, where certain "regional vice presidents" of defendant's company were aware of plaintiff's
mark, but individuals who actually selected defendant's mark were not.). To the contrary, Encherman and Vlosky
selected the word "arbor" because of its association with wine, and the word "mist" because it went well with the
product's frosted bottle and suggested "refreshment." AHA denies that the word "arbor" is necessarily connected

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with wine, and the Court agrees. However, it is also clear that, to a certain extent, the word "arbor" is suggestive of
grapes and wine in the same way that the word "orchard" is suggestive of apples. Consequently, the name Arbor
Page 370 Mist reflects the product’s characteristics. Finally, Constellation had already been using the word “arbor”
as part of its Arbor Valley trademark for over a decade. Overall, Constellation’s prior knowledge of the Arbor Hill
mark does not indicate bad faith.
AHA also contends that Constellation acted in bad faith by “fail[ing], to seek a legal opinion as to whether
Arbor Mist would infringe the Arbor Hill mark.” (AHA Memo of Law p. 17). However, it is again undisputed that
Constellation conducted a trademark search for the name “Arbor Mist.” The fact that Constellation did not obtain a
specific opinion concerning the Arbor Hill mark does not indicate bad faith. See, Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co.
Ltd., 412 F.3d at 388 (“[I]n some cases even where a trademark search resulted in knowledge of the earlier mark, in
the absence of additional evidence indicating an intent to promote confusion or exploit good will or reputation, this
Court has found the junior user to be in good faith.”); see also, Juicy ZCouture, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., No. 04
Civ.7203(DLC), 2006 WL 1012939 at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.19, 2006) (“Failure to perform a trademark search,
standing alone, does not prove bad faith, even where a defendant is aware of other products using similar names.”)
Therefore, the Court finds that this Polaroid factor favors Constellation.
…
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, AHA's motion for summary judgment is granted as to Constellation's Second
Cause of Action for infringement, and is otherwise denied. Constellation's summary judgment motion is denied in its
entirety.
…
8. AHA presented evidence that 15 such affidavits were filed during Fondiller's tenure leading up to the filing of the
subject motions, however, only ten of those Section 15 affidavits pre-date the filing of the Section 15 affidavit at
issue in this case. (Salai Reply Declaration, Exhibit CCC). Fondiller, who had been employed by Constellation since
1994, described his responsibilities, in relevant part, as follows: "I Was responsible [for trademark matters].... When
the company desires to name a new product, potential names are submitted to me or to my secretary, and they're
referred to outside counsel for searching and clearance. Additionally, when we notice names that infringe, in our
view, our marks, I'm the one that instructs outside counsel to act or not as the case may be. And I am the One that
interacts with outside counsel on normal maintenance matters, whether trademarks to be renewed or allowed to lapse
or whatever may be needed." (Fondiller Deposition pp. 8-9).

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